''Why did Britain fail to confront Germany over the occupation of the Czech city of Prague in March 1939, but declare war on Germany six months later over the threat to the largely German city of Denzig?"

However, the Polish guarantee has been deemed worthy of criticism, and many people at the time felt that Britain should not pledge support to a country with a right-wing, military dictatorship. The foreign minister of Poland, Benes, was considered untrustworthy and furthermore, the only ally in Poland's recent past had been Germany. When it is considered that Britain did not offer such help to Prague, whose invasion was a violation of the Munich agreement, it is clear that there must have been stronger reasons for the British government to take such action.

Political opinion had been changed to a great extent after the fall of Czechoslovakia to German occupation in 1939. They had seen that appeasement hadn't worked to control Hitler's expansionist plans, as he had clearly disregarded the Munich agreement made in 1938. This gave Hitler the Sudetenland but protected the rest of Czechoslovakia territory. It's at this point Chamberlain had clearly stated he would not go to war over Czechoslovakia. His reluctance to risk British men for the Czech cause may have been influenced by Chamberlain's personal view of Czechoslovakia as an artificial state.

Yet a much stronger influence in the British decision to go to war over Poland and not Czechoslovakia, was the opinion of the British public. The fall of Czechoslovakia had also brought about a huge shift in the attitude of the public. They were shocked that Hitler had not only ignored the Munich agreement, but also the joint declaration he had made with Chamberlain to avoid the use of force to settle his grievances. They had been angered by Chamberlain's mild action when Czechoslovakia was occupied in March 1939, and called for stronger actions and words from those who represented the British people. This, along with Chamberlain's own anger at events, persuaded him to announce his determination to stand against the German dictator in future acts of aggression. That next threat of aggression from Hitler came when he made moves towards gaining Denzig. This is another reasons why in this particular event, Chamberlain felt little other option but to declare war on Hitler in the event of Danzig's invasion. It is still doubtful, however, that a shift in political and public opinion alone would have been enough to persuade Britain to take a stronger line regarding Poland. In the past, military weakness had been used to justify Britain's policy of appeasement. In the case of the Czech crisis, Britain had felt they weren't in a strong enough military position to declare war. During 1939, and by the time of Germany's demands for Danzig, Britain was in a much more secure position, in terms of her military and defence. The production of aircraft had increased significantly, from 240 a month in 1938 to 660 a month by September 1939. By this time, the radar system in Britain had been significantly developed, and there was much more hope of Britain's being able to defend herself in the event of an air raid. Further air raid precautions had also been started by 1939. Britain was therefore in a much more confident and secure position to be making threats to Germany with the Polish guarantee than she had been just 6 months earlier.

The matter of Britain's military position is bound irascibly to the international situation, and Britain's status within the world. As a result of her comparative military weakness when the German forces invaded Czechoslovakia, Britain could not use force to help Czechoslovakia lest she encourage Italy and Japan to declare war on her in this time of increased vulnerability. Britain could not risk a war on three fronts at this stage. However, the situation had changed to a significant degree within 6 months. Why Britain signed the Polish guarantee, Italy was bound to support Germany due to the 'Pact of Steel' military alliance. However, when Britain declared war on Germany, they did so in the knowledge that Italy had decided to disregard this alliance and remain neutral. This potentially eliminated one opponent. In the case of Japan, Britain had recently averted a war with her after the Japanese blockade of Tientsin had raised tensions yet during the summer, relations had improved somewhat, and the threat from Japan had also eased. Again, we can see that Britain's military position was far ore stable by this point.

Moreover, it could be said that Britain's allies were also stronger, adding to her military confidence. France and Britain's alliance had been strengthened by Chamberlain's agreement to support the French if they needed to defend their territory. Arguably, this was before Germany had invaded Prague, but France's reluctance to help Czechoslovakia was also apparent - during the Czech crisis in 1938 she had tried to free herself from her obligations to protect Czechoslovakia, as stated in the Franco-Czechoslovakian alliance. However, France pledged full support to Britain, offering Poland the same guarantee, when Denzig was threatened. This put Britain in a stronger position to make the threats to Germany, which eventually led to war. Britain also had a stronger ally in Poland then they would have had in Czechoslovakia, who had been to weak to withstand German forces.

In conclusion, it can be seen that while many in Britain may have preferred Britain to have gone to war to hep Czechoslovakia earlier that year, Britain was realistically in a stronger position to take on such a responsibility during the Polish issue. When Poland was threatened, Chamberlain and Britain knew they could no longer let Hitler get away with his expansionism. Hitler's previous grievances could have been regarded as justified, and his actions simply trying to rectify the wrongs of Versailles. To a point this was even true when Germany invaded Prague. Poland was, however, a different matter, and any attack against her could not be excused as the right of the German people to exact change. They therefore must endeavour to stop him, even f this meant war. When the Polish guarantee was made, it was unsure whether war would materialise, or Hitler would back down. As it happened, Britain accepted her responsibility to these obligations when Hitler did invade Poland on the 1st September 1939, with her declaration of war on the 3rd September 1939, with the support of France, Poland and the Dominions.

Examinaers comments

Clear and sustained focus with excellent supporting detail. 55/60 Level 5