General Haig - Butcher or Hero?

At first, the tanks were not integrated in the British war tactics. There was no provision made after land gains. As the tank was not a defensive weapon, any gains it did make were quickly swallowed up. The slowness and unreliability of early tanks prevented them from being a decisive weapon in their own right. They were unable to exploit any success that they achieved. They were exhausting to operate and, with the exception of the French Renault light tank, deployed their armament in their hulls rather than in a rotating turret. Additionally, the Germans were able to capture tanks, and so were able to get their own plans for the weapon. They sent the blueprints off to their engineers and before long; they had their own variation of the tank.

However, the tanks had achieved enough to secure their place on the battlefield, and development continued during the inter-war era.

Terry Norman, in Source 7 is taking the opposite view point, by sympathising with Haig's mindset, quoting Haig in saying that 'it would be folly not to use any means at my [his] disposal', opposing source 6. Also, it has been said that '7 would have given the edge'. At the time, the French were having considerable trouble holding at Verdun against the Germans, and so they called on their allies, the British to relieve the stress, by fighting the Germans on a different front, the Somme. It was essential that the British won this battle, both in terms of making ground on the Germans, as well as demonstrating to the French that they would do whatever was in their power to aid their allies. Haig would have felt it would be necessary to honour the allegiance, as this could be beneficial during and after the war. So, with justification, he called on the tanks to 'surprise [the Germans] to break the stalemate'.

The Battle of Cambrai was notable for the success with which the British employed tanks. On November 20, 1917, about 400 British tanks, supported by infantry moved forward into the German lines, achieving an advance of 8 kilometres. In a sweepingly successful start to the battle, 12 miles of the German front was breached, with the capture of around 10,000 German prisoners, plus many gains in guns and munitions. We can see here the start of Haig's revised tactics, with the 'stepped attacks'.

The Battle of Cambrai ended more or less where it began, but it taught both sides a valuable lesson. It demonstrated the mobility and striking power of the tank, but it also emphasized the necessity for prompt and effective reinforcement with fresh reserves to follow up and exploit initial gains.

I feel that Terry Norman makes a fair point, as the tank was more than just a theoretically devastating weapon. On the battlefield, the tank would have been a very formidable weapon, with impenetrable armour plating, fearsome fire-power and its ability to cover harsh terrain. And it was certainly the answer to barbed wire and other defences put into place by the Germans to slow British advances. This would have delivered a huge blow on German morale. Also, back at home, seeing pictures of the potentially war winning weapon would have greatly strengthened the morale back at home; giving support from the public. Pictures of the tanks would have been shown in the cinemas, which made the viewers think they had a chance of winning, so recruitment went up. After reconsideration, the tank at the time would have seemed a justified course of action. However, after a while, the Germans eventually realised the tanks' flaws, finding strategies for defeating the tanks, and also creating blue prints for their own tanks.

Also, I believe strongly that Haig wasn't at fault for using the tanks at that stage of the war, but it was the way they were used. It was thought that if the artillery bombarded the enemies defences, the tanks would be able to steam right through them. In reality, the artillery shells created giant craters, and turned up mud in which the eventually the tanks would get stuck, or 'bogged down' until they were 'knocked out' with relative ease by the Germans.

*Question 5: These Sources are taken from a novel, a song, and a poem. How reliable are they as evidence about the role of generals during the war? Explain your answer.

All three sources are biased against Haig, as they are all written by world war one soldiers, who would have been very resentful of Haig. However, they can show some elements of truth, and it was a good way of getting through censorship. They show the actual feelings of the men and what they thought at the time of their commander.

I feel that source 8 is the most reliable of the three. This is because it is not being used as fiction, but the described events actually took place. To write novel, most or all facts will be taken into account, but sources 9 and 10 are a song and a poem. In these mediums, the writers may 'twist' the events in some ways, using poet's justice. However minor this is, the account may give a different impression than it should be. Therefore, the chances are that sources 9 and 10 are not reliable; just as source 8 could be, if the writer played with the facts to make it more interesting. Source 8 shows a war of attrition, where 'Dead and wounded were carried to the rear, and food and munitions were brought to the front'. This is much generalised, and is not far wrong. Michael Foreman also likens this process to 'clearing the table after dinner, ready for the generals' next game of soldiers'. However, to the contrary, the novel by Michael Foreman was written in 1989 and facts could be distorted easily over time. Also, it is not a primary source, thus flawing my view that source 8 is reliable in some ways.

Carrying on my previous point that the authors of sources 9 and 10 being able to twist information emanating reservations about the reliability of the sources. Also, both poems have been written post-1917; after such disastrous battles such as Arras, the Somme & Verdun. Therefore, they will be very downbeat about warfare from the start.

Sassoon is particularly sceptical of the tactics employed by Haig; 'but he did for them both by his plan of attack'. This can be explained through poor tactics which were repeated badly, showing Haig as incompetent in his duties as general. We see that Haig is still using tactics from the '1900 Cavalry Training Manual'. While recovering at Craig Lockhart War Hospital he met the poet Wilfred Owen. Sassoon encouraged him to write in a more direct, colloquial style. Wilfred's poetry is likened to Sassoon's in that they both criticise the war heavily: 'What passing-bells for these who die as cattle?' (Anthem for Doomed Youth). However, both poets were injured in respective battles, and have a history of vengeance. Sassoon agrees with both sources 8 and 9 that Haig is 'cheery' before the battle, with no element of guilt. This reflects the image given in source 8; of warfare being a game. '... the generals' next game of soldiers' (but, this phrase has been used for dramatic effect). This poem also agrees with source 9, as it takes the perspective of a soldier at the front. However, unlike source 9, Sassoon does not accuse Haig of anything, but delicately articulates his ignorance. This suggestion of ignorance is also shown in source 6, when David Evans, who takes a critical view of Haig. 'He was advised to use them... Sadly, twenty-eight broke down...' He uses the word 'sadly' rather sarcastically to put his point over. Historian John Laffin agrees with these sources, seeing Haig as a 'butcher' when he says that 'If you believe heavy casualties are inevitable, heavy casualties will be inevitable'. But then, Gary Sheffield refutes this, saying: 'In that type of warfare, casualties are bound to be huge'.

Source 10 I feel is more reliable that source 9 as evidence as it attempts to empathise, but it is less reliable than source 8 because it is constricted to a rhyming pattern, so the writer can obscure the facts through poet's licence.

Source 9 emphasised the narrow perspective of the front-line soldiers. It focuses on Haig, but in a condescending manner. 'With the old commander safely in the rear' and 'thinks he's very brave'; whilst those who served under him 'Are dead and in their grave'. In a sense, this point of view is warranted, but it was also quite essential for the general to stay behind the line for numerous reasons. The general should have no personal outlook of the war, and should have a much wider perspective of the war. The privates would have no idea of battle plans, and would only see their 200metres of trench. They would merely see the disease, mud and seemingly no end to the war. The soldiers also have the opinion that their commander 'boasts and skites' about his victories. This becomes true after the war, when Haig received £100,000, and was made an Earl; whereas the former soldiers found themselves out of work and were reduced to poverty and unemployment. Source 9 clearly would not be reliable as evidence about the role of the general, as would not source 2 & 3 either (I'm very bitter, always will be'.)

Question 6a: What impression do sources 11, 12 and 13 give of Haig's ability as a General?

Source 11 has been written by a Historian, and so has accurate details of Haig as a general. It shows that 'Foch was appointed overall allied commander on the western front'. People didn't think much of Haig, after his infamous losses at Passchendaele, the Somme, and Verdun (to name a few), but he still collaborated well with Foch. He had been demoted by Lloyd George, who according to Haythornthwaite, 'sought to establish greater control over Haig'. If Haig had not collaborated well with Foch, he would have been demoted further, and France would have had been able to exercise even more control than before.

We can see this, when after the Ludendorff offensive of 1917, Haig sees a weakness it the German strategies. He realises that the Germans were not using a 'stepped attack'. They were breaking through the Allied lines, and then carrying on without taking their less mobile heavy artillery. As a result, the gains they did make were quickly swallowed up, as seen in the Ludendorff offensive. He then realises that he needs to change his tactics, which would eventually work with considerable gains. Haig was responsible for the 'defeat of the German army on the western front'.

Source 13 is a tribute to the British army and to Haig, written by Marshal Foch. It shows a favourable view of Haig. 'The victory was indeed complete, thanks to ... their Commander-in-Chief'. Foch thinks that Haig played a big part in their victory over Germany.

Source 13, in correspondence with his wife shows Haig to have prudence in terms of the Treaty of Versailles' handling of Germany. He knows that treating Germany in this manner is just 'laying up troubles for the future', and that if you treat the Germans badly, you may 'encourage... revenge'. He knew what to do to stop aggression targeted towards you. This is a good observation from a tactical and political point of view, showing that Haig is a competent General.

Question 6b: Why is the impression so different from that expressed in sources 8, 9 and 10?

In a letter to his wife in November 1918 (after war ended), we see that Haig has put considerable thought into the treating of Germany after the war. So much so, that he realises that the treaty of Versailles is actually 'merely laying up troubles for the future'. This refutes Foreman. Who claims war for the generals is a 'game of soldiers', and feel that the follow-on from the war is nothing to do with them. Haig shows insight into the peace keeping process. Sources 9 and 10 are also refuted. They claim that Haig does not care for the lives of his men (e.g. "he did for them both with his plan of attack"). Source 13 shows that Haig feels that peace was necessary, and therefore shows that he wants to prevent any more loss of life. Obviously, as Haig is gifted with foresight, he can be perceived as a competent general both in and out of war.

Marshal Foch has great admiration for Haig. He seems to hold the view that even after Haig had been openly demoted by Lloyd George, Haig's ability as general was not affected by the verdict. Others in such a position would not have been so cooperative. This shows that Haig was a worthy general. Source 11 states that Haig was still able to 'collaborate well with Foch'. Foch obviously held Haig in high regard when he talks about Haig's 'most successful period...in the final defeat of the German army', his 'grim determination', and his 'organisational skills'. Source 8, by Foreman likens the battles of world war one as a 'game of soldiers', played out by the generals. As it was, a general should not have any personal outlook, and they should not feel for ach soldier and their families. If he did, it would cloud his judgement, making him a bad general. Christopher Martin takes on a very narrow viewpoint, accusing the generals of staying 'safely in the rear' thinking that 'he's very brave'. The song has been made up by privates in the war, who held the view that whilst the soldiers were going out and dying for their country; their generals were residing in luxury, thinking that they're 'very brave'. They obviously had a narrow perspective of the generals. As aforementioned, it was not in the general's interest to be in the front line. This could hinder planning for the war. Source 10 damns the organisational ability of the generals and their poor tactics when it says 'but he did for them both by his plan of attack'.

Marshal Foch takes the opposite viewpoint. He thinks that Haig's 'organisational ability played a conspicuous part in the final defeat of the German army'. After all that had been said about Haig's supposedly poor tactics, Foch refutes this, inferring that Haig's good tactics resulted in the Allies' success.

This refutes sources 9 and 10, as they give the impression that the generals were incompetent, and cared not for their massive losses ('He boasts and skites... thinks he's very brave'). Also, Foch's views of Haig refute these negative allegations straight away. The privates knew relatively little about those of superior ranks, and so assumed that the generals sat in their chateaus, drinking copious amount of wine. They would have thought when they were surrounded by death and mud in the trenches that some people would have to be on the good end of it. We see, actually, that the generals did feel for their men, when Haig says to his wife in source 4, 'I feel quite sad'. Fortunately, the generals did not have too much of a personal outlook, as if they did then their judgment could be clouded by their mourning, and it could have catastrophic results on the war effort.

These sources highlight the differences between the privates and their generals. The two parties knew very little about each other, and on principle only communised with those of the same stature. The soldiers could not understand why they were making little or no progress. The generals had to couple battles with losses, and soldiers as statistics, as without doing so, they could not fulfil their duties.

Question 7: John Terraine claims that the allied victories of 1918 were gained 'against overwhelming odds' and that 'the Allied leaders deserve more credit than they had been given'. From all sources and your own knowledge, do you agree?

During the war, the allies (Britain especially) organised a naval blockade of German ports with amazing success. The aim was to cut off as much food, trade and raw materials into the country as. Germany's economy suffered greatly from the blockade. Without money coming in, the Germans were not able to fund their war effort as well as they could. By 918, riots were breaking out all over the country in desperation. The civilian population wanted to pull out of the war completely; such was the affect of their plight.

With very little food coming into the country, the average German was only living on 1,000 calories per day. It would be no surprise that Spanish Influenza hit epidemic height in 1918; with nearly 500,000 civilian lives taken. It hit especially badly on the German side of the trenches, and at one point there were more Germans soldiers being killed by Spanish Influenza than by the allies! In comparison, the Influenza took comparatively little allied lives. The German army lost a lot of support during this period mainly because of the sheer amount of civilians that had died because the government were funding war and not still concentrating on public health. This made the allied overall victory over Germany far easier to come by.

The next factor which implies that the allies had a relatively easy time of it was in April 1917 America declared war on Germany. At first this declaration changed little as America had already been supplying the Allies with war materials. However, it did mean that all of America's vast supplies of manpower, materials, money and technology were now available for the Allies to draw upon. Although American troops did not go into action until 1 June 1918, they were fresh and not weary of fighting like the other nations involved. Morale was greatly affected, and the allies, not least the British were in dire need of such emancipation after great losses against the Germans in battles such as the Somme, Verdun, Arras and Ypres. On the other side, the German morale was affected in the opposite way, as they were now faced by fresh, well equipped troops from a world superpower.

When World War I began in August 1914, the Italian government brushed aside the allied powers and proceeded to support the central powers. Subsequently, after having signed the secret Treaty of London with the Allied powers, Italy declared war on Austria and Turkey, and then declared war against Germany about one year later. The central powers lost the assets of Italy's men and supplies, and suffered a good deal of morale loss as a result. Although they did not play a major role in the overall allied victory, it was a loss for Germany and a gain for the allies, making the odds easier for the allies.

During the war, new technology was developed to the allies' favour. Although tanks had first been used during the battle of the Somme they were unreliable and often broke down. In August 1918, however, they were to provide the Allies with an important advantage when 400 tanks were used to break through the German lines at Amiens. During this battle 800 aeroplanes supported the tanks. Through the course of the war the use of aeroplanes changed from their initial role in reconnaissance to an active role in battles through the dropping of bombs and firing of machine guns.

Finally, we see that not only were British tactics often inexcusable, German tactics could be just as bad. Erich Ludendorff was Germany's chief strategist during World War I, and it was he who realised that if Germany was to win the war they had to deliver a knock-out blow to the Allies before American troops arrived. In March 1918 he therefore launched 'Operation Michael'. This operation entailed three fresh armies of Germany's top storm troops break through the stalemate at the western front. This tactic worked exceptionally, and the offensive army broke about 50 miles into enemy territory in just 3 days. However, this did not last, and this plan ended in failure. After their extraordinary breakthrough, the Germans eagerly pursued further into the allied land, leaving behind their heavy artillery. Without their artillery, they were susceptible to allied attack and suffered heavy losses.

On top of this, the troops having travelled and fought so far became tired and hungry. After running out of supplies, they started to loot British supplies. However, in doing so they lingered too long a time. The allied forces promptly swamped the susceptible German soldiers, inflicting losses of up to 1 million soldiers.

There is a lot of evidence to prove that the war was not won "against overwhelming odds", but now I am also to discuss the evidence to the contrary.

In March 1917, revolution broke out in St Petersburg. Shortages of supplies led to strikes & riots in the city, and law & order broke down. The Russian army mutinied and refused to help. Tsar Nicholas II admitted defeat & abdicated. Out of the confusion, a group of communists known as Bolsheviks established themselves. Seeing that they were spending extensive amounts of money on the war whilst citizens were starving on the streets, the Bolsheviks sought to sign an armistice with the central powers, handing over Estonia & Lithuania to them. Before revolution tore through Russia causing it to drop out of the war, the Russians had been keeping up the fight on an eastern front. This had worked to divide the German army into two, between the eastern front, and a western front held up by a British and French coalition. Now, with the Russians out of the equation, Germany was able to concentrate its efforts on the western front. They rapidly redeployed their men, reinforcing their positions. With them, came their supplies. Also, through the use of Poland at Brest-Litovsk, more supplies were transported for use in the conflicts. This had more than one effect, not only did this severely weaken the allied efforts, but also caused huge morale low among allied troops, triggering poor performances. Even after such a shift of power on the western front, the allies still struggled through and eventually won. This seems indeed that they won against overwhelming odds.

In attempts to break the stalemate of the western front, enormous casualties were entailed. There were many major conflicts lost before the final victory. When the British attacked on the River Somme, there were over 500,000 casualties. On the first day alone, 60,000 British soldiers were killed. In 1917, Britain once again tried to break through the German lines at Passchendaele; there were half a million casualties. At Gallapoli landings on 25 April were made by British and French troops. A stalemate, such as the campaign had been intended to avoid, spread across the Peninsula and the frustrations of trench warfare were soon made worse by widespread sickness, monotonous food, trying weather and putrefying corpses. With few options remaining but to dig in for a difficult winter, in October the British government began to consider the need for evacuation. 46,000 allied troops had been killed during the fighting on land from a total of 252,000 casualties. Although the Ottoman Turks suffered around 300,000 casualties, the failed campaign gained little, & it blemished Kitchener's & Churchill's reputations. These bad tactics were summed up by Siegfried Sassoon; 'he did for them... by his plan of attack'.

One of the more spectacular successes of the war (by any belligerent), the Battle of saw combined Austro-Hungarian and German forces decisively break through the Italian line along the northern Isonzo, catching the Italian defenders entirely by surprise. The scale of the Italian defeat at Caporetto led to both a change in government and the dismissal of their Chief of Staff. Over the course of this battle, there were 300,000 Italian casualties, 90% of which were prisoners of war. On another front, Turkey was also doing well during their first couple of years of engagement. The battle of Gallipoli highlights this. The advances of these two nations' armies on the allies show that the allies had more than enough to contend with. The allies had not just German advances to confront on the western front, but also Turkey and Austria-Hungary.

These failures gave a devastating blow to allied morale of the time. The soldiers thought that there was no end to the war, other than by their own deaths. Sources 2 & 3 reflect on this, and criticise Haig harshly, calling him a 'butcher' and a 'murderer', and claim that he 'never cared for men's lives'. They hated him for his seemingly appalling tactics, which caused the death and destruction that was before them. Source 8 shows resentment towards Haig, suggesting that the generals' mentality towards war was that is was just a game, and that good tactics weren't high on their agendas. Source 10 even goes as far as branding the general and his staff as 'incompetent swine'!

We see that the tactical decisions were based on a protocol of attacking mentality, involving honourably running & screaming towards the enemy with bayonets, followed by a glorious, sweeping charge of cavalry. ('Forward, Joe Soaps army, marching without fear'). These tactics from the '1900 Cavalry Training Manual' (on which Haig based his tactics at first), unfortunately did not work, when faced with fearsome machineguns, barbed wire, and a well equipped German army. Another aspect that was in the German's favour was that their trenches had been built suitable for the kind of warfare. German trenches were built using concrete, with formidably placed firing steps, and machine gun nests. In contrast, the Allied trenches were made hastily, using sandbags and mud for the sides. Also they were not well drained. The Germans were pro-defensive. They would not run towards the Allies with bayonets to get totally obliterated. Instead they sat back and let the Allies wear themselves down on their machine guns and artillery. They also set up barbed wire, through which soldiers would have to force their way through before facing the Germans.

A clear example of the allies being unable to integrate new weaponry & technology into their tactics were the tanks. For example, in their trial run at the Somme, '28 broke down before they got there' as well as this, 'thirty-two scurried into the mud and were soon bogged down or knocked out'. There was no provision made after land gains, and as the tank was not a defensive weapon, any gains it did make were quickly swallowed up.

When presented with the machine gun, the British High Command could see no real use for the weapon that was demonstrated to them (by Hiram Maxim). Some officers even regarded the weapon as an improper form of warfare!

The generals were so slow to adapt to new tactics used by the enemy at the start of the war that nearly 1 million casualties were sustained due to the inexplicable unchanging tactics of the world war one generals. In these conditions, the allied forces really were facing overwhelming odds.

It was not until after the Ludendorff offensive, that the allies started to integrate weapons and tactics into their war strategies.

I personally feel that the odds for and against the allies winning the war shifted throughout the war. At the start, I feel that the allies were trying to fight against overwhelming odds. This is because at first, they were being lead by incompetent generals. The quote 'lions led by donkeys' really did apply to this stage of the war, as men were being sent to their deaths by their commanders unnecessarily. This shifted however, by around 1917, when the allies gained the support of both Italy and America. We also saw that Haig and his staff began to realise what tactics needed to be altered, and utilised this to great effect. This greatly eased the odds to which the allies were facing, and after the Spanish Influenza wiping out many German soldiers, the allies were not facing overwhelming odds to winning the war.

John Terraine also claimed that 'the allied leaders deserve more credit than they had been given'. Just like the previous claim, there is lots of evidence to back this up and to refute this. Firstly, I will discuss this evidence to refute this assertion.

It is a fact that the men in service under Haig loathed him. They suffered low morale, and were faced with the daunting reality that they would wake up the next day in atrocious, squalid conditions, in which they were living and fighting. This environment involved disease, the rancid smell of decaying bodies, the constant pounding of artillery shells and mud everywhere (as described by David Evans: '...scurried into the mud'). Fred Pearson goes as far to accuse Haig, saying that he does not 'think he knew what a trench was'. This made himself and millions of other soldiers serving under him 'very bitter'. As a result, should Haig not be at the end of every defamatory allegation thrown at him...? Look at how he made his troops dwell in such dreadful conditions.

This brings the argument on to his supposedly shocking tactics. It has been said that Haig base his tactics on the 1900 Cavalry Training Manual, and these outdated tactics were made a mockery of by the superior German weaponry. For example, in the early stages of the war, Haig believed that his men should run in a feat of nobility towards the enemy with a bayonet. Then after the opposition had been torn apart by the infantry attack, a glorious cavalry charge would follow suit. These failed in entirety, for obvious reasons. It was not only this, but Haig seemed to repeat the bad tactics he had used in battles such as the Somme, and Passchendaele. He was incredibly slow to adapt to new tactics, let alone integrate weaponry. Really, at this time, men like Fred Pearson were quite justified in calling him the 'biggest murderer of the lot'.

Often, it is dubious that he was such a disciplined commander as pointed out in sources 11 and 12. Especially when we see that he did not obey instructions himself. He 'ignored the counsel' offered to him, when advised not to employ tanks at the Somme. He strongly believed that it would take men's lives to beat the enemy, and he was not afraid of making difficult choices. To his men, he would be labelled a 'butcher', which in some ways is fair enough, and he certainly could be viewed a 'murderer'.

What happened after the war made a definite detrimental affect of his former soldiers' view of him. He returned from the war unscathed, with vast crowds cheering him as he was paraded down the streets. But then, according to a historian, John Laffin, they 'would have cheered for Charlie Chaplin' and were actually 'cheering for the end of the war, not for Haig'. He was then granted an earl ship, and he received £100,000. His men, however, returned to bankruptcy and unemployment. The former soldiers would have viewed that as both they, and Haig participated in the victory over Germany, it was unfair of the awarders to remunerate Haig alone, and condemn them to poverty. Even if he was eventually a war winning general, those who 'really did the job' should have taken as much credit as Haig did. This is summed up by Fred Pearson: 'I know what I'd have given him...'

Now, I am to discuss whether John Terraines' theory was indeed justified. There does seem to be extensive proof that the generals of the war did deserve more credit, but that does not mean that this claim is any more conclusive.

The main reason why Haig was reviled by many is that, in their opinion, he made intolerable losses during battle. However, to make a fairer judgment, we must try to ascertain our views from a wider perspective. Like many other generals of the time, he would have taken the vast majority of his battlefield knowledge from either the academy or from a war textbook. He would have been taught an attacking mentality, not to hold back and be pro-defensive. This is true of nearly all of the allied high command. What was really needed was to be pro-defensive, and let the enemy come to you. This way, you could counter strategies more easily, and improve conditions for soldiers. Unfortunately, this way of thinking did not convince the allied generals until near the end of the war; and was used well in battles such as Cambrai and of the Hindenburg line.

As a result of more advanced weaponry and technology, heavy losses were inevitable on both sides. The generals were accused of being reckless and uncaring for their men's lives because of the sheer number of dead under their command. Peter Fisher, in source 2, says Haig 'never cared for men's' lives', and Foreman likens the war to the 'generals'... game of soldiers'. He uses the word 'game' to imply that the generals even enjoyed warfare. When Haig, in correspondence with his wife, states that he feels 'quite sad', the past argument is entirely disproved.

In order to do his duty, it was necessary for a general to control the war from a remote location. This way, they would be able to strategise using a wider perspective. If they had become personally involved, thinking about the men's well-being, they would certainly have been incompetent in their duties. The soldiers, criticising the generals for staying behind the lines, are disparaging the very men who are trying to keep them alive. If they did have a personal outlook into the war, they would surely end up lapsing, at the cost of hundreds of thousands' lives. Therefore, the soldiers do deserve more credit than given for staying behind the line. Source 9 slates Haig in residing 'safely in the rear'; but he was only following typical modus operandi.

Sources 2 and 3 take a very resentful view of Haig. They claim that he was a 'butcher' and a 'murderer'; and that he 'never cared for men's lives'. They fail to give him any credit, even after his great triumphs at the end of the war. They see that he had won the war and that he had been rewarded by being made an Earl and given £100,000 - source 3 says "I know what I'd have given him..." implying that he would have done quite the opposite to rewarding him. The men would have seen their friends and compatriots die under Haig, and would have an extensive bias against him; however surely the authorities would also have recognised this. As previously discussed, he was made an Earl and rewarded with a substantial amount of money. If he was as bad as the men in the sources make him out to be, he would not have been rewarded upon his return, and he would certainly not have won the war. Also, if he was so bad, he would have been demoted further, and he would have been taken out of the equation completely. This contradicts what the soldiers in source 2 and 3 say about him deserving less credit than given. Also, Christopher Martin accuses him of being an 'incompetent swine'. If this was the case, then once again, surely he would have been sacked completely.

There is some good evidence given here, arguing that Haig and other generals deserved more credit. But I do feel that evidence to the contrary provides a stronger argument for him and other generals deserving more credit, but he opposite side provides a strong opposition as to whether Haig deserved more credit. Although those who were of a similar military and social standing would agree that Haig did deserve more credit, there would inevitably be those of a lesser position who would feel the exact opposite. This is mirrored by the sources; those written by soldiers feeling that he was a 'butcher' and a 'murderer', and those written by generals who held the sort of view that Haig 'played a conspicuous part... in the final defeat of the German army'.

I do take into consideration that the generals had just followed tactics from the military institutions, and that they were well within their rights to stay behind the lines in order to get a wider perspective of the war. However, I do feel that Haig should have done more for his men, by enhancing his tactics, and improving the conditions the men had to live in. Also, he could have insisted on the former soldiers getting treated better after the war ended.

Although by the end of the war, Haig had improved his tactics greatly, and had been responsible for the vast improvement of the British army's performance, he does not deserve more than he received. If anything, I feel that he got what he deserved, even a little more. Therefore, I disagree with Terraine's claim that the allied leaders deserved more than they received.

To answer the question, I conclude that at first, the allied armies were facing overwhelming odds. However, towards the end of the war, with the addition of Italy and USA to the allied force, the allies were no longer facing overwhelming odds.

I do disagree with Terraine's claim that allied leaders deserve more than they had been given, because Haig should have improved on his previously dire tactics, despite the considerable gains towards the end of the war. In my opinion, winning the war does not make up for the preceding years of extreme losses and atrocious strategies that the British army faced on Haig's behalf.