Favorable external and internal circumstances, not Bismarcks diplomatic genius, explain the unification of Germany Discuss.
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Lupostupido (student)
History SL
History Essay
History Essay
Discuss the following statement:
“Favorable external and internal circumstances, not Bismarck’s diplomatic genius, explain the unification of Germany”
William Frisch Møller
History SL (2uhiS1)
Bent Egaa Kristensen (BK)
October 9, 2012
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Table of Contents
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Introduction
Internal Circumstances
The Zollverein
The Growth of Nationalism
The Decline of the Austrian Empire
Sub-Conclusion
External Circumstances
The International Situation
Sub-Conclusion
Otto von Bismarck
The Schleswig-Holstein War
The Austro-Prussian War
The Franco-Prussian War
Sub-Conclusion
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
This essay will focus upon how the Unification of Germany was established by 1871, more specifically, a discussion of the following statement:
“Favorable external and internal circumstances, not Bismarck’s diplomatic genius, explain the unification of Germany”
In order to tackle this statement, it will be necessary not only to look at the significance of internal circumstances, such as the decline of Austria’s power as well as the growth of nationalism, and the external circumstances being the international situation at the time, but also to interpret Bismarck’s influence and true role in bringing about the unification. In other words, the essay will start by discussing whether or not unification would have been possible before 1850 (i.e. before Bismarck’s political influence). The essay will then take analyze the importance of Otto von Bismarck’s diplomatic actions, and thus conclude upon the above statement based on the presented arguments.
Internal Circumstances
This chapter will deal with various internal circumstances, which not only laid the foundations upon which the German Unification was based, but also present the possibility of unification before 1850, and hence the true influence of Otto von Bismarck. The circumstances presented in this chapter will be viewed upon as internal in terms of the German Confederation of 1815.
The Zollverein
One could argue, that the most significant internal circumstance in terms of creating a unified Germany was the creation of the Zollverein. Not only was the enlarged Prussian Customs Union an important factor in strengthening Prussia economically, but it also served as a foundation for the development of nationalism among other German States, and ultimately the Unification of Germany as a whole.
The origin of the Zollverein can be traced back to 1818, with the enforcement of the Prussian Tariff Reform Law[1]. The law abolished all customs duties within Prussia and replaced them with a tariff to be charged at the Prussian frontier. However, the accomplishment of extended free trade within Prussia and then within other states of the German Confederation marks the true creation of the Zollverein, an economic union, which to a great extent stimulated Prussian trade, as it produced a wider market for home-produced goods at cheaper prices. In the ten years after its establishment, most of the states within the confederation became members of the union, with the exception of a minority of southern German states as well as the Austrian Empire.
By refusing to join the Zollverein, due to being a highly protectionist state, Austria presented Prussia with an opportunity of economic dominance. An opportunity that Prussia fully utilized, and was a contributory cause of her later military and political supremacy in Germany. The Zollverein also ensured that Prussia, despite her reactionary politics, came to be regarded as the natural leader of a united Germany.
Moreover, the Zollverein, through the developments of communications, industries and banking activities, created a sense of neighborhood among the German states. In other words, economic unity encouraged the idea of German unity, and therefore a focal point for nationalist sentiment.
The Growth of Nationalism
The growth of German nationalism throughout the beginning of the 19th century also played a crucial role in the formation of a unified Germany. The Zollverein may have laid the foundations for a possible unification, but the widespread feeling of nationalism among the middleclass liberals made it a realistic event.
German nationalism originated during the turn of the 18th century with the defeat of Napoleon in the battle of Leipzig. The War of Liberation has often been seen as the first collective action of the German nation, which caused the beginnings of the German Unification[2]. In other words, nationalism arose simply, as resentment to French rule and occupation.
A substantial example of how German nationalism very well could have resulted in the Unification of Germany, before Prussia became subject to the political influence of Otto von Bismarck, was the potential creation of a constitutional monarchy by the Frankfurt Parliament.
The Frankfurt Parliament was essentially established by the “Vorparlament” assembly, as a result of the 1848 revolutions within the German states, if not the rest of Europe. Not only was it important in confirming the leadership of Prussia, but also in terms of planning a united Germany. In March 1849 a Constitution for the German Empire was finally agreed upon. The united Germany was to exclude the multi-racial empire of Austria, and be based upon a constitutional monarchy, which would rule through an elected Parliament. Therefore, the assembly offered the crown to Frederik William, the King of Prussia[3]. ...
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The Frankfurt Parliament was essentially established by the “Vorparlament” assembly, as a result of the 1848 revolutions within the German states, if not the rest of Europe. Not only was it important in confirming the leadership of Prussia, but also in terms of planning a united Germany. In March 1849 a Constitution for the German Empire was finally agreed upon. The united Germany was to exclude the multi-racial empire of Austria, and be based upon a constitutional monarchy, which would rule through an elected Parliament. Therefore, the assembly offered the crown to Frederik William, the King of Prussia[3]. This decision clearly marked Prussian leadership within the confederation and German urge for unification. Although the assembly was finally suppressed and dissolved by Prussia, due to threat of losing his absolutist privileges as well as a potential war with the Austria, it proved the true influence of liberal-nationalists, who had learned that power rather than “speeches and majority votes”.
The Decline of the Austrian Empire
The decline of the Austria Empire, is the final internal circumstance in which will be discussed in this chapter. The fading of Austrian political influence within the German Confederation throughout the start 19th century caused the rise of Prussia and therefore the possibility for Bismarck to unify the north German states.
One could argue, that the decline of Austrian influence in Germany began with its exclusion from the Zollverein[4]. Being excluded from the customs union meant that by 1849 Austria experienced deep economic and financial problems. But, it also symbolized the rise of Prussian influence, as it had all of a sudden acquired economic dominance, which proved to be vital in terms of future military and political power.
However, this was not the only event Austria missed out on. As a result of being composed of various ethnic groups such as, Germans, Italians, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles and Ukrainians, the Austrian empire was faced with serious revolts from all sides during the 1848 revolutions[5]. Being multi-racial, it was important for the Austrian Empire to suppress the “revolutionary ideas” of nationalism and liberalism, and although Clemens von Metternitch did everything in his power to prevent these ideas from spreading, it was impossible.
In other words, Austria was too engrossed in internal affairs to focus on international relations and growth, especially in terms of the German Confederation. Ultimately this lead to the Frankfurt Parliament proposing a “smaller” unified Germany, with Prussia as the leading nation marking the true decline of Austrian dominance in central Europe[6]. A final, but important thing to note in terms international relations, was that Austria had no allies by 1860, a statement that will be researched in more detail under external circumstances and Bismarck’s diplomatic skills.
Sub-Conclusion
Internal circumstances provided the actual framework by which Otto von Bismarck could work toward the Unification, and are hence crucial to the German Unification as a whole. However, the fact that the growth of nationalism coinciding with the decline of Austrian dominance within the Confederation could easily have lead to unification by 1850, points towards internal circumstances being independent of Bismarck, supporting the initial statement.
External Circumstances
Internal circumstances were however not the only factors that contributed to a unified Germany. In order to achieve unification Otto von Bismarck had to victor in the Three Wars of Unification, which one could argue would be impossible if not for the favorable international situation.
The International Situation
The international situation leading up to the three wars of German Unification, namely the Schleswig-Holstein War, the Austro-Prussian War and finally the Franco-Prussian War, was very much in favor of Bismarck’s plans of unification and could hence determine whether or not Bismarck was merely an opportunist.
An important factor in understanding the international situation was the Crimean War that lasted from October 1853 to February 1856. The Crimean War was fought between the allied nations of England, France and Turkey against Russia[7]. In order to develop a better understanding of the impact this war had on international relations, the section will be divided in terms of the Great Powers:
Britain
Following the Crimean War, Britain completely withdrew from European affairs in order to avoid being caught up in another expensive and destructive war. This was an essential pre-condition to any territorial revision in Europe. In terms of both the Austro-Prussian as well as the Franco-Prussian wars, Britain had nothing to fear from Protestant Prussia and a strong Germany would be a useful bulwark against France or Russia.
Russia
The Crimean War had dealt a serious blow to Russian pride, and hence was unfavorably disposed to Austria after 1856. The reason for this was that the Habsburgs had failed to support her in the Crimean War. In other words, when it came to the Austro-Prussian War, Russia was prepared to see her former ally pay for her treachery.
Austria
Throughout the 19th century, Austria adopted a wavering diplomatic policy. Sometimes Austria would side against Russia, such as in the Polish Revolt of 1863, and other times against Britain and France[8]. By 1856 Austria, due to her neutrality in the Crimean War, had lost her friendship with Russia without obtaining that of Britain and France. In other words, Austria had no allies at the time of the Austro-Prussian War, and helped Bismarck acquire an easy victory.
France
The neutrality of France during the Schleswig-Holstein and Austro-Prussian War, could be viewed upon as a diplomatic accomplishment of Otto von Bismarck, and will hence be discussed in the next chapter[9].
Sub-Conclusion
Conclusively, the international situation at the time of Otto von Bismarck’s ascendancy can be viewed upon as important evidence in support of the initial statement. The passivity of the Great Powers, in terms of all three Wars of Unification, could point towards Bismarck being more of an opportunist rather than a diplomatic genius.
Otto von Bismarck
This chapter of the essay will tackle the evidence that contradicts the initial statement of how favorable internal and external circumstances were the primary cause of the German Unification. Or rather, analyze whether Bismarck’s political actions had an impact on the process of unification. The chapter will be divided chronologically into the Three Wars of Unification, as this will give a clearer indication of Bismarck’s political and diplomatic genius.
It can be argued, that Bismarck was a crucial factor in bringing about the Unification of Germany, as he was, through diplomatic means, capable of isolating his enemy, which was a crucial factor in terms of winning the Three Wars of Unification. Otto von Bismarck became Minister-President of Prussia in 1862, as a result of the Constitutional Crisis. Due to the disastrous mobilization during the North Italian War in 1859[10], one of Frederik William’s main concerns was to strengthen the army. This was done through the introduction of a bill, which, among other things, aimed to increase the size of the army. However, the liberals were opposed to this, as it implied that they would have to pay more taxes. This was an opportunity for Bismarck to rise, and once contacted, he managed to drive liberals out of office, gag the press and encouraged the King to create new units by collecting existing taxes.
This is a clear example of Bismarck’s Realpolitik, the pursuing of realistic goals by any means necessary. Realpolitik characterized Bismarck’s political career from first to last, in his view the end justified the means. He recognized that a conservative regime, which he greatly believed in, could not longer operate without popular support, not least that of the liberal-middleclass whose power was growing. In other words he hoped to achieve conservative ends by liberal and nationalists means, which ultimately lead to the German Unification.
The Schleswig-Holstein War
The Schleswig-Holstein War presents us with evidence of Otto von Bismarck’s true political intellect, in his potential planning of a foundation to the war with Austria, as a result of defeating the Danish nation. In 1863, the Danes formed a new constitution, which planned to incorporate Schleswig and Holstein into Denmark[11]. Nationalism boomed throughout the Confederation, which marked the first of Bismarck’s many opportunities. From the outset it was clear that Bismarck wished to annex both duchies, since this would ensure that his harshness during the Constitutional Crisis be forgotten, and to do this Bismarck realized he had to wage war.
However, before sending in troops, Bismarck assured that Denmark was isolated. Russia was sympathetic to Prussia, as a result of Prussia’s assistance in the Polish Revolt, and would hence remain neutral. As for Austria, Prussia managed to form an alliance with her, since she had no interest in Bismarck allying with forces of nationalism. However, Britain stood firmly behind Denmark, and Palmerston (the British Prime Minister) stated, “If Denmark had to fight she would not fight alone.” Bismarck demanded Denmark submit the matter to a European congress, Denmark encouraged by Britain refused. He correctly called Palmerston's bluff and together with Austria defeated Denmark in February 1864, which to a greater or lesser extent reflects Bismarck’s political awareness.
After the war in 1865, it was agreed by the Convention of Gastein[12], that Holstein would be administered by Austria, and Schleswig by Prussia. This could be viewed upon as a deliberate design of Bismarck, since he knew that he now could pick a quarrel with Austria over Holstein when the need arose. But the real question and the true essence of this essay, which will be tackled in the conclusion, is whether he had used the duchies as a means to maneuver Austria into open confrontation, or whether he simply allowed events to ripen. In other words, that the following Austro-Prussian War was due to a series of internal as well as external factors, such as the given international situation.
The Austro-Prussian War
In order to achieve a “smaller” Germany under Prussian control, Bismarck knew he had to defeat Austria. The second War of Unification carries evidence of how Bismarck truly was a genius when it came to manipulating states in a very diplomatic manner. Knowing, that both Britain and Russia would remain neutral in a potential war against Austria[13], the only real concern was France. Hence, at the secret Biarritz Conference, Bismarck managed to buy France’s neutrality, by bribing Napoleon III with hints of compensation in the Rhineland. Finally, unwilling to fight the war alone, Prussia forged an alliance with the Kingdom of Italy. A promise of the Austrian territory of Venetia to Italy ensured the alliance[14].
Now all Bismarck had to do was initiate the war, however his assumption about how a Prussian invasion of Holstein would trigger the war was incorrect, and he hence had to resort to different measures. Bismarck instead presented to the Diet, an extended version of his proposals for a reform of the Federal Constitution, in which Austria was to be excluded. This move was a masterstroke by Bismarck as it won him support and forced Austria to declare war on Prussia.
With the advantage of Prussian breech-loaded weapons, the war lasted a mere seven weeks and ended with a sounding victory at the Battle of Sadowa. With the road to Vienna open Bismarck arranged an armistice. Bismarck’s true diplomatic genius is evident here, as he robbed France any chance of claiming advantage out of the war.
The Treaty of Prague expelled Austria from the German Confederation and Venetia was seceded to Italy. The extraordinary lenient treaty was designed so that Austria did not remain an enemy of Prussia. Prussia annexed Hanover, North Hesse, Schleswig and Holstein and formed the North German Confederation out of these states, Prussia and Saxony[15]. Only Napoleon III attitude and local feeling prevented the confederation including the southern states. Bismarck through military might and diplomatic brilliance defeated Austria allowing Prussia to become dominant in Germany.
The Franco-Prussian War
The final step in securing unification, and thereby hoping to reach his final aim of a “conservative” Germany, was to engage in a war with France. Napoleon III failed to receive compensation for his neutrality during the Austro-Prussian War, which made him desperate, he needed to acquire some territory to increase his flagging support at home as well as live up to his powerful name.
France tried unsuccessfully to buy Belgium and Luxembourg. The British stopped the former and German public feeling of nationalism the second[16]. Realizing that France was hostile enough to start a war, Bismarck implemented his tactic of isolating the country diplomatically. Russia was hostile to France and Austria reconciled with Prussia over the lenient Treaty of Prague. Britain was offended over French intentions with the attempt of buying Belgium, which Bismarck had ingeniously disclosed at a crucial time. Italian friendship had been bought with Venetia. Finally, the south German states were drawn into a military alliance with Prussia if France were to initiate the war. Once again, Bismarck manages to utilize the, at that time, current international situation to push through with his plan.
Bismarck encouraged a Hohenzollern relative of William I to stand as a candidature for the vacant Spanish throne hoping to encircle France. France was enraged and demanded the candidature be removed. However, Frederik William agreed, against Bismarck’s wishes. The French, not satisfied, sent the French Ambassador Benedetti to the spa of Ems to obtain an assurance the matter would not be revived. Benedetti accosted the Prussian King in the street. William, furious, sent a telegram to Bismarck who, through the process of “striking out a couple of words”, made the telegram appear as an uncompromising response to the French demand[17]. The telegram was released publicly and caused war fever to sweep France, and demonstrated Bismarck’s true ability and understanding of manipulation. Bismarck ordered a Prussian mobilization that caused France to declare war (assuring the military alliance with the four south German states).
Prussian military and industrial strength, guided by Bismarck’s, to some extent diplomatic, isolation of France ensured Prussia victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck had achieved his main goal of German Unification under Prussian leadership. Ten days before the armistice was signed Bismarck proclaimed the German Empire at the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles on 18 January 1871[18], which symbolically reflects his achievements.
Sub-Conclusion
The above chronology substantiates the true diplomatic genius in terms of isolating France and Austria, as well as his ability to manipulate and thereby outmaneuver various states, demonstrated in his engineering of the Ems telegram. However, this control over international affairs, as well as internal matters, was not alone due to Bismarck’s political and diplomatic “supremacy”, but rather the favorable internal and external circumstances at the time. In other words, Bismarck was an opportunist who through hard determination created a unified Germany based upon the given circumstances.
Conclusion
Based on the chronology of events leading to the German Unification in 1871, one could conclude that Otto von Bismarck was indeed capable of diplomatically outmaneuvering Austria and France, and with astute political moves increased support for unification at home. However, on the contrary, the unification would not have been a possibility if not for the internal circumstances within the German Confederation, as well as external circumstances present in the rest of Europe.
In other words, Bismarck was an opportunist rather than the master planner throughout the process of completing the unification of Germany. Bismarck achieved the goal by taking advantages in internal and external circumstances, such as the fortunate international situation, strength of Prussia (economically and militarily), increasing nationalism, and the decline of Austria, rather than creating his own:
“Bismarck's greatness lay not in mastering events, but in going with events so as to seem to master them. He had no rigidly defined programme when he became Prime Minister in 1862[19].”
Hence, the statement by which this essay is structured upon, namely “Favorable external and internal circumstances, not Bismarck’s diplomatic genius, explain the unification of Germany,” is only partially true. It may be accurate to state that German nationalism may have brought about the unification independent of Bismarck, but the fact is, that Bismarck through realpolitik as well as his ability to grasp favorable opportunities was capable of unifying the German states and can hence not be completely disregarded as an important contributory factor.
Bibliography
. Farmer & Stiles. Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919. Hodder Education 2008
2. Wilmot. The Great Powers 1814 – 1914. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd 1992
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[1] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Economic Developments 1815 – 48 (p. 14)
[2] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, The Situation in Germany by 1815 (p. 3)
[3] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, The Frankfurt Parliament (p. 32 – 36)
[4] See ”Internal Circumstances: The Zollverein”
[5] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, The Course of the Revolutions (p. 29)
[6] See ”Internal Circumstances: The Growth of Nationalism”
[7] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, The Position of Austria after 1848 (p. 52)
[8] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Austro-Prussian Conflict (p. 63)
[9] See ”Otto von Bismarck”
[10] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, The Position of Prussia after 1848 (p. 56)
[11] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Austro-Prussian Conflict (p. 64)
[12] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Austro-Prussian Conflict (p. 65)
[13] See ”External Circumstances: The International Situation”
[14] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Austro-Prussian Conflict (p. 66)
[15] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Prussian Ascendancy (p. 71)
[16] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Franco-Prussian Relations 1866 – 70 (p. 83)
[17] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, The Road to War (p. 88 – 89)
[18] Farmer & Stiles: The Unification of Germany 1815 – 1919, Results of the War (p. 97 – 98)
[19] A.J.P. Taylor
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