Crews arriving on the first alarm were split into 2-man crews and were assigned to search the building for victims and fire extension. Serving on one of the crews were Brotherton and Lucey from Rescue 1. All the crews proceeded up the stairwell and observed the other crew from Rescue 1 enter the third floor. Engine 1’s crew, Brotherton and Lucey continued to the roof. Once on the roof, they reported to Interior Command that they were on the roof and had heavy smoke and embers showing. The crew then ventilated a skylight and proceeded down the stair-well to the sixth floor and conducted a search. After searching the sixth floor, they descended to the fifth floor to search for victims. Meanwhile Engine 1’s crew conducted their search on the second floor and the other crew from Rescue 1 searched the third floor. Upon completion of their search, Engine 1’s crew descended the stairwell until they found Interior Command. Conditions at this point had deteriorated rapidly and had caused crews working on the second floor to become disoriented. Interior command ordered personnel accountability report. It was determined that two fire fighters from Rescue 1 were missing. This report was not relayed to IC#2. At 1842 hours, IC#2 requested a third alarm assignment due to the heavy fire conditions. Engines 3, 7, and Ladder 2 responded. At 1847 hours Brotherton or Lucey made the following radio transmissions:
Rescue to Command, I need help on the floor below the top floor of the building. We are lost. Rescue to Command, we need help on the fourth floor…We have an emergency, Command. We are two floors down from the roof. This is the rescue company. Come now, two floors down from the roof. Guys, not the top floor, one floor down…We need air, we need air. I.m sharing a tank off me right now. We are lost. You got to send a rescue team up here for us. Second floor down from the roof, two floors down. We were on the roof, and then we checked the next floor down. Now we are on the next one. Hurry. (Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Investigative Report #99F-47 Sept. 27, 2000)
At 1854 hours, IC#2 requested a 4th alarm be struck and verification from Interior Command what floor the two firefighters were lost on. Interior Command replied they were two floors from the top and that he had crews going up to find them. Interior Command then requested Brotherton and Lucey to activate their PASS devises. One of them replied that their PASS was activated.
Arriving on the 3rd alarm with Ladder 2 was Lieutenant Spencer and Firefighter Jackson. Ladder 2 was directed to conduct a search on the fifth floor. While conducting their search, they became disoriented and low on air and requested Interior Command to send someone up the stairwell and yell. The crew from Engine 3 responded to the request but never made contact with Spencer and Jackson.
Engine 3 arrived on the scene and split the crew. The Lieutenant went to the command post and was given orders to conduct a search on the fourth and fifth floors. After conducting their search, they returned to the A side of the building and began firefighting activities with a 1 ¾” hand-line. Also arriving on Engine 3 were Firefighters McGuirk and Lyons who never checked in at the command post nor received an assignment. It is believed that they may have joined Spencer and Jackson on the fifth floor. At 1924 hours, IC#2 conducted a personnel accountability report and it was determined that six firefighters were missing. The Chief of the department ordered a 5th alarm be struck at 1929 hours.
A thermal imaging unit was brought to the scene by a mutual aid fire department but is believe to have stopped working due to the intense heat. At 2000 hours Interior Command ordered everyone out of the building, and an evacuation signal was made. Operations changed from an offensive attack to a defensive attack with elevated master streams. After the fire was extinguished, search-and-recovery operations continued until recall of the box alarm at 2227 hours on December 11, 1999.
It is obvious through the actions of fire officers and firefighters on this scene that a well structured incident management system was not in place. Having two incident commanders can only create confusion by giving conflicting orders or assignments. Utilizing ICS components used in high-rise incidents such as lobby control, staging, and operations would have possibly eliminated freelancing and conflicting orders. McGuirk and Lyons’ deaths could have been prevented if only they had not committed the fatal error of entering the building without being assigned.
Another responsibility of the Incident Commander is personnel accountability. Although periodic roll calls were taken during this incident, it is the responsibility of all officers to account for every fire fighter assigned to their company and relay information to Incident Command when a member of their crew becomes separated. As the incident escalates, an accountability officer should be assigned to manage personnel accountability. Tim Sendelbach stated in a recent article:
Effective accountability during Safety Engine/RIT deployments can be enhanced through the use of restricted entry points. Following the initial PAR report, the Incident Commander should immediately restrict entry to only those members of the Safety Engine/RIT. Upon the request of additional assistance, the Incident Commander can then direct the assigned crew to enter the structure. (Firehouse.com 26 June 2004)
Crew integrity is essential while operating on the fireground. Several times throughout this incident, crews became separated. Firefighters should not work beyond the sight or sound of the company officer. The company officer should communicate with the sector/divisional commander or the Incident Commander by portable radio to ensure accountability and indicate completion of assigned duties. Just as company officers should know the location of all fire fighters assigned to the company, the Incident Commander should be kept informed of the operating locations of all companies on the fireground.
The Safety Engine/RIT deployment demands strong leadership and well disciplined personnel; crew continuity throughout is an absolute necessity for proper accountability during firefighter rescue operations. Strict adherence to the orders of the Incident Commander and Company Officers must be followed to prevent further injury and/or loss. (Firehouse.com 26 June 2004)
Although valiant efforts were made to rescue these lost firefighters, certain actions and/or equipment may have assisted in their rescue. Firefighters assigned to RIT should utilize a “tag-line” to prevent becoming lost themselves. It is assumed that four of the firefighters lost did not utilize a tag-line to conduct their searches and became disoriented and lost. To assist in conducting a rapid search, thermal imaging cameras should be utilized by all rapid intervention teams. “TIC cameras should be part of every Safety Engine/RIT initial cache of tools. If prolonged search operations are necessary, multiple TIC cameras may be needed to expedite the rescue effort. The Incident Commander should consider requesting additional TIC cameras immediately upon notification of a trapped, lost or disoriented member.” (Firehouse.com 26 June 2004)
Another factor on the fireground is operating in vacant buildings. Proper risk management must play a significant role in the decision to deploy crews into an occupancy in which a high potential for firefighter injury or loss exist. Pre-fire planning vacant or abandoned structures will enable firefighters to identify which buildings within their jurisdiction require defensive operations to maintain firefighter safety and survival.
The tragic loss of these firefighters should not be in vain. Firefighters across the nation should study this incident and learn from the mistakes made that December day. Perhaps if all crews operated within a well structured incident command system, managed personnel accountability, maintained crew integrity, utilized tag-lines and thermal imaging cameras, four of these firefighters lives might have been spared. Most importantly, if a pre-fire plan had been conducted on this structure, interior operations would not have been initiated therefore preventing the loss of lives December 3, 1999.
Works Cited
Firehouse.com May 2002
National Institute on Safety and Health. Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Investigative Report #99F-47 Sept. 27, 2000
Sendelbach, Timothy "Managing the Fireground Mayday" Firehouse.com 26 June 2004