The second step, collection, includes both acquiring information and provisioning that information to processing and production elements. The collection process encompasses the management of various activities, including developing collection guidelines that ensure optimal use of available intelligence resources. Intelligence collection requirements are developed to meet the needs of potential consumers. Based upon identified intelligence, requirements collection activities are given specific tasking to collect information. These tasking are generally redundant and may use a number of different intelligence disciplines for collection activities. Tasking redundancy compensates for the potential loss or failure of a collection asset. It ensures that the failure of a collection asset is compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the collection need. The use of different types of collection systems contributes to redundancy. It also allows the collection of different types of information that can be used to confirm or disprove potential assessments. Collection operations depend on secure, rapid, redundant, and reliable communications to allow for data exchange and to provide opportunities for cross-cueing of assets and tip-off exchanges between assets. Once collected, information is correlated and forwarded for processing and production.
The third step, processing, is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for the production of intelligence. In this process, incoming information is converted into formats that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in producing intelligence.
The fourth step, production, is the process of analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and integrating raw data and information into finished intelligence products for known or anticipated purposes and applications. The product may be developed from a single source or from all-source collection and databases
The final step of the intelligence cycle is dissemination. Dissemination is the conveyance of intelligence to the consumer in a usable form. Intelligence can be provided to the consumer in a wide range of formats including verbal reports, written reports, imagery products, and intelligence databases. Dissemination can be accomplished through physical exchanges of data and through interconnected data and communications networks.
There are various sources and elements of collection. Open source collection includes the acquisition of material in the public domain: radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, technical and scholarly journals, books, government reports, and reports by Foreign Service officers and defense attachés concerning public activities. The extent to which open source collection yields valuable information will vary greatly with the nature of the targeted society and the subject involved. The information might be collected by human sources-individuals who buy books and journals or observe military parades-or by technical means- recording television and radio programs.
Clandestine collection involves the acquisition of data that are not publicly available. As with open source collection, both human and technical resources may be employed. The traditional human spy may be employed to provide sensitive political, military, or economics information. Alternatively, technical collection systems can be used to photograph military installations or intercept a wide variety of communications and electronic signals.
Great secrecy and sensitivity characterizes human source clandestine collection. Although much technical collection is also clandestine, secrecy is not always as vital in technical collection as it is in human collection. Foreign nations are well aware that the U.S. operates an extensive space reconnaissance program. Even those nations capable of tracking the movements of the U.S. spacecraft can take only limited denial and deception measures. As a result, the ability to effectively collect the required data des not, in general, depends on clandestine operation. In contrast, a human “asset” whose identity becomes known to a foreign security service will soon be arrested or become the channel for disinformation.
Analysis involves the integration of collected information-that is, raw intelligence from all sources-into finished intelligence. The finished intelligence product might be a simple statement of facts, an estimate of the capabilities of another nation’s military forces, or a projection of the likely course of political event in another nation.
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of collected information. It is a specialized information product that provides the United States or an adversary with information required to further its national interests. One of the most important functions of intelligence is the reduction of the ambiguity inherent in the observation of external activities. In the most obvious case, adversary intelligence organizations may seek information concerning military capabilities or other matters that directly threaten the national security of the United States. In other cases, adversary nations, or other groups, may seek information about U.S. diplomatic negotiating positions, economic programs, or proprietary information from U.S. corporations.
In each of these cases, the information sought may provide the adversary with an edge and might allow him to implement a well-developed strategy to reach his goals. In most cases, the development of an intelligence product involves collecting information from a number of different sources. In some cases, information may be disseminated immediately upon collection based upon operational necessity and potential impact on current operations. This type of raw intelligence is usually based on fragmentary information about fast-breaking events and may contain substantial inaccuracies or uncertainties that must be resolved through subsequent report and analysis. Finished intelligence products contain information that is compared, analyzed, and weighted to allow the development of conclusions. Finished intelligence is produced through analytical review in the intelligence process. The intelligence process confirms a fact or set of facts through a multiplicity of sources to reduce the chance of erroneous conclusions and susceptibility to deception.
Several intelligence disciplines are used to acquire information. These disciplines include human intelligence HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and open source intelligence (OSINT). Each of these disciplines is used by adversaries against the United States to some degree. Most nations, and many subnational and private organizations, have HUMINT capabilities that they use to collect data on their adversaries and competitors.
Human intelligence is derived from human sources. To the public, HUMINT remains synonymous with espionage and clandestine activities, yet, in reality, most HUMINT collection is performed by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attachés. HUMINT is the oldest method for collecting information about a foreign power. HUMINT includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the individuals who exploit, control, supervise, or support these sources.
Clandestine HUMINT sources include agents who have been recruited or have volunteered to provide information to a foreign nation, and foreign nationals who successfully infiltrate an organization with a cover story. The latter cases are fairly rare, and generally come to the United States under the guise of being political refugees. Once in the United States, they move into positions that allow them to gather political, technical, or economic information for their governments.
According to one estimate, over 100 countries currently conduct intelligence operations against the United States.
Even with the explosion of technical capabilities, HUMINT can still provide information that even the most proficient technical collectors cannot, such as access to internal memoranda and to compartmented information. Most importantly, human collectors can provide key insights into the intentions of an adversary, whereas technical collection systems are often limited to determining capabilities. HUMINT can be used to reveal adversary plans and intentions, or uncover scientific and weapons developments before they are used or are detected by technical collection systems. HUMiNT can also provide documentary evidence such as blueprints of facilities, copies of adversary plans, or copies of diplomatic or policy documents. Finally, HUMINT is extremely cost effective compared with technical collection systems and does not require a significant technological production base for support.
Signals intelligence is derived from signal intercepts comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELlNT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), however transmitted.[9] COMINT, one of the primary SIGINT disciplines, includes information derived from intercepted communications transmissions. COMINT targets voice and teleprompter traffic, video, Morse code traffic, or even facsimile messages. Assuming access is possible, COMINT can be collected from the air waves, cable, fiber optics, or any other transmission medium.
MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source emitter or sender. This information is then used to facilitate the subsequent identification or measurement of the same type of equipment. The term measurement refers primarily to the data collected for the purpose of obtaining finite metric parameters.
IMINT is a product of imagery analysis. Imagery includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. IMINT includes the exploitation of data to detect, classify, and identify objects or organizations. It can be produced from either hard- or soft-copy (digital) imagery. Hard-copy imagery is synonymous with film, while soft-copy imagery is displayed on electronic terminals. Both types of imagery sources can be analyzed and interpreted for various purposes by different users.
At one time, the imagery intelligence threat was largely restricted to the former Soviet Union and later to the Russian Federation. This is no longer true. The proliferation of space-based imagery systems permits a much greater use of imagery products by nations that previously did not have access to them. Currently, imagery can be purchased from a variety of sensors. These capabilities will allow adversaries to conduct in-depth analysis for targeting and technical intelligence gathering.
Imagery provides significant benefits to an adversary collecting intelligence. The imagery allows activity to be detected, target characteristics studied in detail, and equipment and facilities enumerated. Large areas can be covered by imagery sensors for mapping of areas of key importance.
OSINT is ‘Open source intelligence’ involves the use of materials available to the public by intelligence agencies and other adversaries. Some analysts have estimated that the Soviet Union derived up to 90 percent of its intelligence from open source information. With the proliferation of electronic databases, it has become easier to collate large quantities of data, and structure information to meet the needs of the adversary collector. Open source information can often provide extremely valuable information concerning an organization's activities and capabilities. Frequently, open source material can provide information on organizational dynamics, technical processes, and research activities not available in any other form. When open source data is compiled, it is often possible to derive classified data or trade secrets. This is particularly true in the case of studies published in technical journals. A significant understanding of research and development efforts can often be derived by analyzing journal articles published by different members of a research organization. Finally, open source information is generally timelier and may be the only information available in the early stages of a crisis or emergency.
Open source intelligence collection does have limitations. Often articles in military or scientific journals represent a theoretical or desired capability rather than an actual capability. Censorship may also limit the publication of key data needed to arrive at a full understanding of an adversary's actions, or the press may be used as part of a conscious deception effort.
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