However, while the mission did not achieve its goals, it cannot be said to have been a failure to the full extent. The insight into the political workings and machinations that this mission to Bei Jing gave Britain were invaluable. Emperors Qianlong’s specific rebuke of the request to establish embassies in Bei Jing, for example, must have given them an example of the extent to which China as a country was closed. Qianlong asked, how was the British government to provide for an embassy in Beijing in china, a ‘country so tightly organised that a foreigner could not hire a single Chinese without official permission?’ Another example of the insight gained by this mission comes from Lord Maccartney himself. He said, upon his return, that ‘China is an old, crazy first rate Man of War (ship)…She may, perhaps not sink outright, she may drift sometime as a wreck…but she can never be rebuilt on the old bottom.’ This statement in particular is referred to as ‘perceptive’ by the historian Robert Vohra, possibly because of the way it is reflective of the popular historical view of the large extent of dynastic decline Qianlongs reign was sufferings from. Therefore, it can be argued that the mission was not a failure to a full extent, as it was successful in bringing the British further knowledge.
The Amherst mission, 23 years later, while better prepared, did not have more success in the achievement of its diplomatic goals. The mission was expelled from Bei Jing without an audience when it was learned that Amherst refused to Kowtow. The new emperor Jia Qing’s edict to the King addressed the ambassador’s disrespectful ignorance of ettiquette and stated that ‘if you remain sincerely loyal to us, your ambassadors need not come to court.’ Therefore, it can be seen that the Amherst mission was also a failure in the respect that it did not achieve its diplomatic goals, and even served to further confirm the Chinese views that the British were inconsequential barbarians.
However, as with the Macartney mission, the Amherst mission was not a failure to a full extent. The noted historian Robert Vohra states that while to the Chinese the envoy was somewhat inconsequential, in England ‘more and more people were coming to the conclusion that since all attempts to establish fair relations with China only resulted in insults to Britain, China would have to be dealt with in a more forceful fashion.’ Indeed, he even goes so far as to state the fact that the first Opium war took place a decade and half after the Amherst mission, directly linking the Chinese treatment of the British to the decision to escalate hostilities. Therefore, it can be argued that, while the mission failed to bring about further changes in the state of trade, it was successful in encouraging the western realisation of how little a priority to the Emperors (and thus China) trade was, and therefore opening a pathway for thought on alternative methods of interacting with China besides simple acquiescence.
Lord Napier’s appointment in 1834 as the head of the British east India trading Company in China came with government support and this made his powers fuzzy. In a similar fashion to the mission leaders, Napier’s goals (and orders) were to improve the framework of trade for the British in China. Also in a similar fashion to the mission leaders, his success in achieving these goals was non existent. His actions (which stemmed from his letter attempting to deal directly with the Governor instead of through the Cohong) resulted in reaffirmation of the Chinese system of trade and tribute and also
their Cino-Centric, superiority based world view.
However, despite the failure of Lord Naipiers attempts to change the system, the crisis was not a failure to the full extent. It can be argued that in long term the British gained from the situation, despite the short term humiliation. Because of the fact that it was the third instance where the British took the line that ‘it was not by force and violence that his majesty wished to establish commercial intercourse between his subjects in China,’ the precedent had been firmly established in Chinese minds. They were misled and deluded (understandably so) into thinking that their world view was correct and that they could persist in treating foreign countries as tributary state, and the foreigners as useless barbarians. This precedent can be seen as beneficial to the British as it meant that the Chinese were totally unprepared for their successful performance in the first opium war, which allowed them to sign the treaty of Nanking.
In conclusion, the extent to which the missions of macartney, Amherst and Naipier in china failed cannot be judged simply by their lack of short term gain. The long term effects the missions had upon the British views of China must be taken into account. If these two different aspects are looked at, it can be seen that the missions were not failures to the full extent, because of the invaluable knowledge they brought to the British, and also because of the precedent they set to the Chinese (which encouraged them to underestimate the strength of the British desires for trade).
