Bates (2001) therefore argues that “if only as a consequence of demographic change, such societies”… “form capital albeit in the context of kinship rather than markets” (pg.31). Kin sponsored migration into new hinterlands is a response to population growth and engenders trade insofar as different terrain provides crop variety. The result is the beginnings of markets and, perhaps more importantly, the protection against natural environmental risks by extended families that, having diversified their yield by migrating to new lands, can spread the risk of natural disaster. Moreover, Bates points to a natural tendency for agrarian farmers to adopt conservative farming practices rather than potentially more profitable courses of action which would yield greater profit (2001, pg 38-39). Though this conservatism (primarily in crop choice) represents ‘self-insurance’ against risk, this behaviour places a restriction on how much wealth they can produce since low yield crops plus population growth equals less return (Bates, 2001, pg. 42).
Wealth generation in kinship societies is also limited by the nature of their coercive powers which arise in response to the need to protect wealth from the threat of theft or invasion by other people (in Bates, R, 2001, pg. 42). The family-already the insurer against natural risks-becomes the protector against risks of the human kind. Property rights are protected by teaming up with kin and being willing to defend with force the interests of the tribe. According to Bates (2001), “this system of governance requires, then, that men be warriors, capable of inflicting harm; it also requires that they be willing to retaliate, and be known to be willing to do so” (pg. 45). The threat of force is therefore crucial if order is to be maintained but there is a negative aspect to this method of protecting property. Kinship societies, responding to the exigencies of the time, rely on the threat of violence by private groups in defence of their interests and a culture arising therein to secure peace. But this security comes at a cost since it relies on the fragile tension of what Bates calls a “hair trigger society” the response to transgression is therefore harsh-the society, one of fear (2001, pg. 48). For Bates (2001) then, “the political institutions of kinship societies impose a cruel trade-off: peace on the one hand and prosperity on the other” (pg. 48).
As has been hinted at, “in the process of development”…”coercion alters in nature” so that “rather than providing a means for engaging in costly acts of redistribution, it becomes a means for promoting the creation of wealth” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 50). The process is instigated by the growth of prosperity arising in the kinship societies and being consolidated with the rise of towns. In an almost dialectical fashion, the rise of new forms of political power takes place in response to the limitations of old forms of security which are now unable to secure wealth enough to fulfil the new requirements of now prosperous landowners seeking to extend and protect their wealth. The use of force to protect property became more formalised-if still private-under landowners who employed peasants to fight on their behalf. The cost of this form of protection though was prohibitive and “only those who stood to lose much possessed an incentive to provide it” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 54). But perhaps the more far-reaching implication of the growth of feudalism from the commercialisation of agriculture is the concentration of political power upon the dominant economic force (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 56). The unity of economic dominance and brute force privileges select kinship groups who contest the sources of wealth: “those that prevailed formed ruling lineages and provided kings” (Bates, R, 2001, pg.56).
The success of the newly establishing monarchies was reliant on their ability to finance conquest. Methods used by ruling lineages to secure monies to fight wars amounted to a trade of some power for some more wealth. The genesis of what could properly be considered a state arises from what Bates considers to be mercantilist policies of the dominant ruling lineages (2001, pg. 56). On one hand wealth was ceased by force and blunt manipulation-the exploitation of the agrarian workforce, and the “confiscation of the wealth of their bankers, the estates of the church, and the possessions of their aristocrats” was played out and led to and accompanied the enforcing of economic dependency of subjects (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 56-57). But more importantly, the encroachment of monarchies into towns gave rise to the emergence of less coercive means of gaining wealth-from a wealth-redistributing tendency to a wealth-creating tendency. Because of the logistical difficulty in seizing and holding an urban centre, coupled with the mobility of capital monarchs sought to assist in wealth creation in towns. Monarchs sought to elicit growth in urban manufacturing by primitive import substitution-the establishment of tariffs on imported goods-and by cheapening the availability of raw materials and food stuffs by restricting their export and subjecting the domestic market to competition form abroad. But perhaps the most striking aspect of the transition to wealth promotion is the disjunction of the power from the hands of the monarch to the hands of private hands of the citizen. This ‘trade-off’ entails the exchange of direct control wealth producers in return for greater efficiency in organising local economies.
For Bates (2001), “the investment was not of wealth; instead it was of power. By delegating to the citizens of the towns the power to govern their affairs, the monarchs empowered them to form economic organisations capable of promoting the growth of the urban economy-and thus the government’s revenue base” (PG. 62).
The historical development of European nations is therefore characterised by economic and political processes. From the agrarian kinship societies to the feudal era and the formative stages of industrial capitalism, the ever present interests of the ruling faction-financing war-has been inspired by and balanced against the generation of wealth. The next half of this paper will argue then that emerging developing states are hindered by their inability to trade violence for prosperity and that the cause of this predicament is to be found by comparing the favourable conditions (both domestic and global) of the past with the less than favourable conditions confronted by states in under-developed countries today.
Drawing on assumptions most commonly associated with dependency theory, Bates seeks and understanding of ‘state formation in the modern era’ which is sympathetic to the impact of the policies of early developers on the global environment in which the late developers are expected to compete economically. Bates would agree with the view that there “is a situation in which a certain number of countries have their economy conditioned by the development and expansion of another…placing the dependant countries in a backward position exploited by the dominant countries” (Santos, T, cited in Valenzuela, J and Valenzuela, A, 1978, pg. 544). Indeed, external influence accounts for much of the persistence of underdevelopment and this argument is supported by evidence that suggests that “the economic policies of the developing nations bears a striking resemblance to the mercantilist policies of their predecessors” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 71). The process which Bates describes in particular emphasise import-substituted industrialisation-the adoption of policies designed to cheapen raw materials and the protection of emergent industries from foreign competition. Far from ‘rolling back the state’, developing countries had shown a tendency toward state-led industrialisation. Bates (2001), confirms that “by actively intervening in the economy, they, like their mercantilist predecessors also rendered their government a ‘fountain of privilege’” (pg. 72).
The late developer’s broke with the course of development followed by early developers during the post-war period when the crippling of Europe left two remaining superpowers to impress their considerable influence on the global political environment (in Bates, R, 2001, pg.75). It is with no small amount of irony that the interplay between prosperity and violence; still influencing the conduct of developed states then impacted developing states by effectively sterilising the self-same process. Bates draws a powerful comparison between factions in a kinship society coming to an uneasy peace via the threat of violence and the threatening stance of the two cold war superpowers, and it is almost inevitable then that, like the kinship example, the immanence of a third world war is ended with the establishment of a more efficient means of defending the interests of both parties (in Bates, R, 2001, pg. 76). The creation of the United Nations and the Security Council enabled western powers to not only reduce the risk of fighting amongst themselves but to control the emergence of conflict elsewhere on the globe. As Bates (2001) puts it: “by enabling the great powers to dampen the possible escalation of small disputes, the United Nations could then provide peacekeeping facilities, be it envoys, mediators, or armed forces” (pg. 76). The critical juncture for newly independent nations was the premature imposition of statehood and national sovereignty. The establishment of global policing bodies muted the threat of war for these territories and therefore disposed of a critical motive to develop-the implication being that with no motive, the trade-off between prosperity and violence need not happen. Whereas in ‘early modern states’, “the economic imperative,-the need for resources and the necessity of raising them domestically-became a political objective, shaping the institutions of governments”, in newly established developing countries, the threat of war-the force which gives rise to the trade-off, is absent (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 77).
The implied absence of development incentive was exacerbated by the tendency of the cold war superpowers to facilitate their strategic territorial expansion by funding development programs in exchange for military support-elites were provided economic benefits with which they could defend their political position rather than promoting economic growth in order to fund a military.
The onset of the debt crisis marked a crucial stage in the history of the late developers which culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. For Bates (2001), “these changes international system impacted deeply upon the policies of developing nations, the nature of their policies, and the structure of their institutions” (pg. 84). The result of the debt crisis was greater dependency upon foreign borrowing and the imposition of conditions upon this borrowing by lenders-the borrowing would be accompanied by economic liberalisation which effectively put an end to “industrial protection, the retreat from import-substituting industrialisation and the promotion of exports abroad” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 90). The impact of this economic reform on the political landscape of the countries concerned was far-reaching. The imposition of the market meant that bureaucratic means of controlling the flow of capital were now redundant and the regimes were starved of the resources they needed to contain elites so that “political tensions increased, as incumbent politicians found themselves with fewer and fewer means to make political rivals willing to refrain from public opposition” (Bates, R, 2001, pg 93). The economic problems impinged upon the political structure of developing nations. The drive to democracy then was in response to the pressures outlined above. But perhaps the most pertinent result of the ‘late century shocks to the global system’ is the post-communist ambivalence to conflict in the developing world. No longer fearing the encroachment of communism across the globe, the west no longer felt the need to contain conflict in the developing world. Regimes were therefore unable to meet the conditions of their position-as the regimes could not pay off elites their positions were place under threat. According to Bates, “the end of the century was therefore marked not only by the spread of democracy in the developing world but by the spread of violence” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 96).
To conclude, it is interesting to note that neo-liberal development theory has been criticized for adopting a set of prescriptions which “are nothing less than the prerequisites for a capitalist economy” (Minogue, M, and Kuthari, U, 2002, pg. 180). This criticism is valid in the context of this paper insofar as after the ‘trade-off’ between prosperity and violence (the sacrifice of political power for economic prosperity and security) a prosperous and secure state find it rational to curb expenditure by ‘rolling back’. Prior to the ‘great transformation’ however we see a situation in which it has proved necessary for the state to direct the economic fortunes of a country.
This paper has argued then that the trade-off between prosperity and violence has been a characteristic feature present in the histories of all successful developers. The generation of wealth, if it is successful necessarily leads to circumstances in which it is prudent to adopt protective measures. Developed nations have a history in which the holders of wealth have protected their wealth, first privately then through political institutions which make up the state. The sometimes cruel trade-off means that the greater the prosperity the greater the potential peace but also the more requirement there is for the threat of force to be real. Thus the threat of war with ones competitors has been a powerful factor contributing to the development of western nation states.
However, there is no doubt that the late developer’s ability to undergo the ‘great transformation’ has been perverted by the post war political and economic environment. Insofar as the course of the late developers direction has diverted from the norm established by the early developers, the trade-off between prosperity and violence has not been accomplished.
References
Bates, R, (2000), ‘Prosperity and Violence: the political economy of development”, W. W. Norton and company, New York and London]
Todaro, M, (1997), ‘Economic development’, Sixth Edition, London Longman
Valenzuela, J.S and Valenzuela, A., (1978) ‘Modernisation and Dependency: alternative perspectives in the study of Latin American Underdevelopment’, Comparative Politics 10
Kothari, U and Minogue, M, (2002), ‘Development theory and practice: critical perspectives’, Palgrave