Is there a trade-off between prosperity and violence? If so, what is it? If not why not?

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Ian Sutton

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Essay One

Is there a trade-off between prosperity and violence? If so, what is it? If not why not?

        The best examples of the trade off between prosperity and violence are attributed in Bates to the early developers, whose’ success story stands in contrast to the prospect of the late developers who’s situation is fundamentally related to their historical relationship with the developed nations. In order to come to an understanding of the trade off between prosperity and violence it is therefore necessary to establish the terms of distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries. This paper will therefore establish the cause of the trade of between prosperity and violence in order to highlight its impediments. In doing so this paper will argue that the history of early developers is characterised in Bates by the interplay between prosperity and violence and their respective roles in inspiring the great transformation. It will be argued that the trade off between prosperity and violence passes through distinct stages which has implications for the prospects of late developers. From agrarian beginnings in which a fragile peace was established via the threat of privately wielded violence to the feudal period which sees monarchs engage in wars, the trade off between prosperity and violence is the outcome or solution of the exigencies of the time. There is then a stark contrast between the histories of the developed nations and the modern histories of the late developers. Following Bates, it will be argued that the trade off between prosperity and violence has not yet effectively taken place within the developing world. The impact of global economic forces coupled with the impact of the cold war has negatively impacted the late developers.

        

According to Bates (2001), “development refers to the growth of per capita incomes and to the transformation of social and political systems” (pg. 20). Bates argues that development occurs when the trade-off between prosperity and violence is successful and underdevelopment persists so long and the trade-off is not made. The growth and development of societies from their agrarian beginning to full development is driven by a variety of factors but fundamentally shaped by two overarching themes: “one economic and one political: the decision to form capital and the formation of institutions that make it rational to do so” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 22). Economic growth is seen to arise from investment in all forms of capital and “equally as important, economic growth results from changes in the manner in which people organise the process of production” (Bates, R, 2001, pg 23). Economic organisation, which Bates (2001) regards as being like the interplay between members of a sports team; as much as investment, is able to promote or (if it is in short supply) hinder development (pg. 23). Commitment to a program of improvement in economic organisation and investment is largely dependant on how power is institutionalised, which is within the domain of politics. Prosperity as we shall see, relates fundamentally to political exigencies-how the coercive powers of the state are used. Good economic organisation is a product of sound political choices to delegate power “to those who will govern productive relationships and secure the benefits that can be produced by the complementary efforts of those who employ land, labour and capital” (Bates, R, 2001, pg. 25).  Therefore, contrary to the neo-liberal assumption that the involvement of the state inherently inhibits growth, it is state power that, in the history of successfully developed countries, has facilitated and secured the development process.

        In agrarian societies, the family is the functional equivalent of the State as it is the institution with the vested power to alter economic organisation and choose to invest. And, as Bates (2001) argues, these kinship societies are, contrary to the opinions of some development theories, “dynamic; they expand, differentiate, and engage in exchange and conflict” (pg.31). The neo-classical field, drawing on Keynesian economic models, displays a tendency to adopt an inadequate definition of development that emphasises technological progress and internal policy choices but underestimates external historical and political factors. The neo-classical description of the third world development problem in particular succumbs to the problem “that many Third World economies are so different in structure and organisation from their Western counterparts that the behavioural assumptions and policy precepts of traditional neo-classical theory are sometimes questionable and sometimes incorrect” (Todaro, M, 1997, pg. 89). Bates argues that the perceived stagnation of agrarian societies is a misconception (2001, pg. 31). Blaming too much intervention for the persistence of underdevelopment fails to notice that kinship societies though their expansion lay the foundation for new and ‘higher’ forms of production. Bates also attacks Marxists who cling to the view that the forces of production dictate the content of the relations of production (2001, pg. 31).

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        Bates (2001) therefore argues that “if only as a consequence of demographic change, such societies”… “form capital albeit in the context of kinship rather than markets” (pg.31). Kin sponsored migration into new hinterlands is a response to population growth and engenders trade insofar as different terrain provides crop variety. The result is the beginnings of markets and, perhaps more importantly, the protection against natural environmental risks by extended families that, having diversified their yield by migrating to new lands, can spread the risk of natural disaster. Moreover, Bates points to a natural tendency for agrarian farmers to adopt conservative farming ...

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