Peoples' republic of China

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PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:  A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT [1996]

Introduction

This study assesses the political and economic future of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) up to the year 1996.  The initial discussion following this introduction reviews Chinese history—mostly recent—that is directly relevant to the purpose of this study.  The historical review is followed by a consideration of the foreign relations of the PRC that incorporates an assessment of the future global political role of the country.  The last of the major discussions presented in this study addresses the economic development of the PRC and the likely impact of the PRC on the global economy in the future.

Relevant History

As the official policy of the government of the PRC from its inception was to trade with all countries, whether or not diplomatic relations had been established, business entities from most countries, other than the United States, developed trading arrangements with China in the 1950s and 1960s.  During the 1950s, Chinese foreign trade was heavily oriented toward the Soviet Union.  By 1959, 48 percent of China's foreign trade was with the Soviets.  Political disagreements between the two countries, caused Soviet trade to drop to only 7.5 percent of China's total foreign trade by 1966 (Manatoo, 1990, pp. 63-79).

With the decline in the significance of the China-Soviet trade, there was a dramatic rise in the significance of China-Japan trade.  By the end of the 1970s, Japan was China’s leading trade partner; a position it has maintained.  By 1988, the PRC's leading trading partners were Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States, in that order.  Japan is an important trading partner with respect to both imports and exports, while Hong Kong is more important to China as an outlet for its exports, and the United States is more important as a source of imported products, particularly technology (Manatoo, 1990, pp. 63-79).

The popular uprising in Beijing in 1989 and the PRC government's crushing of that uprising before the television cameras of the world led the Chinese government to temporarily suspend some of its economic readjustments, and to generally slow down the pace of economic reform in the country.  For the most part, however, the PRC government wanted to continue its economic interaction with other countries, and, as the events of the summer of 1989 were pushed out of the public mind outside China by the Gulf War of 1991, economic recession, and American and British general elections, the trading climate between the PRC  and other countries returned generally to pre-Tienamen conditions.  By the fall of 1991, most non-Chinese firms had overcome the fears induced by the suppression of the uprising, and were once again desirous of doing business with China (De Voe, 1991, pp. 51-52).

Concerns of the American government continued, however, to impede the development of US-Chinese trade.  Generally, the Administration (first Bush and then Clinton) favored extension of most favored nation status for the PRC, while strong opposition to that designation for the PRC existed in the Congress.  Through early-1996, the Administration position has generally prevailed, although to reach accommodation with the Congress, some governmental restrictions on US-China trade continue (Brauchli & Chang, 1996, p. A14).

In contemporary China, pragmatism has taken precedence over ideology (Gottschang, 1993, pp. 206-276).  Where Mao Ze Dung was quoted as saying that it is better to be Red than to be expert, his eventual successor, Deng Xiaoping, was quoted to the effect that it makes no difference whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice.  The pragmatic approach of Deng was, in a sense, a return to the pragmatic attitude present in the earliest days of the PRC that was manifested in the country's determination to deal with all countries in foreign trade, regardless of political orientation, so long as bases of equality, mutual benefit, and non interference in one another's domestic affairs were maintained.  That attitude continues to prevail (Obi, 1991, pp. 46-48).

From their inception, the PRC's economic readjustments have been made within the framework of a comprehensive plan (Koo, 1990, pp. 797-820).  Centralized planning and control is maintained in agriculture, to the extent that minimum production quotas continue to be established, and must still be met.  These quotas are designed to insure that basic food supplies continue to be available for Chinese cities (Huang, 1990, p. 43).  Once the family quota is met, however, all production from family plots may be sold on the open market, at prices established by the market (Manatoo, 1990, pp. 63-79).  Agricultural reform has permitted China to become a net food exporter, as opposed to a net food importer.  Agricultural exports, however, are not the PRC's leading export product group (Hunter, 1995, p. 355).

Another action by the PRC government that has boosted foreign trade with countries such as Japan, Australia, the United States, and Canada around the Pacific Rim involves intellectual property protection.  The PRC provides both patent protection and trademark copyrights.  Patents will be neither granted nor recognized, however, on foods, beverages, flavorings, pharmaceutical products, chemical substances, animal varieties, or plant varieties, although processes used in the production of such goods may be patented.  Trademark copyrights similar to those granted in the western industrialized countries are provided in the PRC.  Trademark copyright protection is provided for a 10-year period, and they may be renewed in 10-year increments (Gottschang, 1993, pp. 206-276).

        Foreign Relations: Economic and Political

Four legal structures govern foreign participation in the contemporary economy of the PRC.  The Chinese are intensely interested in joint venture agreements.  Joint venture agreements provide the Chinese with access to both foreign technology and foreign capital.  The Chinese are also interested in the licensing of technology from foreign countries.  The special enterprise zone concept is a procedure by which the Chinese plan to accommodate foreign business entities on Chinese soil.  Overall, regardless of the specific form of business ventures involving foreign entities, the Chinese have developed and implemented a countertrade framework within which all foreign trade must be accommodated (Crane, 1990, p. 57).

China's joint venture law became effective in July 1979.  In the first month of the law's existence, 100 joint venture agreements with foreign business entities were signed.  A Chinese must be chairman of the board of all joint ventures, and a majority of the board members must be citizens of the PRC.  It is permissible, however, for the joint venture agreement to be so written that all important issues must be agreed to by two-thirds of the board members.  Thus, the rights of both parties to the agreement may be fully protected.  Further, China has stipulated that the investment of a foreign joint venturer will not be expropriated or otherwise confiscated.  Joint venture managements are also provided the right to fire employees for cause, regardless of the current status of China's iron rice bowl policy.  Profits accruing to a foreign joint venturer may be repatriated (Crane, 1990, p. 63).  If profits are repatriated, however, they will be subject to an additional (over and above any Chinese income tax previously imposed) 10 percent tax.  Chinese income taxes on joint ventures are in the 30-to-35 percent range.  If a foreign joint venturer's profits are not repatriated, the additional tax will not be imposed.  Generally speaking, joint venture terms will range from 15-years to 25- years, depending upon the type of industrial activity involved (Crane, 1990, p. 66).

One Chinese goal is the licensing of technology for the modernization of existing industrial facilities, as opposed to the purchase of new turn-key projects (Yenai, 1990, pp. 707-721).  Under such licensing arrangements, the Chinese demand complete documentation relevant to the technology to be acquired.  American business entities entering into such technology licensing agreements must be aware of (1) this Chinese approach, and (2) to any restrictions on such complete transfer as may be imposed by the United States government or by corporate policy.  Several legal disputes between the Chinese and American business entities operating in China have developed as a consequence of the American entities being unable to fulfill their obligations under licensing contracts because of American governmental restrictions (Ye                        

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Further, products imported for use in the operation of the venture, as well as exports from the venture, are exempted from Chinese customs duties (Xu & Li, 1990, pp. 49-69).

China conducts much of its foreign trade under bilateral trade agreements with other countries.  These agreements often provide for an exchange of Chinese raw materials for either foreign industrial goods or foreign raw materials.  Compensation trade agreements are easier to negotiate than are joint venture agreements.  In compensation trade agreements, foreign business entities deal with Chinese license holders, in an arrangement similar to that prevailing in the early years of the twentieth century.  While the ease of doing business is advantageous under countertrade agreements, and while the risk exposure of foreigners is generally lower than that associated with joint ventures, the potential rewards may also be much lower.  Joint ventures bring technology into China.  They are, thus, favored by the Chinese.  Countertrade agreements are limited by the government of the PRC to the necessities (Gottschang, 1993, pp. 206-276).

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With respect to PRC laws relevant to direct foreign investment, the areas of concern are (1) limitations on local borrowing, (2) restrictions on the repatriation of profits, (3) export policies, (4) pricing policies, (5) rules pertaining to the entry of foreign firms into the economy, and (6) market access.  There is little, if any, local capital available to the foreign investor in China (Yenai, 1990, pp. 707-721).  The PRC is, in fact, seeking external capital.  Through joint venture operations, indigenous capital will flow into projects.  Such capital, however, will not be available directly to foreign investors (Yenai, 1990, pp. 707-721).

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