'What is meant by the term "hegemony", and how far can it be applied to Britain's international role in the mid to late 19th century?'

        At this point it is valuable to begin to explore the concept of ‘hegemony’.  It was first postulated by the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, it’s intention being to represent both the intellectual and economic domination of the ruling class.  Hegemony also implies a dynamic element, where the ideas of different classes struggle for intellectual supremacy in much the same way as the classes themselves struggle economically.  Essentially, it set out to demonstrate how the ideas of the dominant class permeated society, but also implies consent to some degree on the part of the weaker classes.  A far more subtle view than the traditional idea of states demonstrating their authority through the monopoly of violence and simple oppression, it is often adapted for application to International Relations.   Philip McMichael develops the concept into one more applicable in the arena of I.R.:

Theoretically, then, hegemony is most fruitfully conceived as the construction of a set of political-economic relations embodying the power of the dominant state.  It is the imposition of an organizing principle in the world capitalist economy as a reproductive mechanism favoring capital accumulation in the dominant state (and, therefore, state revenues).  To establish this condition, a unified world market and an associated universalization of political liberalism in the interstate system is necessary.

By examining the role played by Britain in the mid to late 19th century it should be possible to see if she indeed fits this definition for the period.  McMichael identifies the importance of observing whether the most powerful state is indeed reconstituting the economic and political order.  Possibly the most important tool, both financial and political, that existed at the time was ‘Free Trade’.  It was certainly viewed as the central concept of British economic policy by the mid-19th century; however, its ideological and political role in the expansion of empire was no less important in many respects.  In fact, the concept of free exchange of goods and capital ran contrary to most established tenets of economic understanding of the day.

Mercantilism had been the dominant idea behind previous empires, both the early British and European, but was attacked in the late 18th century by Adam Smith.  His book, The Wealth of Nations (1776), refuted the idea that for one nation to gain profit, another must lose it.  After rejecting this idea of zero-sum trade, Smith introduced the element of unrestricted trade as a means of increasing wealth for all concerned.  Refined in the 1810s by David Ricardo and the classical economists into ‘Political Economy’, free trade was the perfect tonic for the discredited ideas of protectionism/mercantilism that had resulted in the loss of the thirteen colonies.  The importance of this is immense, and once a cogent movement formed around it in the 1820s, it formed the bedrock of Britain’s economic response to the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars.

        By the middle of the 19th century Britain had established itself as the primary supplier of finance capital into the world markets.  There had also been a large flow of capital to the continent, and this is important in the first place for establishing Britain as a hegemon.  By the definition given earlier, this export of capital allowed for returns to be accrued from the work of others.  These invisible exports were to play an ever-increasing role in balancing Britain’s trade, but importantly allowed her political leverage with most of her rivals – although America was still very protectionist at this time due to internal considerations.  Free trade was the process by which Britain had opened up the world to her capital, and ‘capitalism’ became an indispensable fixture in the lexicon of both economists and politicians (see Hobsbawm, 1975, p1) in this period.  Free trade was only a concept, though, and it was through the sheer dominance of the Royal Navy and associated maritime ventures in all main shipping routes that was to provide the apparatus.  Representing the internationalist approach of Britain as contrasted to the, albeit understandable, domestic fixation of her main rivals, naval freight and military strength was to give the ability to open markets all over the world.

Europe had not been docile the whole time, and the impact of free trade and expanding industrialisation would be felt in the third quarter of the century.  The peace that had reigned since the defeat of Napoleon was to be shattered by war -  ‘…with the exception of Britain, all the European ‘powers’ were substantially – in most cases even territorially – changed between 1856 and 1871’.  Italy and Germany emerged as modern nations from these struggles, their territorial designs being the catalyst for four major wars (see Hobsbawm, 1975, p77).  Thus, by the 1870s, there were industrial challenges to Britain’s dominance of economic production.  Bismarck, through his defeat of Napoleon III, entrenched Germany as the prime economic and military force on the Continent.

        Until this point, when assessing Britain’s role in the world there is little to dispute the application of hegemony to it.  British products flooded newly opened markets, British shipping dominated the seas and British capital funded the development of infrastructure throughout the world.  Which meant that she gained the lion’s share of the 80% increase in trade in the 1850s, and the additional 50% growth in the 60s (see McMichael, 1985, p126).  Also important here is the fact that British economic ideas seemed to be proved almost as laws of nature – the massive increase in world trade in this time gave enormous benefits to the emerging bourgeoisie of Europe as well as Britain, and was very attractive to their rulers.  This contributed to their willingness to enter into free trade.  There were other factors too, especially the promotion of liberalism in the political sense.  By expanding the franchise and reducing the power of absolutist rulers, this was important for maintaining a political economy, linking the main capitalist producers of wealth with the political processes they now depended on so much.

        Even a hegemon is not impervious, however.  The entente that was negotiated between Napoleon III and Britain was very useful in containing the Austrians and Russians in these years.  Indeed ‘…when the Indian Mutiny broke out, and Britain, in Clarendon’s phrase, existed as a nation simply by the grace of Louis Napoleon…who even permitted us to hurry reinforcements across their soil.’  This serves to emphasise the difference between domination and hegemony.  Even though Britain was the most powerful nation in the world at this time, were it not for the consent of other nations, even traditional enemies, there would have been a lot of trouble for her.

        The final quarter of the century provides a more complex picture for Britain’s role.  Her hegemonic position was by no means as clear by the end of the 1870s.  Liberalism was on the wane in Europe, as the wars of national unity had shown.  Nationalism was a new political force, with it’s own agenda and economic ideas.  The rapid growth of the previous two decades was halted in 1873, with the commencement of the ‘great depression’.  Industrial capacity had increased by so much that it caused a glut in cheap, manufactured goods and led to a crisis in capital accumulation (see McMichael, 1985, p134).  Simply put, there were too many companies vying for the same free markets.  The logic of the rising Nationalism was to turn protectionist, and so many states took steps to protect their internal markets.        The shift in this time to new forms of power (electricity, oil, the internal combustion engine), machinery (made from steel or other new alloys) and industries based on emerging scientific advances, such as chemical firms and the like, shows how far the world had moved on from the early days of the industrial revolution (see Hobsbawm, 1975, p304).  Also, the protectionist slant of economies now allowed for the development of strong domestic markets in the larger, unified European states, which to some degree lay the foundations for the development of consumer economies in the future.  Britain, of course, reacted differently, her rationalisation of capital being to divert it from now closed foreign markets to Imperial ones – especially India, which was to become ever more pivotal to Britain.  Also, the position of the City of London and the returns from overseas capital investment already made - £1,000 millions invested by 1875 (see Hobsbawm, 1975, p34) – gave her some relief.  Even Gramsci appreciated this,

The composition of the British balance of trade was subject to constant modification for about fifty years prior to the war [WWI].  The part contributed by the export of goods declined in relative importance and equilibrium was reached more and more thanks to so-called invisible exports.

        Drawing together all the evidence, it looks correct to conclude that hegemony as a concept is applicable to Britain’s role in the mid to late 19th century.  Even though Britain’s economic position relative to the rest of Europe and America declined in the final quarter of the century, her efforts before this had built a base to continue operating as the prime world-power, especially in terms of naval power.  The loss of ideological supremacy, in terms of liberal politics and free trade, can be seen as symptoms of the hegemonic decline towards the end of the period, but it was not until the outbreak of World War I that Britain’s hegemony could resist the expansionist Germany no longer and was finally exorcised.

Bibliography

Gramsci, Antonio, Further Selections from The Prison Notebooks, D Bootham (ed), 1995, Lawrence & Wishart

Holland Rose, J; Newton, A.P.; Benians, E.A. (eds) The Cambridge History Of The British Empire, Volume II, 1940, Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age Of Capital, 1975, Phoenix Press.

McMichael, Philip ‘Britain’s Hegemony in the Nineteenth-Century World-Economy’ in Evans, P. et al (eds.) States Versus Markets in the World-System, 1985, Sage.