National, or regional, armies were often remarked upon for their readiness, or aversion, to adopt an L&LL policy whenever conditions permitted. The Portuguese were noted for their general adoption of it. Whilst, in the German Army, the Prussians were recognized to be particularly aggressive, the Bavarians rather less so and the Saxons relatively amenable. In the British army most battalions tended to go along with it as far as the Thrusters and the general situation allowed.
It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider what conditions tended to permit, or deny, the mutual development of a L&LL way of life in the trenches, be it temporary or of longer duration.
SET BATTLES AND OFFENSIVES
Obviously, in the prosecution of a planned offensive it was virtually impossible to develop a laissez-faire situation when one side was ferociously attacking the other on a massive scale. During the onslaught the motivational imperative of Kill or be Killed was the overwhelming consideration. However, once the attacking force had been fought to a standstill, or effectively counter-attacked, conditions could develop locally, or more generally, to permit a truce for the collection of the wounded and the dead of both sides. Unless, the attack was launched in a series of offensive phases - it was in many major offensives such as the 1st. Battle of the Somme, in 1916 - other mutually acceptable activities such as the overt, or covert, reestablishment of trenches and barbed-wire installations, might begin. From this a more general attitude of ‘We won’t, if you don’t’ could develop, with perhaps minimal levels of reportable, and observable, aggressive action, aimed at keeping the Thrusters, and their High Command sponsors, happy.
INFANTRY AND FIREPOWER
The fighting capability of the infantryman (in which classification must be included the battalion’s NCOs and officers) for most of the war was generally dependent on the following weapons: namely the 0.303 in. Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) rifle, the Mills, fragment, hand- grenade (also widely used with SMLE cup-discharger/launcher), the Lewis gun, the Stoke trench mortar, of various calibres, and the Vickers machine gun. However, as the number of these heavy machine-guns in service increased, the machine-gunners became under the command of the Brigade, as specialist units, and so were not under the direct control of the battalion. Some units also acquired lethal expertise with the entrenching tool. (This was a regulation-issue short-handled spade that was specially sharpened to make it an extremely effective offensive weapon in the restricted fighting space of the trench. It was used rather in the fashion, and vigour, of the medieval mace). Accordingly, the infantryman’s scope of action was limited to a maximum range of around 2,000 yards. Generally speaking, that meant up to the first support trench of the enemy. The trench-bound infantryman could then employ his skills within these confines and confidently anticipate the opposing enemy infantryman to retaliate in likewise fashion, or even more aggressively.
If protected by a well-prepared and maintained trench system, the infantry were well shielded from rifle and machine-gun fire and, to a lesser extent, the rifle-grenades and lighter artillery shells, provided they stayed with-in the system and kept below the level of the trench parapet. However, they were singularly susceptible to mortar and heavy artillery fire and, from 1916, poisonous gas; particularly mustard gas, for which there was only very limited protective measures and little effective treatment. Many of the in-trench casualties were caused by these latter classes of weapons and were entirely beyond the infantryman’s control; apart from calling up the artillery for appropriate counter action in an attempt to achieve some relief.
All of the British infantry divisions eventually used sniping as an effective form of middle distance aggression. In addition to the specialist sniper units at the company and battalion level, the more aggressive battalions actively pursued sniping on the basis of individual initiative; a N.C.O. from the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers was credited with over one hundred sniper kills. It can only be imagined what punitive response the cumulative actions of this individual brought down on the heads of his fellow-soldiers.
The only other really aggressive potential, which existed at the battalion level, rested with the Trench Mortar Officer. As already indicated, his specialist unit could use the highly effective high-trajectory ballistic profile of their trench mortars to penetrate into the very heart of even the most sophisticated trench defences, including well built dug-outs. An active and competent mortar officer could bring about a high state of terror in the opposing army. Of course, this would engender similar levels of retribution, with the inevitable consequent casualties and damage to his own trench system. It can be imagined that, often, he would be under spoken, or unspoken, pressure to resist any over enthusiastic self-instigated urges for offensive action.
Other aggressive activities that were strongly encouraged, and at times strenuously insisted upon by the High Command, were more territorial in orientation. The most important of these were reconnaissance patrols in No Man’s Land (usually passive) and trench raids (deliberately offensive and, occasionally, diversionary). In principle, volunteers carried out these activities. Some infantrymen gained renown for their voluntary repeated forays into this dangerous area. Invariably, both of these activities were carried out at night and nearly always included attempts at taking prisoners for intelligence purposes. Nighttime activities also included active maintenance and improvement of the trench system and barbed wire installations.
Even here, a quid pro quo situation could develop where these activities would be tolerated, provided they did not get too aggressive and too costly. Indeed, there are many reports of reconnaissance patrols of the protagonists passing each other identified but unchallenged.
It was, therefore, quite logical to assume that, in the absence of High Command sponsored demands and initiatives for ‘Over-the-Top’ adventures, the infantrymen entrenched on both sides of No Man’s Land could, and did, co-exist, in a state relative tolerance. However, the status quo would always be subject to the vicissitudes of retaliatory actions prompted by long-range artillery and gas attacks, largely sponsored by higher command levels and beyond the control of the Battalion itself.
THE ARTILLERY
After the shell shortage crisis in the early part of the war, the artillery (Field, Howitzer and Heavy Guns) became an enormously powerful force. It consisted basically of two elements; the support artillery situated about 2,000 yards behind the main trench line and the heavy artillery several miles behind the reserve trench system.
On the face of it would seem, therefore, that both the short and long-range artillery would act more or less under the total control of the higher echelons. However, the battalion would usually have a limited input in certain well-defined situations, where back-up barrage support may have been seen to be strategically and/or tactically necessary, and responsibility for demanding it would be delegated to the battalion level. Thus divorced from the immediate daily problems and alarums of the infantryman’s life, it might be supposed that these two arms of the artillery generally led an independent existence. And, with certain limited exceptions, strictly followed their own song-sheet, somewhat oblivious to the daily cares and tribulations of the men in the trenches. However, this viewpoint ignores an important personal element; the presence of the Royal Artillery Forward Observational Officer (F.O.O.) who, in order to obtain highest level of collaboration with the infantry, served in the trenches alongside them. The F.O.O. would be only too painfully aware of the results of provocative actions by his fellow gunners. No doubt, apart from his own wish for self-preservation, he was inevitably subject to a certain amount of psychological pressure from his erstwhile trench companions to limit, whenever possible, the degree of provocation to supportable levels.
The artillery was itself far from immune from retaliation. Active artillery units were usually susceptible to increasingly accurate counter fire as the war progressed, and the guns and gunner’s skills improved. This was particularly so when they were firing as individual guns or batteries. Spotters on the ground and in the air (in balloons and aircraft) could readily determine the location of the gun batteries, and direct the line of retaliatory fire. All gunners, therefore, had an interest in limiting their activity; particularly the big guns which were less mobile and, thus, less able change their location in response to accurate counter-fire.
TENDER POINTS
In all sectors, quiet or otherwise, both sides would select certain strategically vulnerable points as acknowledged retaliation sites. These targets were known as ‘Tender Points’ (TP’s). The TP’s might be busy and essential crossroads, or communication trenches, up which vital supplies and replacements had to be brought. Or even something more mundane, but important, such as a latrine. If a L&LL status was being observed, and the offended party felt that they had been provoked beyond the norm, these TP’s would be periodically strafed by an appropriate punitive reaction such as machine gunfire, bombing with hand-grenades/grenade launchers and/or mortar-bombs, or shelling with artillery gunfire. To meet the requirements of the ‘Thrusters’ of the various command echelons for continuous offensive action, whilst L&LL was in-force, these TP’s could be routinely shelled at certain times of the day and/or night. In this way, the offensive criteria of the command echelons were met, whilst all at risk on the receiving end could take appropriate avoidance action. Especially favoured for their demonstrative effect were the larger mortar-bombs, which, because of their size and high trajectory, could easily be spotted from the opposing trenches and avoidance movement taken to a safer spot. In particular, the B.E.F. ‘Pigs’ and the German Minenwerfers were readily seen in flight and produced spectacular explosions. Various alerts, such as whistles and sirens, were developed to facilitate these avoidance measures. At the same time the mortar-bomb would provide a justifiably significant explosion for the benefit of the higher echelons of command. In sectors where, currently, L&LL was not being observed, these TP’s could be murderously dangerous. They produced a constant stream of human and animal casualties and destroyed equipment. TP’s often received infamous notoriety as ‘Hell-Fire Corner’, ‘Death Ravine’ and the like.
CONCLUSIONS
Bearing in mind the duration of the war on the Western Front, and the continual circulation of up to 700 British infantry battalions between the front-, support- and reserve-lines, in both the more active and quieter zones, certain adaptations to specific circumstances were inevitable. Amongst which were certainly included the mutual acceptance of an unofficial and illicit L&LL philosophy, whenever an acceptable level of tolerance/understanding could be achieved between the opposing armies. As already stated, some nationalities, armies and individual fighting units were more eager to sustain offensive action under all situations than others. This was generally reflected in the overall casualty figures of these units. Overall, it is certainly true that the Allies almost consistently suffered proportionally more casualties than the Central Powers, as they were more consistently on the offensive. But there is also the confounding factor of the consensus that it was the superior organisation of the German Army that enhanced this imbalance. Equally, it is often averred that it was the extraordinary casualties suffered by the Germans in the 1918 Ludendorff offensive, which broke the morale of the German Army to the extent that no recovery was possible.
So, what is the overall verdict to be drawn about how the British Army’s attitude to L&LL affected the outcome of the war? Undoubtedly, some units of the infantry of the Allies and the Central Powers participated in L&LL, some of the time, whenever it was rational and feasible to do so. It is inconceivable that they could have survived years of continuous warfare without adopting, at least in some instances, some form of it. Perhaps, then, as far as the British and Commonwealth armies were concerned, the war winning combination could be defined as follows. Firstly, the general attitude of most British/Commonwealth infantrymen, who were increasingly militarily professional as the war went on, was that of encouraging at least some degree L&LL. At the same time they stoically maintained a toecap-to-toecap confrontation with the German Army whilst periodically energetically pursuing the High Command’s policy of continuous offensive action. This meant that when the German High Command in 1918 finally felt obliged by external factors to take the great gamble of their last great offensive on the Western Front, the German Army suffered increasingly unsustainable levels of attrition to their armies. Secondly, by thus steadfastly holding the Germans and their allies at bay in the trenches, the trench fighters enabled the twin pressures of the Allied land and sea blockade, and the failure of German State’s domestic production, to squeeze the fighting heart out the German nation and its autocratic rulers.
