The tactics, which developed directly from trench warfare and the desperate attempt to break the stalemate, culminated into a ‘war of attrition’. The introduction of 1916 saw the instatement of Sir Douglas Haig who was committed to destroying the German line by sheer strength in numbers and power. Both sides quickly utilised the benefits of the rifle, machine gun and artillery action, which eventually attested to being advantageous for defence as complete slaughters of armies were experienced.
The dominance of artillery fire is alliterated in source 19.J as the American historian Hurbert Johnson stated, “Firepower won battles and decided wars and firepower was an amalgam of rifle, machine-gun and artillery action.” He further noted the ‘unconscious assumptions that the offence had a good chance of beating the defence if it could deliver the greater volume of fire’ again confirming the nature of fighting on the Western Front as a ‘war of attrition’. These misconceived concepts by respective officers created a year of attrition to unlock the opposition through a number of key and costly battles at Verdun, the Somme, and a year later at Paschendale.
The Somme, for example produced 60000 British casualties during its first day, which accumulated to a total of over a million casualties by its end in November 1916. The immense destruction caused by the power of new technology indicating another testament to the war of attrition as Source 19.J explores the German perspective through general Sixt Von Armin who felt the repercussions of the strength in artillery. He states, “…the casualties were so great before the enemy’s attack was launched, that the possibility of the front line repulsing the attack was very doubtful” which corresponds directly to the nature of the fighting being characterised as a ‘war of attrition’ as the effect of the methodical artillery is portrayed but more importantly so is the emphasis given to this nature of fighting by each of the generals. The nature of the Western Front in its unconscious belief than superiority in men held the key further acknowledges the idea of a ‘war of Attrition”. During the Battle of the Somme, British Generals gave orders that men would only need to walk across no-man’s land as when they were to reach the German trenches there wouldn’t be one German standing for they would have succumbed to the brutality of the artillery fire or more surprising is that they were to walk in a line as if one or two rows of troops were to be shot down the third would most certainly succeed. The strength in numbers resulting through Kitchener’s citizen’s army campaign brought about high pre-battle morale that was to be incorporated into the ‘war of attrition”. The Battle of Verdun also experienced the heavy losses so typical of the ‘war of attrition’ as officers centered every resource into establishing a breakthrough. “The French called the road to Verdun the voie sacrée (holy way), because so many men went down it to their deaths” (Joffre, 1916).
The focus upon human resources is again justified through the trench warfare that is dealt by Source 19.L by Dennis Winter. He states that the burden of trench life needed an abundance of men, “to dig a front-line system it took 450 men six hours per 250 yards”. As the source observes the reliance of detail and material resources in order to withstand the tactics of attrition as troops attempted to prevent weariness. Likewise Source 19.K pictures a number of soldiers that were needed to provide assistance to a tank again outlining the demands placed upon troops in the ‘war of attrition’.
The nature of the fighting at the western front can also be represented as a ‘war of attrition’ due to the changing face of war through total war. Many of the soldiers were often supported through economic and social means particularly enforced by government regulations in order to benefit the front with material assets that could be inturn utilised in the war of attrition. The fighting consisted of an abundance of shells and ammunitions where, “more shells were fired one day at the Somme than over the whole Franco-Prussian War. The only means for this was through the coordination of an intense home campaign in the munitions industry allowing the nature of the fighting to resemble a ‘war of attrition’. Furthermore the development of tactics such as the introduction of creeping barrages, in-depth defence, tanks and gas complimented the home front campaign creating a ‘war of attrition’. General Sixt von Armin acknowledges the impact of attrition into the development of in-depth tactics to create limit losses and aid the firepower.
