The typical grain yield in medieval Europe was 1:3; that is to say that every grain cast would yield three at harvest. This is the lowest level at which agriculture is worthwhile. However with the development of cities in Western Europe, the trading and manufacturing population gave up growing food, buying it from farmers instead. The emergence of a rich urban market encouraged landlords to raise surplus. By the 16th and 17th centuries yields had risen to 1:6 and 1:7. Theories relating grain yield to population development have been laid down as such:
“Civilisation begins only where one grain of seed multiplies itself at least five times. It is this minimum surplus which determines (assuming there are no food imports) whether a significant proportion of the population can be released from the necessity of raising food to pursue other occupations. In a country with low yield ratios highly developed industry, commerce and transport are impossible, as is developed political life” R.Pipes
The life of the Russian peasants was comfortable, but they could never produce enough surpluses to support Russian development.
The adverse natural conditions that existed in Russia, however, cannot be named as the sole cause of the low yields. Scandinavia, despite its northern location, attained by the 18th century ratios of 1:6.
The other cause was Russia’s isolation. Most obviously Russia is isolated in geographical terms, being thousands of miles away from civilised Europe, and with no access to major sea routes. As a result many in the west were almost oblivious to events in Russian or even its very existence, and political connections were very slight and intermittent. Economically, she was also an isolated state, existing without any rich or friendly neighbours with whom to trade, and is too remote from great routes of international trade to have developed a significant urban civilisation on the basis of foreign commerce. Russia has always had to rely on its own resources to support its population (which has always been considerably smaller than those of Western countries). This lack of markets for cereal produce formed part of a vicious circle. The poor natural conditions made for low yields, this resulted in poverty, and poverty meant that there were no buyers for agricultural produce, this lack of buyers would then discourage yield improvements. What little trading that did occur with foreigners was conduct by the tsar and the richest landlords who preferred to import only luxuries, and not items that would benefit the country’s economy.
So far we have seen that Russian was clearly unable to support a high level of development, and compared to the rest of Europe it was indeed backward technologically speaking and, also isolated physically, economically and politically.
We can take the term ‘weakness’ to be the stability of government, and its security against foreign invasion. These features would always be difficult ones to achieve for Russia, formed as it was from a multitude of self-contained and self-governing communities.
To begin with Russia was split roughly into individual principalities, around which existed a free and exceedingly mobile population. Within his own private domain however, the prince would exercise authority both as a sovereign and proprietor. Here he was in full command, an outright owner of all men and things. Initially the population of the princely domain consisted mainly of slaves and other persons bonded in one form or another to the proprietor. Outside his domains, the ruler exercised very little authority, being confined largely to the collection of tribute. From the solid base of authority that were their private domains, the Russian princes gradually spread their power over the free population. The princely dynasty of Moscow (which emerged as the country’s leader) applied the institutions and practices which had initially worked out in its own closed world to the realm at large, transferring Russia into a giant royal estate (though the Russian government lacked the means to make the claim good). Indeed in the second half of the 17th century it would take 3 weeks for and inquiry to be answered from Kiev to Moscow through the use of a messenger. Thus towns and villages lying at some distance from the principal roads were for all practical purposes incommunicable. This factor alone made it impossible to institute in Russia a tightly organised bureaucratic regime before the 1860’s when railways and telecommunications were introduced. It had no alternative, therefore, but to continue the old dyachic arrangement, farming out the bulk of the country to the landed gentry, clergy and bureaucracy in return for fixed taxes and services.
Practical evidence of Russia being a weak state is easy to find. In terms of conflict, Russian was volatile, though only at its borders. Right up until the 18th century she was continually involved in small-scale war along its southern and southeastern borders. In western parts where the situation was somewhat calmer, there was war approximately one year out of every two. These conflicts (led by Tsar Alexander) were primarily driven by the extensive, highly wasteful nature of Russian rural economy and the need for ever fresh land to replace that exhausted by over-cultivation and under-manuring and the need at all times to push outward. Alexis’ major wars were fought in the west against Poland, but were largely unsuccessful. By the end of his last campaign 1656, the success and plunder of the first three years of the campaign had run out, and the costs of war had proven heavy. The government had been forced to start issuing copper coins in place of silver ones early in the war, and increased money supply afterwards promoted huge inflation.
From this evidence it must e said that Russia must be classified as being a weak state, highly susceptible to foreign invasion, with a far from total control of her people, and a delicate economy. But the principle that Russia belonged to its sovereign was firmly established; all that was lacking to enforce it were the financial and technical means.
The final element of the “common European view” that we must analyse is the allegation that the Russian people were a barbaric race. This is essentially a judgement on the society which the other elements had produced. The two most published works on the topic are Herbertstein’s Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii, and Olearioys’s Neue Bechreibung der Moscowitschen (mentioned in the introduction). The single most important set of perceptions in both of these works is the “unlimited control of the lives and property of all (the tsar’s) subjects”.
Herberstein work was written in the 16th century and is particularly critical of many parts of Russian life. He writes that the are more “cunning an deceitful that all others”, and that they have “no sense of honour”, rulers routinely violating “their solemn oaths. The treatment of deplorable treatment of women, and the lack of justice or freedom of citizens is also described. When Olearioys visited Russia the image he painted was much the same, the distinctive features being “political tyranny, moral debasement, and indifference or hostility to intellectual pursuits”. These damning accounts of Russian life lead us to believe that Russian society was surely of a more barbaric nature when compared to that of Western cultures of the time.
However, the bleak picture described above can be balanced by accounts of the willingness of Tsar Alexis to become a more westernised state. The campaigns in the west (that ended around 1660) had changed the Tsar, and opened his eyes to the possibility of moulding an imperial environment for himself. Within a matter of months, hundreds of foreign craftsmen and artists were brought to Muscovy. Silver caskets, dishes, plates, knives, forks, trees for his gardens, carriages, Spanish uniforms, armchairs, and even a glass summerhouse were all ordered from the west. As well as these luxuries, he also ordered doctors, alchemists, herbal books, spring makers, birds and glassmakers. Indeed Alexis’ efforts seem to have been genuinely concerned with his country’s economic health and military strength.
This evidence suggests that barbarianism was not at the heart of Russian mentality, and was merely a way of life crafted out of the harsh history of its people. We can see that Russia was willing to tang and making positive steps to do so, but for the majority of the 17th century at least the Russian people as a whole lived in a comparatively barbarous society.
In conclusion one can see that the allegations of “backwardness, isolation, and weakness” are far easier to justify that that of a barbarian society. Russia was through various historical and geographical causes, considerably less advanced technologically, had a much weaker government, and was thus isolated from the west politically and economically (as well as geographically). Barbarianism however is somewhat harder to justify. Slavery was the natural state of most Russians at the time, but the willingness and desire to adopt western ways of life proves that they were not a totally barbarian people.