As heavy industries grew rapidly, consumer goods were ignored in the First Five Year Plan. Textile production actually declined during the FFYP largely due to the collapse in livestock numbers and the destruction of the cottage industries that had taken place previously in the rural areas of the country as a direct consequence of collectivisation. The development of the housing industry was virtually ignored by the government. However, during the Second & Third Five Year Plans, the situation improved considerably as money was pumped into the consumer goods industry. Footwear production and food processing made significance progress and by late 1930s, new bakeries, ice cream and meat packing factories were established in many cities across Russia. However, it is clear that more could have been done by the government to boost the consumer goods looking at the immense effort that it put into the heavy industries and after 1937, as war drew closer, the resources from the consumer goods were diverted back again towards the heavy industries and production levels fell again.
One of the most important indicators of the success of an industrialisation programme is the extent to which the country has been urbanised. This means the movement of population from the countries to the towns and the growth of big cities in which there are a large number of factories employing many workers. Between 1928-40 there was rapid urbanisation in the USSR-there can be little doubt about that. Moscow’s population increased from 2.2m in 1929 to 3.6m in 1936, Leningrad also experienced urbanisation with its population increasing from 1.6m in 1926 to 3.5m in 1939. New cities were created and certain previously undeveloped areas such as the Donbass coal and steel region saw a massive growth in their population. The public transport system was developed and in the larger cities, underground railway was being developed. The railways system was increased massively and by 1928 there was over 50,000 kms. of railway lines stretched across Russia. However, urbanisation had its drawbacks. Each Soviet citizen had, on average, 5.88 sq. metres of living space during this period, which was well below the 8.25 sq. metres sanitary norm. In Moscow demand for houses were far greater than what the councils could provide for-In 1932 there were 550 people living in a local army barrack 15 feet wide and 800 feet long. The cities were crowded with people from the countryside and one historian uses the term ‘ruralisation’ to describe this growth. Magnitogorsk lacked the basic resources needed for workers’ housing and the conditions in which the workers lived were appalling. Thus industrialisation did certainly occur but the people who actually brought the factories to life were often the losers.
Connected to the problem of poor working and living conditions for workers, was the issue of living standards as a whole. It is true that long-term unemployment was absent in the USSR during this time. The need for workers was so intense due to the industrialisation process that women were being drawn into industry and by 1937, 40% of all industrial workers were women. On top of this the employers looked after their workers well with many allocating good quality apartments, included social wages in their salaries and raised their wages as well. However, although real wages rose after 1933, they stayed below the level of 1928. Even the government, on some occasions, looked to improve the conditions of the workers. Rationing was no longer needed by 1936 and cheap food and clothes were available for workers. Even education was made free. However, in Leningrad, meat, milk and fruit consumption fell by 2/3rd between 1928-33. Alex Nove says that during the first years of the FFYP, there was a ‘most precipitous decline in living standards known in recorded history.’ Food shortages and rapid inflation troubled the industrial workers. Moreover, the huge movement of people from the countryside to the cities greatly increased the populations of the cities and thus resources per worker fell rapidly. On the whole, living standards improved after 1933 although it took many years for the figures to get higher than the 1928 levels.
For the successful completion of any industrialisation programme, there has to be a highly skilled workforce. In the USSR, training schemes were introduced along with each of the Five Year Plans. As a result, the proportion of skilled workers in the workforce rose rapidly in the 1930s. However, in 1933 only 17% of the workforce in Moscow were skilled. Because of the Stakhanovite movement there was a rise in performance-related pay in the factories. As Thurston argues, it gave some workers an opportunity to voice their thoughts about the working conditions in their factory and criticise corrupt managers. However, these Stakhanovites caused tensions within the industries and there was fierce and unhealthy competition to beat targets. Moreover, slave labour was used to complete projects such as the White Sea Canal-in 1941, 8% of the workforce were in labour camps. Thus we see that Stalin’s labour force was still highly unskilled and many historians have argued that it was a major barrier to a rapid growth in the USSR’s industries.
On the whole historians agree that success of Stalin’s industrialisation drive was more successful in its later years i.e., in the Second and Third Five Year Plans. The FFYP was marred with ill-planning with no details set down, targets were set too high and the Gosplan and Vesenkha were competing with each other set higher targets. Resources were in shortage and the factories constantly demanded more than they needed. Bribery and corruption were rife and some firms produced more and some less. As a result industrial production suffered. In the Second and Third FYP, the plans were sorted out better and the details were discussed with experts and realistic targets were set for firms to meet. New training schemes were set up and a better idea of costs and revenue was made-as a result industrial performance was improved greatly during these years. However, on the whole there were certain drawbacks of the drive. There was always confusion around especially helped by the colossal paperwork which was floating around everywhere. It contained targets, which were never met, profits, which one could never see, and this distracted the authorities to further raise the targets. Fighting between firms was prevalent over natural resources. There was always someone to blame if the targets were not met. This greatly slowed the pace of the industrialisation drive of Stalin. The process of industrialisation did result in the increase of the size of the economy and greater production although the process could have been much faster. Thus it was an attempt, which was met with partial success. However, it certainly set the ball rolling for the USSR to develop in a major industrial power in the future.
