Source 5 agrees with sources 4 and 6 that agricultural reforms were a failure. It shows an increase in crops and livestock between 1958-62, as the peasants were eager to cultivate the land, as described in source 4, however was not able to meet the target of increasing crops and livestock by 70% in 1965. Source 5 proclaimes that the total agricultural output of 1962 droped from 107 to 99 by 1963, which corresponds with Source 6 'The 1963 and 1965 grain harvests were badly affected by adverse weather'. Source 5 disagrees with source 6 that in 1965 grain harvets were bad, as the total output increased in 1965, which presents a limited amout of support for the reforms, yet in general supports its failure. The reliability of source 5 is extremly limited as we have no regognition of its origin or the writer. It is a resonable assumption that the statisitics are from the soviet government, which could have been used as propaganda, to remove Khrushchev from power as they were released the same time that he was removed or to hide the true statistics. Source 5 shows limited evidence of peasants resistance towards Krushchev agricultural reforms.
Alexander II was the First Tsar leader in the period studied. In source 1, Ronald Hingley supports Alexander II success 'the emperors achievement is one of momentous moral and symbolic significance', Peter Oxley agrees that Alexander was the 'Tsar Liberator'. However, Hingley predominantly supports the failure of the emancipation, 'most of the liberated serfs resented recieveing too little land for their needs', 'Nor the freedom granted to them was by any means complete, after 1861 individual peasants remained bound in various ways to their village communes', this shows peasants resistance and failure of reforms. Hingley describes the positive aspects 'peasants were freed and were granted a size of allotment'. However there were still limitations and peasants had a negative attitude towards the policies due to the taxes they had to pay as they 'remained subject to legal discrimination'. Source 1 implies slight support from the peasants yet shows great resistance. Sources 5, 4 and 1 support the failure of the agricultural reforms but do provide some support for the various new policies, also Sources 1 and 6 are similar due to the peasants initial enthusiasm for the new agricultural reforms.
Source 2 shows successes and failures of Stolypins land reforms. Account A describes 'Government placed its wager not on the needy or the drunken, but the sturdy and the strong', this is proof of previous agriculture failures due to people still needy and drunken, evidently not a problem resolved by Alexander II. Account A only supports the failure of the previous reforms, and does not provide sufficient evidence to show peasants resistance. This source can be seen as unreliable as it was written by Stolypin who wanted to encourage people to support his reforms. 'The peasants are very hostile towards the law of 9 November', this quote from account B supports the peasants resistance towards agriculture reform, however it does not question the failure of the reforms. Account B is written by a Tsarist official, in 1996 which limits the sources value as we are unaware of his motives and if his thoughts were the same during Nicholas' rule. Account C contridicts account B, 'A bright new future lies ahead of the Peasants'. In theory Stolypins agricultural reforms were successful, yet it promised more than it could deliver, benefitting some peasants but not a significant amount. Account C is the most reliable source when discussing the peasants resistance due to its origin and the writer, however we cannot generalise all peasants feelings towards towards Stolypin and his agriculture reforms. Account C does not provide any evidence for the failure of reforms.
Source 3 is a conversation between Winston Churchill and Stalin describing the problems he faced as a Communist leader in Russia. Stalin introduced the new agriculture poicy of collectivisation, to move towards marxist and communist reform. 'The collective farm policy was a terrible struggle', this empasises that many peasants resisted the collectiviation policy. 'You were not dealing with a few score thousands of aristocrats, but with millions of small men', this shows that the peasants created problems for stalin by uniting together against the policies. Source 3 supports the question as it shows how the peasants resisted agricultural reforms and it does show some agricultural success 'we vastly increased the food supply' and the social structure enforced with the kulaks and the poor peasants. This source contradicts source 6 as Nove believed that it was due to Stalin that Krushchev policies were failures, yet source 3 implies his success 'we have improved the quality of grain beyond all measure'. The reliablity of Source 3 is questionable due to Stalins desire to impress Churchill and attempt to gain appreciation of his policy of collectivisation.
In conclusion sources 1 to 6 all help us to create a greater understanding of Russia during the Tsar and Communist leadership. The peasants resistance continued to be a predominant problem for all rulers when attempting to enforce new agricultural ideology, however the sources only support the question to a slight extent due to lack of evidence. The main factor of the failure of the agricultural reforms was the inability of the rulers to meet the peasants needs and compromise with them to realise their contribution to the success of their plans. All of the sources show consistant failure, however the extent of the failure depends on each source, and the sources show higher incidents of agricultural failure rather than peasants resistance. Although all of the sources are helpfull, their reliability is limited and therefore more sources must be analysed to discover the extent of the peasants resistance and the agricultural failures.
