In origins andoutcome, the Spanish Civil War was a Spanish and not a European affair - Discuss.
'In origins and outcome, the Spanish Civil War was a Spanish and not a European affair.' Discuss.
The essay question concerned considers the nature and character of the Spanish civil war from its early development to the fall of Madrid on March 28 1938, effectively ending the conflict. In attempting to answer the essay question proficiently it is fundamental to first of all divide the assessment into two sections. The first segment aims to deal with the origins of the conflict, considering the extent of European intervention leading up to the outbreak of war. The second section is concerned with the development of the civil conflict, specifically concentrating on the disposition of European involvement. Almost seventy years after the Spanish Civil War there is no consistency in the historiography of events which many believe influenced the outbreak of the Second World War. A backward almost forgotten country became the focus of a world problem. Many believe 'the Spanish conflict was only the latest and fiercest battle in a European civil war which had been raging intermittently for the previous twenty years.1'Ardent debate persists with regards to not only the foreign weight on the preparations, process and outcome, but also towards the time, interests and the scale of foreign intervention. The reality of the matter is that intervention from the Great Powers had significant consequences on the process and outcome of the civil war.
In considering the extent of intervention with regards to the foundations of the Spanish conflict it is fundamental to determine Spain's early domestic position. 'Spain in 1930 was simultaneously a moribund monarchy, a country of uneven economic development, and a battleground of ardent political and intellectual crosscurrents'2. There existed a neo-feudal society with Spain's traditional ruling elite commanding the system. The majority of the population were living off the land with roughly half employed in agriculture. The great landowners held enormous power. 'In Estremadura, La Mancha and Andalucia, 7,000 landowners owned 15 million acres, the three richest grandees accounting for about 600,000 of them.3' The Catholic Church held a domineering position in all circles of |Spanish life. 'It was also estimated to have owned up to one-third of the total wealth of Spain'4. The ever obvious disparity of land and wealth began to produce a mounting polarisation of the population. Diminutive industrial advance combined with poor state of affairs in exports expanded the number of starving which in turn lead to increased migration to larger cities, in particular the industrial Barcelona. Anarchism became the principal power within the Spanish working class, converting all to the belief that 'freedom and mutual aid were the only foundation of a naturally ordered society'5. The establishment of the CNT (anarcho-syndicalist movement) illustrates the politically aware masses who welcomed the restructuring of society centred on self-managed industry and agriculture.
Following the failure of Primo de Rivera dictatorship, elections held on the 12 April 1931 witnessed gains from anti-monarchical candidates in all large towns apart from Cadiz, which confirmed that 'Old Spain' was inept in adjusting to the modern world. The second republic had been spawned without bloodshed and 'at a time when Spain had accumulated considerable industrial progress, but also at a time when the pace of progress had clearly been declining for a decade, even before the occurrence of the worst depression in modern times'6. The anticipation for change produced a strong victory for the coalition of Left Republicans and Socialist in June 1931 elections.
The Second Republic faced great tension over the issues of land reform, the power of the church, the army, and regional devolution. 'The centralist and authoritarian representative of old Spain regarded any attempt to tamper with the traditional structure of the nation as treason.7' The vigour of traditional Spain had begun scheming in opposition to the Republic within weeks of Alfonso's abdication. Alternatively, for the working classes the reform programme was not far-reaching enough with the government doing little to improve the living conditions of the worker and landless peasant. General elections on the 19th November 1933 produced a result shock for the Republic, resulting in a sway of supremacy to the right.
The return of the right produced the deconstruction of almost all the Republic's reforms. Labour laws were revoked causing an escalation in unemployment. Landowners and Employers rejoiced by evicting tenants, putting up rents, slashing wages, firing workers and ruthlessly crushing uprisings organised by CNT. An atmosphere of hostility prevailed; the powerfully charge rising in Asturia was portentous of events to come. The elections of 1936, elected the so-called Popular Front (a coalition of centre and left-wing parties, republicans, socialist, communists, and the POUM) organised under Manuel Anzana. 'The popular front was only some 150,000 votes ahead out of nearly 10 million cast'8. The Spanish electorate was virtually split down the middle, and the leftist Popular Front coalition scarcely overcame rightist parties. Traditional Spain rejected the Cortes and began to assign an extra-parliamentary campaign. The most noticeable and dynamic was the Falange which was subsidized by the Italian government. The menacing actions of the anarchist and far left groups threatened the right with a sense of revolutionary change.
Frustrated with the rights failure to gain power through political means, the army, under Generals Sanjurjo, Mola, and Franco, led a rebellion of "Nationalists" in July against the Republic. In brief, the Republic failed, and as a consequence, both sides appealed for assistance from abroad.
The evidence seems to indicate that the whole affair had been typically Spanish. The foreign influence on the outbreak of the revolt appears to have been minimal. The history of origins indicates that civil war was a consequence of the deep polarisation in the population.
The next phase of the assessment aims to analyse the influence of foreign intervention in the process of the Civil war. The most effective way of assessing European intervention will be to examine in detail the stance and actions of each Great Power on a separate basis. 'In 1936, twenty-seven European nations formally adhered to non-intervention policy regarding the Spanish conflict9', however this proved to be negated in time. All the key European powers followed different and equally contradictory policies. 'Each great power responded to non-intervention in the way that best agreed with the policy it was already following: the fascist powers with instinctive aggression, the democracies with caution'10. Geographically Spain assumed a very valuable standing. She possessed vital naval bases on the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Balearic Islands. In addition she held large Iron ore and bauxite resources which would prove very beneficial for a war campaign.
Hitler was not interested in territorial expansion, but in economic, military and strategic, and alliance matters, although he put the ideological factor to the forefront. Hitler decided to support the Nationalists and meet Franco's inquiry for transport planes on 25 July 1936, along the advice of Hermann Goering, the German minister for war and the officer of the 'Vier-Jahresplan'.
The war offered Germany the possibility to test the emerging airforce, with regards to a possible Second World War. In Spain, Goering saw a playground for the German army. In economic matters, the German fascists were particularly ...
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Hitler was not interested in territorial expansion, but in economic, military and strategic, and alliance matters, although he put the ideological factor to the forefront. Hitler decided to support the Nationalists and meet Franco's inquiry for transport planes on 25 July 1936, along the advice of Hermann Goering, the German minister for war and the officer of the 'Vier-Jahresplan'.
The war offered Germany the possibility to test the emerging airforce, with regards to a possible Second World War. In Spain, Goering saw a playground for the German army. In economic matters, the German fascists were particularly interested in the Spanish commodities especially copper and iron.
The institutions ROWAK (German) and HISMA (Spanish) were founded to control and organise the German-Spanish economy-relations as a kind of compensation system.
In return for military support the Germans got food and raw materials, things that were urgently needed for their war production. At the end of 1937 Germany was the supreme power regarding the Spanish relations with foreign economies.
In terms of strategic advantages, Hitler was interested in a German friendly Spain in case of conflicts with France.
At the beginning he provided transport planes to the Nationalists, in order to transfer troops and material from Morocco to Spain. This enables Franco to circumvent the republican sea-blockade and to start his revolt in Spain. The most famous German support is represented in the Legion Condor, that was responsible for the elimination of Guernica and that was involved in all major Spanish conflicts.
Altogether, Germany supported Franco with 17,000 soldiers, 600 airplanes, 200 tanks and 1,000 artilleries [8].
In the course of the war, Germany sent approximately 10,000 men to fight with the nationalists. Perhaps the most important part of this contribution was the 'Condor Legion', composed mainly of planes and air force troops, created in November 1936 specifically to strengthen Franco armies. Pg76
Germany
Hitler was fearful of communist Spain. Hitler saw any victory of socialist Spain as a creation of a leftist bloc in Europe. The quest for Lebensraum was dependent on a prior defeat of France, and that defeat would be endangered if the Spanish Popular Front were not first eliminated.
Economic advantage - Spain's minerals, aid German rearmament
Hitler was not ready to provoke a European conflict, didn't want to alarm or antagonize. He used the conflict as a form of preparation for the struggle in Europe which was inevitable. pg81
Carr
Germany - Spain could facilitate Hitler's own eastern ambitions by dividing any would-be anti-German coalition. France would take her eyes off Czechoslovika and take some her men from the Rhine, while Italy would forge the German threat to Austria. Anti-communist crusade might win Br & Italy as allies.
Hitler dispatched 26 aeroplanes and 86 men, which arrived on 29 July pg215.
Dispatched arms on 29 Sept known as Operation Otto.
'From the 29 July to 11 Oct the Germans transported 13,523 Moroccan troops and 270,100 kg's of war material from Morocco to Andalusia'. pg217
In Sept the Germans had 553 troops in Spain compared to 413 Italians.
Internet
German Condor Legion had 600 aircraft and 200 tanks. Gave Nationalists command of the air in a war where aerial bombardment and superiority became decisive. German Junkers airlifted Franco's Troops and Army of Africa from Morocco. Mussolini gave Franco 47,000 Italian Volunteers who boosted Franco's units. German 88mm artillery and tanks were far superior compared to Republicans. Quantity of material and human help was less than that given by the Soviets to the Republic. But it arrived on request and when most needed after setbacks or before major attacks. Germans tried out new weapons and tactics.
Germany backed Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War, hoping to drive a wedge between the democracies and Italy, and thus prevent a recreation of the Stresa Front, which Britain, France, and Italy had formed in 1935 to oppose German rearmament.7 7. J. Noakes, and G. Pridham, eds. Nazism, 1919-19-1945: Volume 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1994), 664.
By aiding and encouraging Italian support for the Nationalists, Hitler hoped that the tension already existing between Fascist Italy and the democracies would be exacerbated because Britain and France were against a Nationalist takeover of Spain and foreign intervention altogether in the conflict. Italian support for the Nationalists thus defied British and French aims. Mussolini, for his part, desired not only to expand his influence in the Mediterranean but also, like Hitler, to stave off Communism in Spain. Soon after conflict broke out in Spain, Italy was sending Franco troops in addition to material, and Italian submarines began attacking neutral shipping in the Mediterranean.8 8. Whealey. Hitler and Spain, 9-14.
Germany also used the Spanish war as a chance to improve its image with the democracies. Because the Spanish Communist Party was a prominent part of the Republican coalition, and because the Soviet Union became the only nation to give outright support to the Republicans, the Germans used their Propaganda Ministry at full force to pose as the 'defenders of Western civilization' against the Communists.9
9. Robert H. Whealey, "Nazi Propagandist Joseph Goebbels Looks at the Spanish Civil War." The Historian, Volume 61, no. 2 (1999): 348.
Italy
represents the second foreign power, which supported the Nationalists. Ever since 1922 Italy had been ruled by the fascist government headed by Benito Mussolini, who created a totalitarian state. Independent from Germany, Italy decided to intervene in the Spanish affair on 28 July 1936. Apart from economic interests, it was scared of a spread in communism, like its German precursor. The intervention later enabled him a better relation to the German 'Fuehrer' and established the axis Berlin-Rome[9]. However, furthermore, Mussolini was driven by the idea of a 'mare nostro', which meant the extension of the Italian control and influence of the Mediterranean and hoped to get at least military bases on the Balearic Islands. This is the main reason why Italy supported Franco even more with weapons, soldiers and planes than any other state.
CARR
Mussolini - resented both Fr & Sp popular govts as they stressed an anti-fascist crusade.
9 Italian savoias reached Sp Morocco on 29 July.
22 August expanded senting 200 Italian troops
Italy
Policy was dominated by what she saw as the restless desire to redress what she as the injustices of the Versailles treaty. The defeat of Spanish nationalism would be a defeat for what he saw as a sister movement. Mussolini believed that immersion in blood and violence was the only way to forge the spirit of the new fascist man. Position of France was key factor, an alliance between Span and France would threaten Italian expansion in the Mediterranean. Nationalist victory might lead to the expulsion of Britain from Gibraltar giving Italy access to the Balearic Islands and an opportunity to weaken British access to the Suez. Intervention was a continuation of his headlong search for prestige. Pg82
Britain's aim objective to 'diminish the numbers of Britain's enemies'[10] and why they 'wanted to avoid another Great War at almost any cost'[11]. They took also 'financial and economic constraints'[12] into their consideration. They were engaged enormously in the Spainish economy and the industrialists did not welcome the prospect of a communist Spain which would almost certainly entail nationalisation and collectivisation. Britain's 'investments were almost equally distributed between the two rival territories in Spain'[13]. Besides, both were in a three-way power struggle with the fascist and communist ideology. On the one hand, they were not willing to support the communist spread and to increase its influence on their own country, because there were already Popular Front governments in power in Spain and France. On the other hand, France would be surrounded by fascists if the coup were successful. However, they were restricted in their liberty of action regarding foreign politics especially because of the divided internal politics.
Britain - Security of £40,000,000 which private citizens had invested was at stake.
Imperial interest of Gibraltar
Eden declared Non-intervention as a leaky dam but better than no dam. What were Britain's reasons for supporting this policy?
Conservative Government under Baldwin had no sympathy with what it regarded as a Red Government. Viewed Popular Front as a Bolshevik Dictatorship. Attitude was that fascism was a lesser evil to communism. Fear that Intervention would result in a general European war - wanted to avoid this at all costs so turned a blind eye to German and Italian involvement. Neutrality would avoid antagonising Hitler and Mussolini. Believed that Franco would win anyway. Did not want to make him an enemy. Gibraltar would be vulnerable. British economic and business interests: Spain was Britain's largest arms importer. Big companies such as ICI invested in Spain. Capital in sherry, olive oil, mines and textiles. Feared that these would be nationalised.
In France there were stable political conditions, with steady changing governments and coalitions. At the time of the Spanish Civil War Leon Blum and the Popular Front were in power for the most time and the coalition partners were not able to come to terms. Blum, if he did not want to crash the coalition, could not intervene. He also did not want to loose the alliance with Britain, which was strongly against any intervention. So, in particular Britain decided to cope at first with its own problems and not to intervene for the benefit of the Republicans. The primary object was to contain the war within Spain. Therefore France proposed the Non-Intervention Pact in 1936. In the following weeks and months France, Britain, Russia, Germany and Italy signed that contract, meaning that no state was allowed to support one party in Spain in terms of materials After the October-Revolution in 1918,
If Spain fell to the Nationalists, France would be surrounded by Fascist states.
A Franco victory could threaten French boarders in the case of war. The government in Paris held similar outlook to Madrid. Open support of Popular Front gov may have lead to the downfall of Blum or even civil conflict (conservative elements).
French - threat of Germany. Spain was more important to France than any other Great Power.
Genuine fear of civil war in France due to extreme political upheaval. The French Right and Left were marching and fighting on the streets of Paris. Large sections of French society supported the Nationalist e.g Catholics. Many intellectuals admired fascism - saw the order and glory that Hitler and Mussolini had brought to their countries. France isolated. Nazi-Polish Non Aggression Pact broke France's Little Entente. Forced to rely on British support. Influence of Britain - France could not act alone. Baldwin gave strong signals to Blum that Britain would not welcome French support for the Republic. Political survival - Blum's cabinet divided over Spain. Aid one way or the other would split the cabinet and bring down the Government.
Russia was led as a communist country under Stalin. It was opposed to the second spreading ideology, fascism, and frightened the rest of Europe. At first Stalin signed the Non-Intervention Pact and stayed neutral, with the intention to get into closer contact with the other European powers and form an alliance against Hitler. Later he changed his Spanish policy and tried to encourage the other states to enter the war, however without success. So he had to covertly provide aid for the Republic. The Russian support was, however, the only material support the Republic received. Besides the support for the Nationalist was more steady and continuous. One reason for this is especially the fact that a significant part of the communist deliveries was confiscated on the French border. Taking the communist influence into consideration is of utmost importance, because it was one significant reason, why the Republic and revolution failed. The republicans` overwhelming dependence on Russian aid enabled the Spanish communists to increase their power. The Russian materials were only provided to people, who wanted to reverse the revolution. They transformed the power from the working class to the state, undermined collectivisation and they even support private property, what was totally opposed to the anarchistic ideology. Herewith the communists, strongly influenced by Stalin's foreign policy, hoped to meet the French and British economic interest and gain them for an intervention. Next to interests in economic and strategic relations, Stalin saw in the Spanish Civil War an avocation for Hitler's interests in Eastern Europe. 1938 Russia abruptly ceased the support for the Republicans, but without any obvious reasons
Why was the Soviet Union a reluctant supporter of the Spanish Republic?
Stalin realised international fascism posed a threat. When war broke out, Stalin responded vigorously with aid but then declined. Communists organised International Brigades. Never intended to give the Republic enough to ensure victory but only to enable it to resist until the Spanish war escalated into a wider European conflict involving Britain, France and Germany. Once the Munich Agreement (1938) dashed this prospect, Stalin lost interest and Soviet aid dried up. The Republic had to buy arms on the black market via Russia. This was paid for with her gold and silver reserves that were shipped to the Soviet Union. Overtly supporting the Government would threaten the French - Soviet Pact and may have resulted in Russia losing an ally. Impact at home. Soviet Union had become a dictatorship under Stalin. All those involved in Spain were purged and liquidated.
Stalin - feared Hitler and Japan wanted to build anti-fascist alliances throughout Europe. 1936 he called for a Anglo-French-Soviet coalition against Hitler, but diplomats suspected communism's revolutionary aims. Fighting for democracy not socialism - Carr
Soviet Union
The rise in fascism in Italy and Germany convinced Stalin of the need seek alliances with the democratic capitalist states France and Britain. On the 2 May Comintern Policy was a response to Hitler's well advertised plans on Soviet territory. Mutual Assistance was signed in Paris. Defence of Russian territory would take precedence over the encouragement of revolution. Stalin wished to avoid doing anything which might provoke Germany being far too aware of the Soviet Unions unprepared ness for war. When war broke out Stalin had the dilemma in that he could not stand back and let the Republic go under, for a fascist state on the border to France would strenghten the right and weaken the left as to increase the probability of the Franco-Soviet Pact being abrogated. On the other hand a Republican victory could spark an all-out social revolution in the Iberian peninsula, which would alienate the conservative western powers, he dreaded the thought of the democracies being driven to line up with dictators against the Soviet Spain and Soviet Russia. Stalin realised that it would be immensely damaging in propaganda terms if the Soviet Union, the 'First Workers' State', failed to come to the aid of a beleagured Popular Front government. Pg79
Essentially, he needed to prevent the Republic being defeated, but he also wished to avoid an outright victory for the Spanish revolutionary left.
Arm supplies to Spain began only when it became unavoidably clear that Germany and Italy were merely using non-intervention as a convenient front for their aid to the nationalist.
The first ship containing arms, the komodo, docked in Cartegena on 15 Oct.
Stalin decided to supply enough arms to keep the republic alive, instructing that the Spanish proletariat should go no further than was acceptable to French and Br policy makers. His aim was to keep Hitler bogged down in an expensive venture. Soviet readiness to keep social revolution in check, thus the anarchists and the quasi-Trotskyist of POUM - would face the determined opposition not from the fascist forces of Franco, but from Moscow-dominated Communist. Pg 80
It was Italo-German arms shipments to the nationalist that obliged him to provide support for the republic.
Finally, I want to mention the international brigades. Anti-fascist movements and strong support emerged in numerous countries. That resulted in the forming of international brigades that fought on the side of the Republic. Brigades like the Thaelmann, Garibaldi, Lincoln and Marseillaise Brigades were recruited of German, Italian, Irish, French, Russian, American and Baltic fighters[14]. 'In a decade of worldwide depression and spreading fascism, the revolution in Spain signalled a message of renewed hope to the scattered forces of working-class emancipation throughout the globe'[15]. Many people saw in the Republic the last hope to repel the fascists. 'Approximately 35,000 anti-fascists from fifty-two countries joined the student, unemployed, union, and cultural movements that were influenced by the Communist Party'[16].
In conclusion, the origin of the Spanish Civil War was definitely an internal affair. The civil war was the consequence of the deep polarisation in the population between the capitalists and the working class. However, the process was massively influenced by previous mentioned European powers. Without the massive fascist support of Germany and Italy, Franco would not have been able to win the war and establish his fascist regime. Hitler enabled him to start his coup properly in providing transport planes to circumvent the sea blockade. At latest with the outbreak of the 2nd World War, the British and French appeasement policy proved as unprecedented failure. In refusing the intervention of the Spanish Civil War, they lost a chance to limit Hitler's power and discourage the fascist movement. Contrary to this, the French confiscated Russian material deliveries for the Republic. The communist counter-measures to undermine the anarchistic revolution emerged as a kind of disillusionment and division in the republican area, what weakened the anti-fascist movement. All this together led to following conclusion 'The effects of the neutrality of the United States, Britain, and France combined with the fascist support of Germany and Italy proved disastrous to the Spanish Republic'[18].
Bibliography
Carr, R., The Republic and the Civil War in Spain, (London: Macmillan, 1971) This
Edwards, J., The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, (London: Macmillan, 1979)
Hayes, P.M., Themes in modern European history, 1890-1945, (London: Routledge, 1992)
Preston
In 1936, twenty-seven European nations formally adhered to non-intervention policy regarding the Spanish conflict. pg83
Soviet Union
The rise in fascism in Italy and Germany convinced Stalin of the need seek alliances with the democratic capitalist states France and Britain. On the 2 May Comintern Policy was a response to Hitler's well advertised plans on Soviet territory. Mutual Assistance was signed in Paris. Defence of Russian territory would take precedence over the encouragement of revolution. Stalin wished to avoid doing anything which might provoke Germany being far too aware of the Soviet Unions unprepared ness for war. When war broke out Stalin had the dilemma in that he could not stand back and let the Republic go under, for a fascist state on the border to France would strenghten the right and weaken the left as to increase the probability of the Franco-Soviet Pact being abrogated. On the other hand a Republican victory could spark an all-out social revolution in the Iberian peninsula, which would alienate the conservative western powers, he dreaded the thought of the democracies being driven to line up with dictators against the Soviet Spain and Soviet Russia. Stalin realised that it would be immensely damaging in propaganda terms if the Soviet Union, the 'First Workers' State', failed to come to the aid of a beleagured Popular Front government. Pg79
Essentially, he needed to prevent the Republic being defeated, but he also wished to avoid an outright victory for the Spanish revolutionary left.
Arm supplies to Spain began only when it became unavoidably clear that Germany and Italy were merely using non-intervention as a convenient front for their aid to the nationalist.
The first ship containing arms, the komodo, docked in Cartegena on 15 Oct.
Stalin decided to supply enough arms to keep the republic alive, instructing that the Spanish proletariat should go no further than was acceptable to French and Br policy makers. His aim was to keep Hitler bogged down in an expensive venture. Soviet readiness to keep social revolution in check, thus the anarchists and the quasi-Trotskyist of POUM - would face the determined opposition not from the fascist forces of Franco, but from Moscow-dominated Communist. Pg 80
It was Italo-German arms shipments to the nationalist that obliged him to provide support for the republic.
Germany
Hitler was fearful of communist Spain. Hitler saw any victory of socialist Spain as a creation of a leftist bloc in Europe. The quest for Lebensraum was dependent on a prior defeat of France, and that defeat would be endangered if the Spanish Popular Front were not first eliminated.
Economic advantage - Spain's minerals, aid German rearmament
Hitler was not ready to provoke a European conflict, didn't want to alarm or antagonize. He used the conflict as a form of preparation for the struggle in Europe which was inevitable. pg81
Italy
Policy was dominated by what she saw as the restless desire to redress what she as the injustices of the Versailles treaty. The defeat of Spanish nationalism would be a defeat for what he saw as a sister movement. Mussolini believed that immersion in blood and violence was the only way to forge the spirit of the new fascist man. Position of France was key factor, an alliance between Span and France would threaten Italian expansion in the Mediterranean. Nationalist victory might lead to the expulsion of Britain from Gibraltar giving Italy access to the Balearic Islands and an opportunity to weaken British access to the Suez. Intervention was a continuation of his headlong search for prestige. Pg82
The Non-intervention committee set up on 9th Sept 1936 based in London.
Carr
The five great powers with the greatest interest in Spain - Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union - all pursued different and mutually conflicting policies.pg213
Britain - Security of £40,000,000 which private citizens had invested was at stake.
Imperial interest of Gibraltar.
French - threat of Germany. Spain was more important to France than any other Great Power. A Franco victory could threaten French boarders in the case of war. The government in Paris held similar outlook to Madrid. Open support of Popular Front gov may have lead to the downfall of Blum or even civil conflict (conservative elements).
Germany - Span could facilitate Hitler's own eastern ambitions by dividing any would-be anti-German coalition. France would take her eyes of Czechoslovika and take some her men from the Rhine, while Italy would forge the German threat to Austria. Anti-communist crusade might win Br & Italy as allies.
Hitler dispatched 26 aeroplanes and 86 men, which arrived on 29 July pg215.
Dispatched arms on 29 Sept known as Operation Otto.
'From the 29 July to 11 Oct the Germans transported 13,523 Moroccan troops and 270,100 kg's of war material from Morocco to Andalusia'. pg217
In Sept the Germans had 553 troops in Spain compared to 413 Italians.
Mussolini - resented both Fr & Sp popular govts as they stressed an anti-fascist crusade.
9 Italian savoias reached Sp Morocco on 29 July.
22 August expanded senting 200 Italian troops
Stalin - feared Hitler and Japan wanted to build anti-fascist alliances throughout Europe. 1936 he called for a Anglo-French-Soviet coalition against Hitler, but diplomats suspected communism's revolutionary aims. Fighting for democracy not socialism
Western European Communist together with liberals and socialists, set to work as early as 21 July quietly collecting money, men and second-hand arms for the Republic.
Origins - Civil War started in Span!
Outcome - Interventionist
Preston P, The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, (London 1986) pg72
2 Jackson G, The Spanish Republic and the civil war 1931 - 1939, (1965) pg3
3 Beevor A, The Spanish Civil War, (London 1982 pg22
4 Beevor A, The Spanish Civil War, (London 1982) pg22
5 Beevor A, The Spanish Civil War, (London 1982 pg25
6 Jackson G, The Spanish Republic and the civil war 1931 - 1939, (1965) pg11
7 Beevor A, The Spanish Civil War, (London 1982) pg36
8 Beevor A, The Spanish Civil War, (London 1982) pg55
9 Preston P, The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, (London 1986) pg83
0 Preston P, The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, (London 1986) pg74