Industrial and economic policy in the Tsarist and Soviet eras saw a large measure of influence from the individual leaders, be it autocrat or dictator. However the approaches to these policies were quite different, mirroring Russia’s relative economic position and contemporary priorities. Whilst under the Tsars, Russia had seen a slow but gradual economic development, by the time leaders such as Stalin and Khrushchev came to power Russia was considerably economically lagging behind and such these leaders took personal decisive action. Under the Tsars much of the economic policy came under the instruction of Sergi Witte a man close to the Tsars. ‘Witte believed the state should provide the means to achieve industrial growth, but that private businessmen would take responsibility to develop industries and trade.’ This was a direct delegation and took away the central power and influence that the Tsars had always held, however it also allowed the Tsars to choose the best experts for the job and saw the experts as advisors to the Tsar, not people with much power or influence. Soviet industrial and economic policy was far more controlled under Stalin. The main economic policy of the period was the five year plans which Stalin hoped, under his own instruction, would help turn Russia around economically and bring about a sense of Socialism in one country. However the implementation of such a plan under the control of one man was overly ambitious, hence the establishment of Gosplan, still a centrally run and controlled body. Under Khrushchev the Sovnarkhozy, 105 regional economic councils, saw power spread much more countrywide. Under Gosplan power remained central and easy to control, however by spreading the power countrywide it was far harder to maintain a centrally controlled economy. Initially ‘there was a feeling that Stalin had overreached himself in the five year plans statement which would have been true if Stalin had tried to centrally control the five year plans, however by using Gosplan there was both a stable organisation to control industry and also a central power that stood above the organisation. It can be said that during the Tsarist era, the delegation of power to private businessmen saw a lower level of overall state control in overall in comparison to an organisation such as Gosplan, however when compared to the Sovnarkhozy which was almost impossible to control centrally it is clear that the Tsarist era was one of a higher degree of power that was kept central, in the hands of the Tsars.
Both the Tsarist and Soviet eras saw significant changes enacted from central government to agriculture and the peasantry, from emancipation under Alexander II to the Collective farms of Stalin and the Virgin Land Scheme under Khrushchev. The decision to emancipate the serfs was influenced largely by Alexander II himself, however ‘the emancipation of the serfs had mixed effects. Productivity actually declined, probably held back by the prevalence of subsistence farming.’ By emancipating the Tsar had undermined some of his personal authority and showed his personal control had its limits. ‘Mir tended to replace the gentry in terms of controlling the lives of peasants and their independence.’ This illustrates how the post emancipation period of Tsarist Russia saw a relative decline in centralised power and control in this respect. The Soviet period saw two large agricultural changes that affected not only the peasantry, but Russia as a whole. ‘At its introduction in 1928, Stalin claimed that it was the free choice of the peasants, but in practise it was enforced on a very reluctant peasantry.’ This forcing of an untested agricultural method onto the country showed one of the highest degrees of centralised power and control in action. Other plans that came directly from the Soviet leaders can also be used to show central power and control in action. Khrushchev’s disastrous Virgin Land scheme, his personal plan to save Russian agriculture, and the plan that ultimately led to his removal from power, showing that unlike the Tsars the leaders of the communist party were replaceable and that power was much more widespread. Lee summarises Russian agriculture in that ‘The problem was that state control over agriculture never really worked. In a country the size of the Soviet Union there were too many variations in climate, local conditions and social customs for centralisation to be anything other than a disincentive to production.’. When considering how much agriculture was a method of central power and control, it is fair to suggest that through personally implemented plans, both eras saw a high element of personal control to varied levels of success from autocrat and dictator alike.
Another method of control was the rise in personality cults formed around the Russian leaders, cults that gave the Russian people delusions that the leaders were of a higher, almost godlike status. Stalin can be quoted as saying ‘The people need a Tsar, whom they can worship and for whom they can live and work,’ suggesting that the similarities between the cult of personality and the ‘little father’ principle were intended to implement a similar level of control. An important thing to note about personality cults is that often they were formed around leaders without their direct involvement or propagation, and although they used the cults to promote new initiatives of to spread propaganda, the spread of this propaganda and the power received as a result was not entirely in the leaders control. The personality cult proved critical for Stalin as ’without his army of willing cohorts, Stalin could not have propelled the Soviet Union into breakneck industrialisation and collectivisation.’ The cult of personality was therefore crucial to Stalin’s central power and control over the Russian people. However it was not just the Soviet period that saw the use of personality cults. Nicholas II saw a cult form around himself ‘although it was against his express wishes.’ This in effect was just a natural progression of the ‘little father’ philosophy that existed in Tsarist Russia and the cult of Nicholas propelled his status. Cults of Personality was more of a Soviet ideology, as the little father principle had always been propagated in the Tsarist times; however both proved to be excellent methods of controlling people and a show of adoration of the Russian people. A good assessment of personality cults is Robert Service’s view of the Lenin cult, as ‘a film of oil over the dark ocean of Soviet reality.’ an effective propaganda device that hid negatives and focused on the positives. The main difference between Tsarist and Soviet cults is of course that the ‘little father’ principle was deeply embedded in the mind of the Russian people. Whilst personality cults formed around the dictators giving them a higher degree of power and control it was already a feature that came with the role of the autocratic Tsar and such gave a higher degree of personal control.
Sherman suggests that ‘If religion was ever the opium of the people, it was in Russia more so than any other country.’ The Russian Orthodox Church represented a major body of control in the Tsarist era and conversely, the era of religious repression in the Soviet era was heavily controlled by the Soviet leaders. The Tsars propagation of the ‘little father’ principle made God fearing Russians easier to influence and control. The church was the perfect place for the Tsars to see their message communicated as it was a church that ‘actively supported a succession of Tsars as the rightful rulers of the country and thus provided a theological basis for Tsarist autocracy.’ The Tsar had virtually limitless powers to control through the church and religion. The Soviet era saw a different approach to the church. Initially ‘Religion was tolerated although discouraged by the Communist party.’Where the Tsars had controlled the church in their role as the ‘little father,’ the Soviet era of fear and repression paired with a cult of personality was far more effective. Stalin was determined to eliminate such ‘harmful superstitions,’ as religion and religious belief. Communist control of the church came mainly through groups such as the League of Militant Godless, who disrupted church services, forced the closure of and even destroyed many churches, most famously the Cathedral of Christ the Savoir in Moscow which was destroyed on Stalin’s order in 1931. Religion was an important method of control for both the Tsarist and Soviet leaders. Where the Tsars sought to control people by directly influencing the church, the Soviets sought to bring the church into line with their policy of fear and repression, eradicating another threat to the Soviet system of ruling. For this reason when considering the degree of control the church provided to the Tsars and the Soviets, it is clear that the Tsars benefited from a much greater degree of control.
One method of control that perhaps the Tsarist rulers were over dependent on was the army, a mistake Stalin was determined not to repeat. The role of the army in Tsarist times was to enforce the will of the Tsar and control the people by putting down protests, stopping peasant revolts and urban violence. In effect they could be described as an all purpose method of control however this statement also highlights the weakness of the use of the army. In Tsarist times the army themselves held a high degree of control, and ruled through central power delegated to them by the Tsar. Although they were acting on the will of the Tsar, it was only the loyalty that they pledged to the autocracy that kept them dependable and such the Tsar was limited in what he could expect the army to do. Hence ‘this meant that officers and conservative forces could not count on any local troops to attack the Bolsheviks’ during the October revolution, and also why it was the Army itself that forced the Tsar to abdicate. This would suggest that to a high extent it was the army that held the true power and control, and whilst they did act under the Tsar, they themselves were not entirely under the Tsars control.
The army in the soviet era was far from similar, with Stalin realising the potential threat of the army and such turning his attention to control of the army rather than reliance upon it. The purging on 80% of the officer classes showed that Stalin in particular was paranoid about the loyalty of the army. ‘The red guard and the red army which grew out of it, were in no sense the successors of the old army, and in many ways conceived as the direct antithesis of it.’ The army had been reduced in both numbers and power, trimmed back to a unit which Stalin could more easily control. The army itself also saw a reduction in duty, with the NKVD exercising a comparable role to the army of old, just on a more violent scale. The Tsarist era saw an army which controlled with central power given by the Tsar, where as the soviet era saw the central powers controlling the army and purging it to remove all traces of the old regime. The army of the Tsarist era was one of the main methods of control, acting as a military and a policing force, and such had a high level of influence. In soviet Russia the police state became the method of control and removed the need for the army.
To conclude, it is undeniable that both eras saw a high degree of central power and control. The very nature of the Tsarist autocracy relied upon the greatest degree of power to be held by the Tsar, the central power. The soviet method too called for a strong central force to control the country, even if this was through planning agencies and economic councils as these bodies were centrally monitored. However the question of whether these eras saw more similarities than differences is far less clear cut. Whilst the Tsarist and Soviet eras are directly comparable on many social, economic and political levels the nature of these comparisons sees many differences in the approach and method of control. Whilst both eras saw the use of fear and repression, the actions of the Okhrana cannot be put on par with those of the NKVD. The use of religion as a method of control can be found in both eras however whilst the autocratic rulers found using the church as an opportunity to preach propaganda, the Soviets saw oppressing religion a far more useful method. Industrial and agricultural development over both eras saw a great deal of central influence, and with policies such as emancipation under the Tsars or collectivisation under the soviets as well as the five year plans and Witte’s industrial policy, they too could be seen as comparable methods of control. When considering all of the evidence even though some areas show stark differences, in the majority of cases the soviet method of control was more of an extension of Tsarist ideology than a completely new and different method. For this reason it can be said that the similarities between the two forms of government are indeed greater than the differences.
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