The demand for aircraft was an immediate concern for AMC. As a stopgap measure more than 400 mothballed aircraft from World War II were called back into action. AMC transferred an additional 275 aircraft to FEAF from the States. Spending on aircraft went up exponentially from $1 billion in 1950 to $10 billion by 1952, but the time lag from the production to getting the planes to Korea meant scaled back operations until they reach full fighting strength. Although the manufacturers were able to meet the demand for aircraft and munitions they had to overcome the effects of the drawn down after World War II. An interesting sidelight to the manufacturing process was that Japan’s economy was boosted by the employment of 16,500 Japanese serving as foundry workers, seamstresses, machinists, metal workers, engineers, and so on. Their contribution to the Korean war effort was noteworthy.8
During the first year of the conflict supplies and material could not be brought to forward locations in mass due to lack of sufficient transportation, poor weather and frequent relocations. Most field level maintenance units were designed for operating at the base or wing level. Heavy equipment was needed to run the airfields. South Korea was so limited in infrastructure, for the reasons mentioned above, the Air Force support units could not keep up with even routine maintenance. When the 27th Fighter Escort Wing moved to Taegu, Korea, they intentionally left their heavy field maintenance equipment behind at a secure rear area base in Japan. Their shuttle system that enabled them to repair aircraft in a less amount of time had the effect of significantly increasing their flying hours and in-commission rates. The Fifth Air Force realized this was the answer and responded by establishing the Rear Echelon Maintenance Combined Operation (REMCO).9 This setup lasted until the end of the war since each REMCO station was more than capable of supporting two or three wings. Not only was it economical, it gave a distinct advantage over the opposition, which lacked an equivalent maintenance capability. In effect, it was a force multiplier.
Despite an effective ferrying system forward airfields were still needed in South Korea to prosecute the air war. Before the battle line stabilized at the 38th parallel, FEAF
relied upon engineer aviation units to repair and upkeep the three available airfields in South Korea. Even the best of the airfields could not support the heavy transports that flew in on a constant basis without constant upkeep. AT Pohang, the 802 Engineer Aviation Battalion was able to repair the concrete runway and add 500 necessary feet of pierced steel planking (PSP) to make the runway serviceable. Unfortunately, they were forced to abandon this airfield when the Chinese entered into the war. It became apparent however, that PSP was the method by which air bases could be set up.
When the line of battle stabilized FEAF concentrated on improving and building new runways using the PSP method. Their efforts continued well beyond the cease-fire. Before July 1953 FEAF had thirty operational airfields with dozens more in Japan, Guam, and Okinawa.10 Additionally, FEAMCOM saw to the logistical requirements for establishing roads, aircraft fuel facilities, revetments, water distribution systems, electrical systems and ammunition storage facilities.11 As more and more forward operating airfields became operational combat efficiency increased. This allowed for air power to extend well into North Korea, putting the enemy on the defensive. None of this would have been possible had not the logistical system met the challenge of overcoming the primitive conditions of South Korea. Another factor that furthered the cause of air power was getting the supplies, equipment and munitions to the battle in time. That was the job of Combat Cargo Command.
Major General William H. Tunner, who engineered the Berlin Airlift, commanded Combat Cargo Command. He had a twofold job at the beginning of the war. One was to use heavy transport aircraft to drop supplies and munitions into friendly forward positions and the other to airborne assaults. This required flexibility, which was achieved primarily through centralized control.12 The first year of the war demanded the most from airlift since the infrastructure of South Korea was so primitive. Airlift was called into action on the very first day of the war to evacuate 850 American civilians out of Seoul. 13 The rest were evacuated by ship. One of the continuing problems was the lack of deep-water harbors. For that reason airlift took on even a more important role in delivering the tonnage necessary for air operations and supporting the ground troops.
At the outset, U.S. Army troops were flown into action to stop the North Korean advance, where they succeeded in August of 1950 at Pusan. General Douglas MacArthur ordered the build up of supplies and material to support the breakout at the perimeter, which took place the next month. By that time General Tunner had his airlift power in place, using an armada of C-54s, C-47s, and C-46s, to land troops and equipment and for air-evacuation from the soon-to-be captured airfields. The first airfield captured was at Kimpo near Seoul. From then on the airlift of supplies and material went non-stop for the rest of the war, delivering on average 800 tons per day.14 This was important as surface lines of supply became choked off at the shores of Ichon. Airlift was the only reliable source to sustain the Marines and Army personnel who were engaged with the enemy.
The C-119 “Flying Boxcars” were given the risky task of providing airdrops. The supply chain of food, ammunition and equipment kept X Corps and the Eighth Army on the move. When these two forces linked up beyond the Pusan perimeter the North Koreans were outmaneuvered and in full retreat.15 Meanwhile Combat Cargo Command expanded its operations by delivering supplies to Wonsan, North Korea, where friendly Republic of Korea troops had captured. In a bold move, material for an entire air base was airlifted to Wonsan, where aviation engineers were able to put together an operational airfield. Sinmak fell to the Eighth Army and it too served as a base for planes to fly in and deliver cargo. This kind of success enabled United Nation forces to put themselves into position to take the capital of North Korea.16
The first large-scale offensive airborne assault to take place was on October 20. More than seventy C-119s and forty C-47s dropped over 2,300 paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team at Sukchon and Sunchon, North Korea.17 The
C-119s also air dropped heavy equipment such as howitzers, trucks, and jeeps. Pyongyang fell that day. During this operation there were many friendly casualties which had to be airlifted out. The lighter of the planes, such as the C-47 and C-46s, could land their cargo at nearby airfields and take casualties directly to Japan. Over 3,000 patients were airlifted out. Airlift also supplied the Eighth Army as they advanced their way toward the border of China. Despite enemy guerillas throwing up roadblocks to stop the land supply line; Combat Cargo Command bypassed this with their airdrops. By November United Nation troops held the entire landmass of North Korea up to the Yalu River.18 Three weeks later China entered the war, changing the entire complexion of the air war.
What came next was a “reverse airlift” to support the retreat of United Nation forces.
Combat Cargo Commanded removed tons of supplies to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. One such example occurred when three fighter groups, based in North Korea, had to be moved to South Korea. Essential equipment and supplies were airlifted to southern airfields and redeployed, thus avoiding major disruptions in fighter operations.19
Another major contribution during the retreat was the resupply effort to prevent surrounded friendly forces from being annihilated or surrendering. Thirty-seven C-119s and twenty-two C-47s airdropped 247 tons of ammunition, rations, gasoline and medical supplies to a small drop zone within the Hagaru perimeter. This gave them the reprieve they needed to make a successful escape. The most spectacular escape occurred on December 7th, when eight C-119s dropped parts of a M-2 treadway bridge from an altitude of 800 feet, which when put together, allowed an entire division to cross a 1,500 foot gorge.20 It was the first air-dropped bridge in history.
In Hagaru-ri, North Korea a different kind of drama was taking place. Two Marine regiments were bottled up near a reservoir protected by mountain passes on three sides. This left only one side in which the heavy transport planes of Combat Cargo Command could send in their planes to evacuate the surrounded forces. The marines had improved the airstrip at Hagaru-ri, crude as it was, to permit the landing and take-off of C-47 aircraft.24 First on the agenda was to bring in supplies and munitions. Second was to evacuate the wounded and dead. Colonel Paul C. Fritz recounts one episode that took place in the basin of the Chosin reservoir:
Several times we were peppered with enemy rifle fire as we flew the pattern
landings or took off and climbed up through the valley. I became particularly
irate when I found new holes very near a main wing tank. I walked over to the
radio jeep and told the operator. He called down two fighters and each dropped
a napalm tank on the knoll. Blood curdling screams rose up as the deadly liquid
rolled downhill. After that show of air superiority, I returned to my C-47 and
got on board. As my eyes transitioned from bright sunlight to dim interior light,
I eyed my load: a significant number of men lay frozen as they had fallen, with
their extremities cast in all directions and faces contorted statues of severe pain.
They were stacked and intertwined on each side of the cabin, secured with ropes
for flight. I would be flying an aerial hearse, but to do it with dignity I flew extra
smoothly. 25
From Colonel Fritz’s account it is apparent that even those who flew cargo missions were not immune from hostile activity. After the battle line stabilized at the 38th parallel his squadron was put at further risk when it was decided a forward operating detachment would be established at Kimpo, South Korea.
The journal Air Power History covers the role of airlift and logistics in several articles, emphasizing the importance of its role. It relied upon primary sources, such as the author noted above and secondary ones, to include William Y’Blood and William Suit. Logistics and movement of cargo by air were almost like a single entity in that they were the life-blood for the troops on the ground and pilots fighting in the air. The war simply could not have been won without their contribution. The next part of this paper will focus on the combatants who fought in the skies over Korea and the role they played to help win air supremacy. Specifically it will analyze FEAF’s strategic and tactical efforts, including their failures and successes.
Major General Emmett O’Donnell saw to the immediate beefing up bomber forces which initially consisted of three B-29 Superfortress groups. Two more groups were put on loan from Strategic Air Command.26 The B-29s were not designed for close air support or interdiction missions, but that is exactly what they did early on in the war. They were the only weapon system that could reach the North Koreans until land and naval forces organized a counter offensive. They attacked tank concentrations, troops, truck traffic, and supply dumps. Although they posed a formidable threat to the North Koreans, this was not what they were designed for and their success was limited. It was not until approval was given for attacks against strategic targets such as railroad yards, chemical plants, vital roads and bridges, did they fulfill their purpose. 27 In all, 18 major strategic targets were designated and hit by the bomber groups. In a short three weeks all of North Korea’s industrial capability was neutralized. The bomber formations did not have much opposition, but all that changed when China entered the war.
China’s MiG-15s found B-29s to be easy prey. In late October of 1951 enemy fighters shot down five Superfortresses and damaged eight others. From that time on until the end of the war, B-29s were never allowed on daytime missions or for that matter without a fighter escort. Unfortunately for the bomber crews, even the fighter escorts could not fend off the MiG-15 attacks. Over the course of the war 72 B-29s were lost, including some 280 crewmembers killed in action. Yet, they were able to fly over 21,000 sorties, dropping nearly 167,000 tons of bombs. On average, a B-29 was lost every 1,000th sortie. By today’s standards these losses would be considered high. After World War Two, however, the B-29 was the only plane in the United States Air Force inventory that was not decommissioned, leaving a staggering total of over 3,000 serviceable planes at the start of the war. 28
The B-29 bomber force acquitted itself well in the Korean War. North Korea’s industrial complex proved to be “soft” for Bomber Command. Their role switched to tactical soon after the complex was wiped out. In the tactical role, however, their success was marginal. For example, one bridge alone had to be hit every day for three weeks before it was destroyed. Small, condensed targets such as this represented a great challenge for the bomber airmen. It was not until B-29s equipped with SHORAN (SHOrt RANge) navigation radar, that small targets could be hit with great accuracy.29 Toward the end of the war, when peace talks were being carried out, B-29 bombers were sent to destroy as much infrastructure in North Korea as possible. The intent was to apply pressure and bring about a quick armistice. In this respect, they succeeded. It was one of the main reasons why the North Koreans sued for peace.
If the bombers applied the muscle, it was the fighters that supplied the finesse. The venerable P-51 Mustang, F-80 Shooting Star, and F-86 Sabre were the primary weapon systems used to control and exploit air space over South and North Korea. Without their involvement, the B-29s would not have accomplished their mission and friendly ground troops would have suffered incalculable losses. P-51s and F-80s shared responsibility for close air support, while the F-86s played the role of air interceptor.
Although the F-80 jet aircraft was designed as a fighter, it gave up that role to F-86 Sabres. At the beginning of the war opposition was nominal and the F-80s had no problem clearing the skies of North Korean Yak fighters, which in all respects, were inferior. When China committed its forces, including its armada of MiG-15 fighters, the F-80s were hopelessly outmatched. The F-80s continued in their ground support role, but it was up to the Sabre pilots to neutralize the MiG fighter threat.
In June of 1951, FEAF had only 89 F-86s. By 1953 that number rose to 165 F-86E/F fighter-interceptors and 132 F-86 fighter-bombers. By contrast, there were 445 MiGs in 1951. At the end of the war there were thousands. Two things gave American forces the advantage to win and maintain air superiority: outstanding airmanship combined with well-executed tactics, and superb aircraft.30 The war produced 40 American aces. All of these were F-86 pilots except for one. Their record was impressive. They felled 810 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat, losing only 78 of theirs to opposition fighters.30 Their contribution to the war effort was immeasurable in that control of the skies could not have been won had not they inflicted serious losses upon the enemy. Korean, Chinese, and even Russian pilots who flew MiG-15s were never able to exploit air space during the entire period of the war.
One of the more unheralded contributors to air power was FEAF’s Air Rescue Service (ARS). With the advent of helicopters recovery of downed pilots and aircrews took on an entirely different complexion. FEAF also employed Grumman SB-17 amphibious planes, SB-29s (that could drop lifeboats), and crash boats that resembled the PT-boats of World War II. All of these assets, represented by 18 different squadrons, were integrated into a single rescue and recovery system. Because of the terrain, which favored United Nation pilots if they had to bail out, and naval supremacy of the Yellow Sea, there was a high rescue rate. 31 This service had an enormous effect on the fighter pilots who could expect to be rescued thereby increasing morale. Letting them live as it were, to fight another day. By contrast enemy forces did not have this capability and it drastically affected their tactics. The author Forrest Marion explains:
MiG pilots generally remained over the Northwestern portion of the peninsula,
Avoiding the Yellow Sea. Former North Korean MiG-15 pilot Kenneth H. Rowe,
(“Lt. No Kum-Sok” prior to his defection in 1953) recalled this reluctance was
due to the enemy’s lack of any rescue capability for downed MiG pilots.32
If one looks at the number of enemy kills registered by previously downed American pilots, the contribution of ARS becomes even more apparent. Seven Sabre pilots went on to score 27 more aerial victories after their rescues. Most notable among them was Joseph C. McConnell who went on to become the top ace among American pilots. It was a common feeling among all pilots that because of this rescue support most were able to put aside concerns for personal survival and were free to concentrate on shooting down enemy planes.33
Another contribution involved two recovery missions of the enemy’s airplanes. An intelligence officer named Donald Nichols, who worked for the Foreign Intelligence Section, was given the task by acting FEAF commander General Partridge, to gather intelligence on the MiG-15. He put together a plan in which close air support pilots would keep a look out for downed MiG-15 planes. On April 17, 1951 Nichols plan was put into effect. They managed, using ARS assets, to take photographs of a crashed MiG and salvage important parts. Not much later another, more intact MiG was discovered. In a short period of time everything was sent to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for analysis. By September of 1951 the Fifth Air Force Intelligence Summary presented their newly acquired knowledge of the MiG-15’s capabilities and vulnerabilities to the Sabre pilots. The pilots in turn used this knowledge against their enemy with devastating effect.34
The practice of picking up downed pilots during the Korean War became standard procedure. During World War II, air-sea rescue was more of a concept than a reality. The chances for being rescued were extremely slim. Once shot down pilots and aircrew were on their own. Statistics point to just a one-in-ten chance of them making it back to friendly lines. In Korea those chances improved to one-in-four. If an aircraft became hit or disabled, because of the high altitudes they operated at (usually above 30,000 feet) they could use their glide-ratio to make it back to friendly territory.35 Cho-do was a northern island close to “MiG Alley” where the Air Rescue Service operated from. Pilots were instructed to head for that island if they got into trouble. The SA-16 amphibious rescue plane, which enjoyed speed and range over the helicopters, accounted for many of the water pick-ups in that region.
In all, FEAF’s Air Rescue Service recovered 996 United Nation troops from behind enemy lines, of which 170 were United States Air Force airmen. Out of the 170 airmen, 41 were Sabre pilots.36 Although Air Rescue Service’s exploits have gone almost unnoticed or overlooked in most historiographies, their contribution to air superiority was critical.
Another vital component to air power was aerial reconnaissance. In 1950 there were only three tactical reconnaissance squadrons in the Air Force with only one belonging to FEAF. Cut backs after World War II drastically depleted their capability. It was like starting out from scratch. Since no aircraft had been designated for this kind of work modifications had to be make to RF-51Ds, RF-80A/Cs, RB-26s, and RB/WB-29s. Later in the war there was a need for high-flying, high-speed aircraft, so RB-45s and RF-86A/F Sabres were field modified to carry out that job.37
Field commanders had to know where the enemy was and the best way to get that information was through taking aerial pictures. One Eighth Army officer explained:
“It is the one positive means by which we are able to study the enemy’s back yard. Its relative importance cannot be overrated—we have to have it.”38 United Nation forces faced a numerically superior enemy and without intelligence it could not win the war. Interdiction through the air, strategic targets on the ground, and areas of tactical importance had to be photographed, interpreted, and acted upon accordingly. Over a million negatives were taken and delivered to the Third and Eighth Armies throughout the course of the war.39 During World War II the Ninth Air Force averaged no higher than 1,300 reconnaissance sorties a month. In Korea, that number was almost doubled.
The most dangerous type of aerial reconnaissance was tactical. Special rules had to be devised in order to counteract the inordinate amount of losses. The RF-51D Mustang, a propeller driven aircraft, was given the primary role for photo-cover of enemy-held territory to a depth of 10,000 yards along the front lines, at altitudes not much higher than 4,000 feet.40 At first there was virtually no opposition. After China entered the war air defenses strengthened to the point that losses of valuable aircraft, and even more valuable men, could not be sustained. To adapt pilots had to fly at 6,000 foot minimums and add a wingman whose job it was to spot ground fire and relay that information to the pilot taking photos.
In October of 1951, FEAF came to the realization in order to get pictures of MiG Alley a faster aircraft was needed. The F-80 Shooting Star, converted to the reconnaissance role and re-designated the RF-80, was an easy target for the MiG-15 which had a 200 mile-per-hour speed advantage. A special order was put in to equip the 67th Reconnaissance Wing with FR-84F aircraft, but they never arrived. Instead six F-86A aircraft were modified by carrying a camera mounted parallel to the longitudinal axis using a mirror arrangement. The photography they produced was marginal at best because they were unable to stabilize the cameras sufficiently when the jet went into high speed.41
The Korean War taught the commanders how important reconnaissance was and that much research and development would be needed to be ready for the next war. Special planes with only one purpose, to take aerial photographs, would have to be developed. Hence the U-2 spy plane and shortly after that the SR-71 Blackbird, were conceived. While the improvisations did not produce the best results, commanders were still able to process the information they were bringing back. It is estimated that reconnaissance squadrons in Korea were able to meet 75 percent of the demands or requests. What they were given was enough to counteract or defeat the enemy.
The journal, Air Power History, gives a fair historiography of the component parts that made up air power in the Korean War. While many of the articles were mere synopses of the bigger stories, the journal succeeded in conveying to the reader the relevant and synergistic component parts that contributed to air supremacy. It clearly demonstrated the interdependency of each component. Logistical needs could not have been met without Combat Cargo to deliver the supplies. B-29 bombers serving in their air interdiction and strategic roles would have failed had not the F-86 Sabre fighter jets protected them against MiG-15s. Fighter pilots would not have been able to return to the war had not the Air Rescue Service saved them. Commanders who directed ground forces and air components such as close air support would not have been able hit targets with the right kind and amount of power, had not reconnaissance did their jobs. The journal was well annotated with sources of information, some of which this author was able to cross-reference. In one instance the journal did not give proper credit for statistical information, but for the most part credit was given where credit was due.42 Overall the journal articles were well written and gave credence to the participants who contributed to the efforts that won them air supremacy.
1 These forces were comprised of 504 F-80s, 47 P-51s, 42 F-82s, 73 B-26s, 27 B-29s, plus reconnaissance aircraft and transports totaling 1,172. However, only 657 of these aircraft were available for use at the beginning of the war. William T. Y’Blood, “The U.S. Air Force in Korea – 1950-53,” Air Power Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000), 6.
5 William W. Suit, “USAF Logistics in the Korean War,” Air Power History, Vol. 49, No.1
(Summer 2002): 49.
10 “United States Air Force Statistical Digest,” (Fiscal Year 1953): 10-14.
11 William W. Suit, “USAF Logistics in the Korean War,” Air Power History, Vol. 49, No.1
(Summer 2002): 56.
12 William T. Y’Blood, “Combat Cargo,” Air Power History, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 30.
13 Daniel L. Haulman, “Salvation From the Sky: Airlift in the Korean War,” Air Power History, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Summer 2001): 18.
24 C-47 aircraft were the only ones in the Korean War that could operate out of primitive airstrips. In this particular case the Marines had bulldozed the airfield to 5,000 feet at the cost of many lives. Heavy equipment operators working at night under floodlights were shot at routinely while they worked. Paul C. Fritz, “The Kysuhu Gypsy Squadron in Korea,” Air Power History, Vol. 47, No 3 (Fall 2000): 10.
25 Ibid, 11. The Marines at Chosin Reservoir sustained over 8,000 casualties, including 751 killed and over 2,800 wounded. The rest were non-battle victims, mostly from the cold.
26 William T. Y’Blood, “B-29s Over Korea,” APH, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 26.
27 Joe Baugher, “Boeing B-29 Superfortress,” [book on-line]; available on ; Internet accessed on 18 November 2002.
30 William T. Y’Blood, “Air Superiority,” APH, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 16.
31 Forrest L. Marion, “Sabre Pilot Pickup: Unconventional Contributions to Air Superiority in Korea,” APH, Vol.49, No. 1 (Spring 2002): 24-25.
36 William T. Y’Blood, “Search and Rescue,” APH, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 43.
37 William T. Y’Blood, “Reconnaissance,” APH, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 37.
38 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983: 545.
42 On page 37 of “Reconnaissance,” in APJ, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2000): on page 37 the author W. Y’Blood cited overall statistics on reconnaissance activity without giving a source. I found the source, cross-referencing it to pages 555 of Robert Futrell’s book The United States Air Force in Korea. The information was copied almost word for word. More than likely it was just an oversight.