A Study of Air Supremacy in the Korean War.

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History 333,

The Historical Method-- Arthur Coumbe, Professor

A Study of Air Supremacy in the Korean War

By Tom Spearman

   

     The Korean War was the first major test of the newly formed United States Air Force.  It had been in existence for only three years when North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. The North Koreans purpose was to attempt to unite the country under communist rule.  When hostilities first broke out the United States war machine was not fully prepared to stop the aggression.  War material was in great supply but it had to be brought out of storage.  More importantly, most of the experienced military personnel had returned to the civilian sector.  The Far East Air Force (FEAF), composed of the Thirteenth in the Philippines, the Twentieth on Guam, and the Fifth in Japan, were responsible for carrying the air war to the enemy.1 The journal, Air Power History, chronicles the stages of the air war and focuses on the integral components that made up the totality of America’s response to achieve and maintain air superiority.   The aim of the journal was to examine the contributions of each component and demonstrate how their integration as a cohesive force helped achieve their goal, which in turn led to a peaceful settlement.  Specifically it looked at the commanders, logistics, combat cargo, strategic interdiction, close air support, aerial combat, search and rescue, and reconnaissance.  The historian, William T. Y’Blood of the Air Force History Support Office, and several others wrote and compiled many of the articles in the journal concerning this period.  The discussion will focus and highlight on the information found in these articles to determine the accuracy and relevancy of their historiography.

      The plan for air power at the beginning of the conflict was simple and straightforward.  The United States Army and Navy were able to halt the North Korean advance because FEAF was able to obtain and maintain air superiority within one month against the relatively weak North Korean Air Force. Air supremacy was reached by the end of August. This allowed for friendly troop movements to take place without the enemy threat coming from the air.  The commander of FEAF, George E. Stratemeyer, had his air power assets ready for wartime operations despite the continuing downsizing taking place after World War II.  His primary objective was to provide support to the ground forces, knock out eighteen strategic targets with a bombing campaign, and set up the infrastructure necessary to carry out future air operations. 2 Little did anyone know that in a few short months the Chinese, with the help of the Russians, enter the picture to contest the skies over North Korea, bringing the intensity of the conflict to a whole new level.

     Intelligence studies revealed that the Chinese had over 1,000 combat aircraft, mostly based in Manchuria.  Of these, 300 were MiG-15 aircraft compared to 89 American F-86 Sabres.  One year later the communist air strength swelled to over 7,000 aircraft due mainly because of Russia’s commitment of over 5,000 aircraft. 3 This gave reason for the air commanders to give pause and reevaluate the situation.  In essence they needed more modern jet aircraft to match these numbers which didn’t become available until the last year of the war. General Otto Weyland, who took command of FEAF after General Stratemeyer suffered a heart attack, along with his subordinate commanders, were responsible for shaping the strategy to execute the air war.  The job entailed integrating fighter, bomber, and close air support units that were mutually supportive of each other.  Logistics and support played a key role but it was not until the line of demarcation stabilized at the 38th parallel that they were able to be fully productive.  Once the line stabilized infrastructure could be maintained and sustained.

     At the beginning of the war airfields in Korea were destroyed by both sides in the conflict. Engineers, from both the Army and Air Force, made it possible to conduct air operations by setting up the infrastructure necessary to prosecute the war. The fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft could not even begin to do their jobs without this.  Behind the engineers were numerous other support personnel such as armorers, who loaded munitions onto aircraft, air traffic controllers that managed air space, aircraft maintenance, medical support, finance, supply, and a myriad of other functions.  All of these contributed to keeping the planes in the fight.4 It was logistics, however, that held to key to getting the material to where it was needed. This not only included aircraft procurement but vital material for the support functions.  

     By 1947 the number of planes in service dropped from 78,000 to just 27,000 with most of them being in storage.  The F-80 Shooting Star was quickly becoming outdated and there were not enough modern jet fighters, such as the F-86 Sabres, to effectively carry the fight to the enemy. Essentially, it was Air Material Command (AMC), headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base that served as the primary logistics support organization. Not only did it have to procure planes such as transports and fighters, but supply, maintenance, modification, repair, and of course, material acquisition.5 Every Air Force function, from support to combat machines involved in the Korean War depended on AMC. As we shall see, this organization was the linchpin to the success of the war.  

     The Air Force utilized a three-tier system for aircraft and equipment maintenance—organization, field, and depot.  Supply groups in FEAF would requisition supplies through the Far East Air Material Command (FEAMCOM), which in turn requisitioned through AMC.  There was some flexibility built into the system because the Air Force could requisition common supplies such as boots, clothing and tents through The U.S. Army Japan Logistics Command.  Getting the material to where it was needed worked through the inter/intra-theater transportation system divided among several organizations such as the Military Sea Transportation Service (U.S. Navy and contractor vessels) and the Military Air Transport Service, later renamed Combat Cargo. Once the material reached inland the bulk of it was shipped using the South Korea National Railway system contracted by the U.S. Army.  The supply system worked despite the partial destruction of the South Korean railway system at the beginning of the war. 6

     The main depot to service FEAF was at Tachikawa AB, Japan.  It was unique in that it was able to utilize a former aircraft industrial facility located next to it.  It could not produce new aircraft but it excelled at upgrading or repairing them.  The facility corrected safety problems and upgraded aircraft for improved reliability and performance. One such example was replacing the wing leading edge slats on F-86Es and F-86Fs with extended solid leading edges. This relatively simple procedure dramatically reduced the drag coefficient thus increasing the aircraft’s ceiling by 4,000 feet and it’s high-speed maneuverability for dog fighting.7 The depot also performed refurbishment on aircraft after they crossed the ocean on ships from the United States. Almost all aircraft suffered from salt corrosion, including those shipped via naval aircraft carriers. When planes were unloaded at the docks they were immediately brought to Tachikawa to get them ready for entering the war.

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     The demand for aircraft was an immediate concern for AMC.  As a stopgap measure more than 400 mothballed aircraft from World War II were called back into action.  AMC transferred an additional 275 aircraft to FEAF from the States. Spending on aircraft went up exponentially from $1 billion in 1950 to $10 billion by 1952, but the time lag from the production to getting the planes to Korea meant scaled back operations until they reach full fighting strength.  Although the manufacturers were able to meet the demand for aircraft and munitions they had to overcome the effects of ...

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