Account for the development of stalemate on the Western Front by the end of 1914

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Sarah Whiteway

Account for the development of stalemate on the Western Front by the end of 1914

The First World War began with precision, acting like clockwork against plans that had been projected up to almost a decade before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the subsequent declaration of war on Germany by Britain. Yet by December 1914 the Western Front had reached stalemate, the exact opposite of what each army had set out to achieve. The question still remains as to how the ultimate attack transformed to stalemate in such a small time period. The scenario is paradoxical in that such exactitude and precision planned years before the outbreak of war, resulted in massive failure by all parties involved. The war plans of the Great Powers, most significantly Germany’s Schlieffen Plan and France’s Plan XVII tailored this exactitude and thus led to the development of stalemate. Several other factors accounted for the development of stalemate, including lack of communications, training and tactics and the size of the armies. Individuals that played a key part in both advantaging and disadvantaging the armies of their nations exacerbated these factors. France’s Joseph Joffre and Germany’s Helmuth von Moltke are clear examples of individuals who heightened the events leading to the development of stalemate on the Western Front.

The Schlieffen Plan has been both praised and criticised by Historians. It has been called “a conception of Napoleonic boldness”, yet reprimanded for failing to consider the development of railways. Historian L.C.F Turner praised it in The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan from a military and strategic perspective as it “offered a real prospect of forcing a decision in the west and avoiding the agonising trench war deadlock of 1914-1918”. Yet he denounced the plan for its “immorality…the political folly of violating Belgian neutrality, and the almost reckless indifference to British intervention”.

However it is important to remember that the Schlieffen Plan was modified by Schlieffen’s successor, Helmuth von Moltke who was a courageous soldier but not a bold or daring Chief of the General Staff. He himself recognised this when once saying, “I lack the capacity for risking all on a single throw”. Yet he seemed to risk plenty in modifying the Plan, bringing with it disastrous consequences for Germany in 1914.

The Schlieffen Plan already had several faults, for it violated Belgian neutrality by invading Belgium, assumed that Russia would not mobilise for at least six weeks, inadequately protected the Eastern Front and did not take in to account human misfortunes which would alter the strict timetable structure of the Plan. These faults meant that the plan was extremely inflexible and left Moltke with many issues that only a strong-minded, committed Chief of General Staff could deal with. Through Germany violating Belgian neutrality, the Great Power established itself as violent and forceful. This was confirmed by German historian, Gerhard Ritter who wrote in the 1960s that “Germany was therefore obliged by purely technical necessities to adopt, before the whole world, the role of a brutal aggressor – an evil moral burden which…we have not got rid of even today”. Turner further added to this theory when he commented, “The Moltke-Schlieffen Plan not only stampeded Germany into committing gross political errors in 1914, but it also accelerated the whole tempo of the crisis in Eastern Europe and went far to make a peaceful solution impossible.”

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Moltke’s tactical flaws were made most obvious when he transferred two army corps from the German right wing and sent them to the exposed Russian Front, further weakening the army in the west and preventing the German advance. Moltke’s faults would come to an end on September 14 when he suffered a nervous breakdown and was replaced by General Erich von Falkenhayn, described by historian John Terraine as  “a man of decided ideas who possessed the nerve which von Moltke had conspicuously lacked”. Hence the Schlieffen Plan, as it was implemented in 1914, made a diplomatic solution of the ...

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