The issue of land was central to the Peasants who had been coaxed into the war effort in exchange for land concessions, the February Revolution had disrupted the promise and the Provisional Government needed to implement land reform if they were to maintain support from the peasants. 'The Revolution was inevitable because the people longed for land and had a hatred for landlords,' The Provisional Government had organised an elaborate land scheme called the Model Peasant Mandates, which sought to abolish landowner's monopolies and divide the land into smallholdings (similar to Lenin's NEP). The Provisional Government's failed to implement this scheme, because the weak antagonistic coalition spent most of their time in office furiously debating less-pressing issues such as Polish Independence and Capitol Punishment. The Government feared land concessions would have led to mass-desertion from the front lines.
The Bolsheviks, despite their contempt for the peasantry, as Marxists believe that agriculture is a restraining factor on the growth of the working classes, (the Bolshevik support base.) The April Thesis had offered land. This was vague and was merely an example of the Bolsheviks paying lip service to the peasants in order to get them onside. But a call for 'Land,' was easy for the predominantly illiterate peasantry to understand. This reflects Lenin's opportunism, despite his disdain for the peasants he realised that their support was crucial for the Bolsheviks to succeed in October 1917. Lenin also realised that satisfied rural workers were key to food production, which was key to fulfilling his promise of 'Bread,' which was necessary to keep the proletariat contented. This is similar to the German 'Alliance of Iron and Rye.' This was the idea that industry could not function successfully without good agricultural production. This offer of immediate land reform enlarged the Bolshevik support base beyond its traditional, working class voters, meaning their attempts at Revolution in October would have been unchallenged by the peasantry.
The Provisional Government sustained the war effort in the hope of gaining post war allied investment in the new republic and also there were patriotic reasons involved, (the government believed if they ended the war, the dead would have died in vain.) However, with the weak government, the war effort lacked an effective, coordinated leadership and Russia fared badly under the Provisional Government. Kerensky, one of the few formidable leaders, linked his name to an ill-fated offensive on Russia's Eastern Front in which 200,000 Russian soldiers died. The Bolshevik offers of, 'Peace,' were all the more appealing in the light of these defeats. The Soldiers, who were mainly peasant conscripts, preferred land reform to success in the war effort. However, many viewed still viewed the Bolsheviks as cowardly and traitors to their country. The Bolsheviks had gained strong support from the peasants through their offers of peace coupled with land reform.
Support from the Urban Proletariat was no guarantee. The Bolsheviks relied on natural support from trade union movements in some heavily industrialised areas, especially Tsaritsyn, the Donetz Basin and the Krondstat Naval Base. But the key to support from the industrial workers in Petrograd, where the revolution was to be staged, was the Petrograd Soviet. This constantly undermined the authority of the Provisional Government, for example, all military orders had to be approved by the Soviet, there was now an organised working class voice in the city under the command of Trotsky. Through the Soviet, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had access to a politicised, organised proletariat. The Bolsheviks would be able to use this as a staging post for the revolution. But Lenin feared manpower was not enough, and the Bolsheviks would need arms. The Kornilov Rebellion would provide that opportunity.
The Petrograd Soviet put forth its order Number 1.which sought to allow Soldiers the ability to name their own generals, fearing a breakdown in discipline and relying upon support from the Provisional Government, General Kornilov attempted to crush the order. When it became apparent that Kerensky, the war minister, planned to support the Soviet, Kornilov and the army decided to march on Petrograd. The Octoberists and the Cadets were alienated over this decision to support the Soviet and left the Provisional Government as a result, leaving it weak and fragmented. Kerensky became highly unpopular with the military as a result of rejecting Kornilov, ' A large part of the officer-corp. regarded Kerensky with contempt, his authority after the Kornilov revolt was so weak that as early as September 1917, Lenin considered a Bolshevik victory guaranteed,' The only option open to Kerensky was to arm the factory workers and members of the Soviet with rifles in order to expel the coup attempt. This was successful in putting down the Kornilov revolt, but in their haste of issuing the guns, the Provisional Government took few records, and therefore reclaiming all the guns was difficult. This allowed Lenin control of not only organised, politicised workers, but an armed proletariat. Due to the military abandonment of the Provisional Government, the only opposition that the Bolsheviks faced was a small women's garrison, which ran at the first sign of trouble. Although the guns were not necessary, they gave the Bolsheviks the confidence to attempt another revolution, so soon after the July uprising had failed.
The Provisional Government had big economic concerns. Inflation rose as the Provisional Government abandoned the Gold Standard in order to print more money to meet the demands of the army. The Rouble was worth one tenth of the 1914 level by mid 1917. Whilst wages doubled, the price of bread quadrupled. There were strikes in many factories because of longer hours and little or no pay due to the war effort. The Bolsheviks offered an immediate end to the war, which they realised was creating the devastating economic situation. Also, through re-nationalisation of key industry and thus allowing centralised planning of the economy, the Marxists offered an economic alternative. This gave them popular backing for the revolution in 1917, especially amongst the Workers.
However, the Bolsheviks were not entirely successful in 1917, they failed to manipulate the disposal of the Tsar in the February revolution and they failed in their July attempt at an uprising because of a lack of popular support. By the end of 1917 they only had control of the areas around Moscow and Petrograd and it took them a further three years to consolidate control over the rest of the country.
Western Historians tend to take the belief that the Bolshevik Revolution of the October was not a result of the social, economic and political climate at the time, but instead it was ' the result of an unforeseen convergence of circumstances cleverly seized upon by Lenin and the Bolsheviks,' These circumstances include the collapse of the Provisional Government, the Kornilov Revolt, the Armed Workers, etc. Trotsky offers the Russian, Menshevik view, 'Russia took the road of Proletarian Revolution, not because her economy was ripe for a socialist challenge, but because it could not develop further on a capitalist basis,' The idea that the Revolution was not the role of chance, that it was somehow preordained and that Communism was the natural path for Russia and that 1917 happened to be the year that Capitalism had run its course. He neglects the basic historical circumstances in which they came to power, which the Western historians pick up on, whilst ignoring ideological aspects picked up on by Trotsky.
Philosopher N. Berdyaev suggests, 'The Russian Communist Revolution came to birth in the misery of a destructive war...revolution always presupposes misery,' This highlights the Role of the First World War in the Socialist Revolution, that the misery of the Great War allowed the Bolsheviks success in 1917, because defeat in war brings misery and misery brings revolution. But Germany is evidence to the contrary. It lost the war quite severely, but the Weimar authorities crushed the Communist Uprisings of 1918, which was temporary and had no mandate to rule, like the Provisional Government. Why then, could Russia not repel the Bolsheviks? The war set the framework within which the Socialist Revolution could occur but it was is accountable for the particular success of the Bolsheviks in 1917.
The Kornilov Revolt was the main reason for the Socialist Revolution succeeding in October. Kornilov not only managed to break up the fragile coalition government, which was meant to provide a strong authority until after the war when a transition to proper democracy could occur. He undermined Kerensky's leadership abilities, especially within the army, which ruined the war effort. But the key factor was that the Kornilov Revolt allowed the Bolsheviks an armed support base, which gave them the confidence to attack. I do not think Lenin would have attempted his revolution so soon after the failed July uprising, if he had not gained armed support. The Success of the Bolsheviks is more a result of the failures of the Provisional Government, upon which the Bolsheviks seized.
The other factors, offer of Land Reform, a call for peace and power to the Soviet, were important in maintaining support once the Bolsheviks were in power, but it was not key to getting them into power, it is joked that even a bunch of schoolgirls could have invaded the Winter Palace that night in October. The Bolshevik's policy of non-cooperation eventually played to their advantage, because, while the other structured parties had involved themselves in the Provisional Government, they were seen as partly responsible for its failure, whilst the Bolsheviks could remain aloof from the governmental failures.
Lenin allowed his Marxist principles to be thrown out of the window for the 1917 Revolution. He did not wait for a Bourgeois form of society to properly take hold. He gave this phase of transition just eight months, without his flexibility and opportunism he would have wait until there was the construction of an effective, large proletariat. The Bolsheviks gained power because they seized control of various situations open to them, which is why they were successful in October. It is not surprising that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were successful in 1917, what was surprising was that they managed to hold power for over seventy years.
Bibliography
Roy A. Medvedev, The October Revolution (Columbia University Press, 1979, New York)
W. Astrov, An Illustrated History of the Russian Revolution (Martin Lawrence Press, 1928, London)
Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (University of Michigan Press, 1932, Michigan)
Paul Miliukov, The Russian Revolution, Volume 1. (Academic International Press, 1978)
James D. White, The Russian Revolution 1917-21 (Edward Arnold Publishing, 1994, London)
Robert Goldston, The Russian Revolution (Phoenix House, 1966, London)
