An evaluation of the United States decision to use atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 shows that the use of the bombs was not a justified means of obtaining Japan's surrender

An evaluation of the United States decision to use atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 shows that the use of the bombs was not a justified means of obtaining Japan's surrender in the Second World War. This evaluation has been made according to the factors which influenced the deployment of the weapons, available alternatives, and repercussions suffered by post war society. In 1945 World War Two was drawing to a close. On May 7 of the same year the Nazi party gave their unconditional surrender to the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. With the war over in Germany, the remaining theatre of war was that of the Pacific. The Americans and the Japanese were left fighting a battle that started when the United States was attacked at Pearl Harbour by the air and naval forces of Japan. As a result of Pearl Harbour the United States deserted their isolationist policy and joined the Allied forces in World War Two. During this time the American government was working on the development of the first atomic bomb, which was to have large implications on the American military and diplomatic policies. The development of this first American nuclear weapon was known as the Manhattan project. On July 16 the first atomic bomb, detonated by plutonium, was successfully tested in the New Mexico desert. Atomic bombs were soon thereafter dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan on August 6 and 9 in1945, respectively, resulting in Japanese surrender and an end to American involvement in the Second World War. The use of these bombs is estimated to have killed in the vicinity of 300,000 Japanese. For the first time a weapon was used that caused unprecedented destruction and altered diplomatic relations forever. The reason given for the use of the bomb was that it would cause unconditional surrender by the Japanese with a minimal loss of American lives. However, various pressures influenced President Harry Truman’s decision to use nuclear arms against Japan. The justification of the multibillion dollar Manhattan project was a concern, as well as acting in accord with a general American hatred of Japan stemming from Pearl Harbour. President Truman may also have wished to use the bombs to gain diplomatic advantage over the Soviet Union. In addition, no evidence has been found to indicate that the government of the United States gave due consideration to the magnitude of the weapon that they were about to use against the Japanese and the political, social, military and medical effects that would be incurred. If they had, one of the available alternatives to the use of the atomic bomb may have been employed. The alternatives existing were a land invasion of the Japanese mainland, or the use of diplomatic negotiations such as modifying the American demand for unconditional surrender or using Russian aid as a threat against Japan. For more than half of a century now historians have contemplated the American’s use of atomic bombs in 1945. This investigation is extended in this paper and it’s seen that the United States was erroneous in its decision that the atomic bomb would be the most advantageous manner to end the war in the Pacific with the fewest casualties in the shortest time frame and that ulterior motives were present in their decision to use it. Before unapplied alternatives and external influences may be examined, however, it is necessary to discuss American objectives and the development of the atomic bombs.

When the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing an estimated quarter of a million civilians and military personnel as well as causing mass destruction, the war was abruptly brought to a close. Despite the remarkable efficacy of the bombs in forcing Japanese surrender it remains a controversial course of action because of uncertainties about American motives in the use of atomic weapons against Japan. “In his memoirs Truman claimed that using atomic bombs prevented an invasion that would have cost 500,000 American lives. Other officials mentioned the same or even higher figures.” (Maddox 4) Here lays the primary reason given by American officials to justify the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The gross overestimation of these figures will be evaluated but presently it is more noteworthy that this is the only justification that was readily available from American officials in 1945. There can be no doubt that minimizing American casualties was a priority for President Truman but it would be unreasonable to assume that this was the sole factor influencing such a tremendous decision. The Manhattan project gave America an international edge on nuclear technology. The project spanned the period from 1942 to 1946 and by the time the bombs were actually employed it had cost almost two billion dollars, in present day currency taking inflation into account it was more than a twenty billion dollar project. As President Truman’s biographer David McCullough suggests, “America had not spend $1.8 billion developing a weapon that could end the war only to put it on the shelf…” (as quoted in Parshall 2). Mr. McCullough indicates that the justification of the multi-billion dollar Manhattan project was an influential factor on the decision to use the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This pressure to appease American taxpayers and government adds an entirely new dynamic to the decision to use the atomic bombs. The implications of this new dynamic are best explained by President Truman’s Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. As he wrote in 1947, “…I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.” (as quoted in Walker 94) If Truman had faltered in his decision to use the atomic bombs, public certainty of his capability to lead the United States would have been significantly undermined. As a result of the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, a general feeling of hatred stemmed from the American public towards the Japanese race. Any decision made by Truman that would have allowed for the Japanese to take more American lives or seemingly shown sympathy for Japan by not dropping the bombs would have been entirely unacceptable. Given the necessity for Truman to justify the Manhattan project and appease the American public it is evident that an urgent halt to American casualties in Japan was not the only pressure being exerted on Truman when he made the decision to use the atomic bombs. The decision to use nuclear weapons to end the fighting in the Pacific were erroneous as Truman’s decision was not based solely on the most advantageous military actions but political issues as well. It is also possible that international relations with the Soviet Union influenced Truman’s decision to employ the atomic bombs.

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As World War Two neared its close the Soviet Union, under Josef Stalin, had military forces in occupation of Eastern and Central Europe. The Soviet military had been largely responsible for the defeat of Germany. American officials were worried about what Stalin might expect as reimbursement for his victories. “President Truman’s critics argue that the bomb was dropped for diplomatic, not military reasons. They quote Truman’s remark that ‘the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms’ to the Soviet Union after the war,” (Loebs 14) Truman is criticized for allowing his pursuit of a diplomatic advantage over the Soviet Union to influence his judgement that atomic bombs should be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. US Secretary Byrnes may have given the best account of American motives: “’Our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe.’” (as quoted in Loebs 14) With American-Soviet relations in Truman’s mind, the possibility that he decided to drop the bombs solely on the basis of the most advantageous military objectives is irrational. When the pressures of justifying the expenses of the Manhattan project, satisfying the American public and gaining an upper hand on the Soviet Union are all considered collectively in regards to the decision of dropping the atomic bombs the actuality is that Truman’s decision was not made exclusively for the motives of minimizing American casualties. These political and diplomatic motives also influenced his decision. If dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been President Truman’s only choice that would end the war in the Pacific his decision would have been incontestably justified. However, alternative courses of action existed and upon their evaluation it is evident that the use of the atomic bombs was no more advantageous than alternate tactics that could have been employed.

J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission states that, “It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.” (as quoted in Alperovitz 1) One of the leading alternatives to the use of the bomb was an invasion of the Japanese homeland. The attack would be on Kyushu in November of 1945 and then if required an attack on the industrial centre of Japan, Honshu in March of 1946. In the years since the end of the Second World War, important military documents have become available for examination. According to existing documentation of US military planning,

…if an initial November 1945 landing on Kyushu had gone forward, estimates of the number of lives that would have been lost…were in the range of 20,000 to 26,000. In the unlikely event that a subsequent full-scale invasion had been mounted in 1946, the maximum estimate found in such documents was 46,000. (Alperovitz 7)

By comparison the atomic bombs, “…caused the deaths of 140,000 in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki.” (Author Unknown 115) The combined total of deaths caused by the atomic bombs is 210,000—over four times as large as the estimated casualties of an invasion. Another advantage of invading Japan was that it was a continuation of conventional methods of warfare. As will be seen in examining the effects of the use of nuclear arms by the United States, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki unleashed a new era of warfare. An invasion on the other hand would employ techniques that had been used since the beginning of warfare. There was one advantage that an invasion of Kyushu and Honshu did not hold over the atomic bombs, however. This was as a result of the fight to the death mentality of Japanese troops. The Japanese war mentality is described by General Korechika Anami, the Japanese war minister in 1945 by Dan Kurzman, in Day of the Bomb: Countdown to Hiroshima. The plan was, “to wait for an American invasion of their homeland and then throw back the enemy with all the forces Japan still had, from kamikaze suicide pilots and human torpedoes to old men and women with bamboo spears.” (231) Japan was not prepared to surrender and become subject to American decisions. Japanese troops had already demonstrated that they would continue to fight and inflict heavy loss no matter how meek the outlook. An invasion of the homeland would have prolonged the war into 1946. However, given the difference in estimated casualties of the two manoeuvres an invasion should have been given due deliberation as an alternative by President Truman, instead of having been brushed aside in a decision to use the atomic bombs in accordance with the previously examined motives. Another alternative that should have been considered was a resolution of fighting through diplomatic negotiations.

When Japan finally surrendered after the second atomic bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki, they made one condition: they surrendered “with the understanding that the said declaration does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of his majesty as supreme ruler.” (Loebs 10). The fact that they were willing to surrender at that point as long as Emperor Hirohito was permitted to retain his position raises the question of whether they would have accepted earlier surrender terms if a modification had been made to the terms, allowing for the Emperor to remain as the supreme ruler. Admiral Leahy, Truman’s chief military advisor spoke on the Japanese preparedness to surrender: “The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.”

(as quoted in Harsch 3) Given that the United States had made clear to Japan that their demand was for unconditional surrender, as history professor Alonzo Hambay has noted, “…the United States could have made it clear…that unconditional surrender would not mean the removal of the emperor.” (7) However, this simple clarification was never made and as a result, “Whether Japan would have responded to such an initiative cannot be known, but one can regret that it did not crystallise in Truman’s mind before the obliteration of two cities.” (Hambay 8) It is most likely given that the modification of terms for unconditional surrender to include maintenance of the emperor’s position was the compromise by which the Japanese eventually did surrender, that their earlier surrender according to these modifications could have been obtained before the use of the atomic bombs. Historian Walter S. Schoenberger agrees with this conclusion as he has stated that, “…the evidence that exists indicates that, had the unconditional surrender formula been modified significantly, it is very likely that Japan would have surrendered, perhaps before the atomic weapons were used,” (305). Another diplomatic act was available as a course of action for the United States as well that would also have resulted in Japanese surrender before the use of the atomic bombs. A top secret internal War Department study by the US government concluded that if the USSR were to enter the war against Japan it, “would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable.” (Encarta 4) Given this fact and that, “Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within two or three months after the surrender of Germany.” (Schoenbereger 73) the United States possessed a second diplomatic alternative to forcing Japanese surrender with the use of atomic weapons: they could have used Stalin’s promise of entry into the war against Japan by three months after the defeat of Germany, or August 1945, to scare the Japanese into surrender. A renowned historian Herbert Feis who was an advisor to three of the World War Two era US Cabinet Secretaries concludes that surrender could have been obtained by the use of the threat of Russian aid. As Feis concluded, if, “…the American and Soviet governments together had let it be known that unless Japan laid down its arms at once, the Soviet Union was going to enter the war. That…might well have made an earlier bid for surrender effective.” (as quoted in Alperovitz 5) These alternatives were advantageous militarily as no casualties were caused, but also politically and diplomatically. The world would not be plunged into a new era of warfare yet they would wrap up the war in the Pacific a concise time frame. Three obvious alternatives existed to the use of atomic bombs against Japan and none of them were engaged to end the war. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and infliction of mass casualties was not the most advantageous manner in which to conclude the fighting in the Pacific, and it is proven to have been an even less desirable tactic when the repercussions it caused on post-war society are considered.

Upon viewing the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima, a Japanese military police captain forced American prisoners of war to look at the damage. “’Look what you’ve done!...One bomb! One bomb! Look there. That blue light is women burning. It is babies burning. Is it wonderful to see the babies burning?’” (as quoted in Parshall 3) The atomic bomb was the first weapon in history able to inflict such damage—physically and medically. Structures within a wide area of the centre of the blast were entirely destroyed, as well as humans, plants and animals. As President Harry Truman wrote in his personal diary of the bomb, “It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered…” (as quoted in Ferrell 5). Two types of atomic bombs were developed. The more simple type of bomb used uranium 235 to set off a chain reaction. The other type of bomb compressed quantities of plutonium using symmetrical shockwaves to produce a chain reaction. Sixty thousand houses within a thirteen mile radius were destroyed and citizens wandered around with their clothing and skin ripped beyond recognition. Long term medical effects were those such as the development of keloids, radiation illness, haematopoietic organ failure and ocular lesions. No medical repercussions of any weapon had been so acute and sustained before the atomic bombs were used. Given these consequences, it is unfathomable that any available alternative was not taken as a way to terminate the war. The conclusion to be drawn is that the Americans, including President Truman were unaware of the effects of the atomic bombs. Bearing in mind that the atomic bombs had been so speedily developed and put to use such a short interval after the test in the New Mexico desert, no time was available to contemplate the effects. Not only was there a lack of scrutiny as to the effects of the bomb structurally and medically, considerations of the changes the atomic bomb would make in diplomatic matters were not made either. The Cold War followed in the aftermath of the Second World War when the United States and the Soviet Union became the dominant powers in international politics. An intensified and hostile situation was created between these two superpowers as a result of many individual conflicts such as the American policy for the containment of Communism. One of the major conflicts responsible for the beginning and continuation of the Cold War was the nuclear arms race. When the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki they were the only nation in the world that had been successful in the development of an atomic bomb. “The Americans initially had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, but it was short-lived. The USSR developed an atomic bomb in 1949. Four years later, the Americans detonated the first hydrogen bomb. Within a year, the Soviets had done the same.” (Aliphat 31) This nuclear arms race that came to be one of the defining features of the Cold War had its origins in the American use of the first atomic bombs in 1945 on Japan: “The confidence provided by the American monopoly on atomic weapons allowed Truman to launch, at Japan’s expense, a ‘diplomatic offensive’ against the Soviet Union, one which would play a role of great importance in engendering the subsequent cold war.” (Kagan 3) It has been mentioned that the bombs may have been dropped with the motive of intimidating the Soviet Union. This intimidation and subsequent retaliation by the Soviet Union in the development of their own nuclear weapons established the arms race that was to extend over the following decades. The post war repercussions that left Japanese society terrorized and left the rest of the world in constant apprehension that a hot spot would emerge from the Cold War and incite a nuclear holocaust do not lend themselves to the rationalization of the American use of atomic bombs to end the war in the Pacific in 1945.

In conclusion, by evaluating the United States decision to use atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 it’s seen that the use of the bombs was not a justified means of obtaining Japan's surrender in the Second World War. This evaluation has been made according to the factors which influenced the deployment of the weapons, available alternatives, and repercussions suffered by post war society.The decision to use the bomb was made and justified on the grounds that it would be the tactic to end the fighting in the Pacific with the fewest American casualties in the shortest time frame. However, upon examination of the decision making process it is seen that other motives such as justifying the multibillion dollar Manhattan project and making the Soviet Union more manageable in Europe existed for the use of the bombs. Given that the bombs were not used solely because they would be the most advantageous militarily for the United States perhaps they should not have been employed, especially given that alternatives to the bombs existed. The war against Japan could also have been ended by an invasion of the Japanese mainland. This tactic would have caused fewer casualties than the atomic bombs did and it would not have had as severe repercussions on post-war society. The use of diplomatic negotiations could have been used as well to end the war with the least amount of casualties in the smallest time interval. The Americans could have clarified that their demand for unconditional surrender did not necessarily mean that the Emperor would be dethroned. It would also have been possible to obtain Japan’s surrender through intimidation by making them aware that the Soviet Union was willing and able to enter the war by the late summer of 1945. Japan was in a weak state economically and militarily, running out of both soldiers and the supplies for them to fight with after having been at war for years. Historians such as Walter S. Schoenberger seem to believe that Japan was ready to surrender and simply looking for the most advantageous means to do it by. Either of these diplomatic acts could have caused their surrender. Given that the existing alternatives were beneficial in regards to the aims of the United States one of them should have been employed to avoid the unleashing of the atomic bomb for the first time. The atomic bombs created unprecedented destruction and had long lasting repercussions ranging from the implication of severe medical conditions on those exposed to the blasts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the incitation of an arms race that became a determining factor of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The atomic bombs, although they only took virtually seconds to force Japanese surrender caused mass casualties and thrust the world into a new era of warfare—the nuclear age. Given that President Truman had motives other than minimizing American casualties in dropping the bombs and therefore did not consider the available alternatives despite the advantages they possessed. It is evident that little consideration was given to the repercussions that the bombs would create as they were employed so quickly after their development. The effects were lasting, severe, and as many historians have concluded since 1945, unnecessary. Many American government officials such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson and renowned historians such as Herbert Feis and David McCullough have concluded that the use of the atomic bombs was not mandatory in obtaining Japanese surrender. In consideration of all the evidence it is found that President Truman and the United States were not justified in giving the command to drop atomic bombs on Japan to end the fighting in the Pacific as there were more advantageous means available to reach their desired end of the termination of the war that were not considered because of clandestine motives that existed for the use of the atomic bombs. As General Dwight Eisenhower of the United States stated in regards to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan in 1945, “’It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.’" (Alperovitz 4)

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