SOURCE B: From P J. Overy, The Origins of the Second World War, published in 1987. This historian argues that the policy of appeasement made goad sense in the context of previous British foreign policy.
The word that British statesmen chose to describe their response was appeasement'. It was an unfortunate choice, for it came to imply a weak and fearful policy of concession to potential aggressors. In fact appeasement was far more than that. It was mane or less consistent with the main lines of British foreign policy going back into the 19th century. By appeasement was meant a policy of adjustment and accommodation of conflicting interests broadly to conform with Britain’s unique position in world affairs. It involved no preconceived plan of action, but rested upon a number of political and moral assumptions about ah e Yin u e of compromise and peaceableness. It involved using the instruments of British power trading and financial strength, and a wealth of diplomatic experience—to their fullest advantage. But it also implied that there were limits to British policy beyond which other powers should not be permitted to go.
SOURCE C: From A.J.F Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, published in 1961. Taylor argues that the policy of appeasement served positively to encourage Hitter in his expansionist plans.
It did not occur to Chamberlain that Great Britain and France were unable to oppose German demands; rather he assumed that Germany, and Hitler in particular, would be grateful for concessions willingly made concessions which, if Hitler failed to respond with equal good will, could also be withdrawn. On 19 November 1937 Halifax (the British Foreign Secretary) met Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Halifax said all that Hitler expected to hear. He praised Nazi Germany 'A the bulwark of Europe against Bolshevism' he sympathized with past German grievances. England would not seek to maintain the existing settlement in central Europe. There was a condition attached: the changes must come without a general war. This was exactly what Hider wanted himself. Halifax’s remarks mere an invitation to littler to promote German nationalist agitation in Danzig, Czechoslovakia and Austria; an assurance too that this agitation would not be opposed Iron without. All these remarks strengthened Hitler's conviction that he would meet little opposition from Great Britain and France.
SOURCE D: From Anthony Adamthwaite , France and the Coming of the Second World War, published in 1977. This historian argues that French foreign policy in the 1930s was based essentially upon feelings of weakness.
Timidity was the dominant characteristic of (French) political leadership. At the critical moments—in March 1936 and September 1938 ministers shrank from any suggestion of constraining Germany by force. This timidity had three main causes. Firstly, then was the cotton of the military chiefs. Early in 1936 before the Rhineland coup, Marshal Gamelin considered that France could not fight Germany with any certainty of victory. Secondly French public opinion was deeply divided on social and economic issues and the lack of national unity prevented a forceful reposte to German initiatives. Thirdly, from September 1935 onwards, military and political leaders were convinced that France could not contemplate war with Germany unless assured of active British help. British assistance was judged essential for the protection of French shipping and supplies in the Mediterranean.
(A) Compare Passages B and D on the motives that lay behind policies of appeasement in Britain and France. 15 pts
(B) Using these four passages and your own knowledge, evaluate the claim that the policy of appeasement deserves a large proportion of the blame for the outbreak of the Second World War. 30 pts
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angelstar727 (student)
