bunker, where early afternoon conferences were regularly held, Hitler certainly would
have been killed by the concussive force of the bomb. These three examples
demonstrate that even with the conspirator’s plans, there was room for error, which
did in fact occur.
The plot depended on two conditions, primarily the successful assassination of Hitler
followed by prompt, determined action in Berlin. The first of these conditions had
already been invalidated but von Stauffenberg who left the Fuhrer’s headquarters was
oblivious to this and was in fact convinced that no one could have survived the
explosion in the conference room. However shortly after 1pm, reports to the
Benderstrasse confirmed, to the conspirators’ surprise, that Hitler was alive, and as a
result Olbricht decided not to issue the order for Valkryie (the code name for the
plan). Following the events of the 20th July, reports described Olbricht, who was in
charge of the technical details of the plot as ‘incompetent’. This supports Olbricht’s
failure to take initiative which is essential for any chance of success in such
circumstances, Hence the second condition failed too. Even von Stauffenberg’s
energy and determination, however, could not make the three to four hours that had
been lost during the three-hour flight from Rastenberg to Berlin. The initial plan to
seize Berlin had ‘totally miscarried and the situation of the group of conspirators was
now hopeless.’ As this source was published shortly after the end of the war, Bullock
would not have had the availability of source that he would have done a few years
later. In effect this reduces the validity of the source since his views may have
changed with a greater insight into the event.
In addition to the previous two conditions, operation Valkryie depended on the
cooperation of more senior officers, particularly General Fromm, in the Bendlerstasse
army headquarters, for suspicious or wavering troop commanders would
ineviatably seek verbal confirmation of strange orders accompanied by even stranger
proclamations coming off the teleprinter. After the coup had started, Fromm refused
to cooperate and suggested Stauffenberg kill himself. In relation to the question the
change of venue for the conference and the movement of the briefcase were both
factors out of the conspirators control. However the decision to use only one of the
two bombs by Stauffenberg did in fact change the consequences of the whole plot and
this therefore legitimately counts as an important reason why the July 1944 Bomb
Plot to assassinate Hitler was unsuccessful. Despite this, the coup still had potential
for success but this chance diminished the moment Olbricht chose to delay the orders
for Operation Valkryie.
Had the conspirators been prepared for Hitler’s survival and organised plans in order
to ensure the coup in Berlin succeeded they may have been successful. The
conspirators’ failure to cut off the Wolfsschanze from Berlin prevented this from
functioning.
Hitler successfully prevented news of the assassination attempt from reaching the
conspirators in Berlin by his Luftwaffe adjutant’s decision to demand a block on all communications aside from those from Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. This was a crucial demand since the conspirators had not constructed any contingency plans for carrying out the coup if Hitler were still alive. Consequently the conspirators hesitated to proceed with operation Valkryie until von Stauffenberg had confirmed Hitler’s death.
Essentially Goebells and the intervention of one insignificant young officer, Major Ernst Remer, were partly responsible for the suppression of the army coup?? The army coup was essentially squashed by a clever stroke by Goebbels and the intervention of one insignificant young officer, Major Ernst Remer. Goebbels telephoned Hitler at the Wolfsschanze and got him to speak to Remer to confirm that he was still alive and to give Remer order to deploy his troops in Berlin under Goebbel’s command. As a result, the conspirators were arrested and to seize government and other key buildings.
The events in Berlin, with their crises, climaxes and debacle also contributed to the failure of the Bomb Plot: the incomprehensible delayed launching of operation Valkryie; the failure to cut off the news from the Fuhrer’s headquarters; Remer’s telephone conversation with Hitler (Major Remer, do you hear my voice?); the arrest of Fromm; von Stauffenberg’s persistent pleading and propelling the slow moving mechanism into action; Field marshall von Witzleben’s angry scene at headquarters of the High Command of the armed forces; the radio announcement around nine o’clock that Hitler would speak to the German people that very evening; the first signs of perplexity on the part of the conspirators; the arrest of the City Commandment von Hase; and con Stauffenberg appearing late in the evening resigned passing through the rooms of OKW.
Seizing control of Berlin was the essential part of the military coup d’etat that was to follow the assassination of Hitler. Plans had been laid by the conspirators to deploy troops of the Gross Deutschland battalion and other crack army divisions under the command of officers know to be sympathetic to the plotters’ cause. They would have acquired control of government buildings, SS and Gestapo offices and the radio station in the first hours of the intended coup. A crucial omission by the conspirators was the failure to plan the cut telephone communication links between Wolfsschanze and Berlin and to prevent Hitler broadcasting to the German people by radio during the night of the 20th – 21st July. This allowed forces loyal to Hitler to seize the conspirators in Berlin before they were able to effect a military coup d’etat and to draw on the personal loyalty he still commanded amongst a majority of the German people.
The conspirators failed to destroy the communication at the Fuhrer headquarters, to conceive a strategy for instantly (immediately) seizing radio stations in Berlin and to arrest part SS leaders. Consequently, the realisation of Hitler’s survival caused the plot to unravel at speed and French and German armies refused to cooperate.
Throughout the war and the Nazi regime, in which the SS and Gestapo dominated the systems of Gleichschaltung, it was extremely difficult for individuals in Germany to communicate. Moreover the German police state was decidedly effective in eliminating opposition at all levels of society. For example, this is indicated by the arrest of von Moltke in January 1944, a key leader in the Kreisau Circle to which von Stauffenberg had become attached.
A further problem was the conspirator’s inability to gain the support of any outstanding frontline commanders in the major German cities and consequently the conspirators based in Berlin came to be of crucial importance.
Through methods of consolidation power, the mixture of legality and violence, of authoritarian powers from above and the Nazi revolution from below, Hitler established his dictatorship so that by late 1934 it was impossible to remove him legally. Subsequently Hitler was able to keep power through genuine support for successful policies, through propaganda and indoctrination and through systems of repression.
Consequently, there was a lack of widespread opposition to the Nazi regime and what opposition evolved was largely ineffective for a number of reasons. Political opposition was divided between left and right and within the left KPD and SPD parties. There was also a crucial underestimation of Nazi power potential from both political elites and from the other popular parties of the centre and left who believed that Fascism would not last and that Hitler could be manipulated in the meantime.
Thus, whilst there was a wide variety of opposition to the Nazi regime, the number of actual registers was small and their aims and methods were uncoordinated This crucial lack of unity, the isolation of opposition groups, meant that the Nazi regime was secure and was only brought down by the vast coalition of enemy powers. For example, the July 1944 Bomb Plot resulted from a military conspiracy, (which involved two long-established civilian underground groups, which had contrasting political aims.) in the background of which stood two long-established civilian underground groups, but which differed in their political aims. These included the left-wing Kreisau circle, which respected and admired the Soveit Union and wanted a deal/contract/understanding/agreement with Stalin and the right-wing Beck-Goerdeler circle, which sought a restoration of the monarchy and a deal with the west.
In order to obtain political stability of his regime Hitler realised that it was essential to gain support from the military. He achieved this by adopting a policy of gradual infiltration, recognising that the influence of Nazi ideas were bound to increase amongst officers and men as members of the Hitler Youth came forward for military service and in the meantime he would win the support and sympathy of the officer corps by his determination to break the impositions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and to create the German Reichswehr to its full strength. Furthermore the Night of the Long Knives removed opposition from within the Nazi Party to Hitler’s policy for dealing with the army and allowed Hitler to demand that the army officers and men swear a personal oath of loyalty to him upon the death of Hindenburg on 2nd August, 1934 as the 1930s progressed the power of the SS increased so that Hitler was able to get rid of several senior commanders who opposed his future plans (Blomberg and Fritsch), he abolished the post of war minister and appointed himself as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces with a personal high command. Consequently, ‘after 1938 the army’s ability to shape military developments within Germany was Drastically reduced.’
However, some officers amongst the army leadership remained opposed to Hitler and Nazi policies throughout the 1933-45 period. Opposition dated back to 1933 when many viewed Hitler and the Nazis as an ‘outside element’. This was a time when in fact many were aware of Hitler’s SA troops and were not won over by liquidation of the SA, when many felt threatened by the removal of Blomberg and Fritsch, and distrusted Hitler’s aggressive war policy despite the military victories during the war’s first two years. Many argued/asserted/disputed that Hitler’s war aims would bring about Germany’s ruin and that the atrocities that occurred during the army’s eastwards advance through Russia were a strain on German honour and culture. As a result, officers of like mind began to form a major resistance group under the leadership of Tresckow who was responsible for a number of schemes intended to kill Hitler.
A key example of this was Claus von Stauffenberg who joined the conspirators against Hitler through his connections with the Kreisau Circle and through an utter contempt for Hitler and Nazism brought about by his strong sense of Christian morality and horror at the excesses of Nazism.
Von Stauuffenberg provided a crucial dynamic in the planning of the July Bomb Plot and of the military coup after Hitler had been assassinated. At the beginning of July 1944, von Stauffenberg was promoted which gave him access to Hitler’s military conferences at the Wolf’s Lair, which allowed for the plot to take place.
Other conspirators were experienced and respected high ranking officers (Ludwid Beck, Werner von Haeften, Friedrich Olbricht, Henning von Tresckow, Erwin von Witzleben) who also put the honour of Germany and its army before their personal oath of loyalty to Hitler
Shortly before 20 July 1944 von Stauffneberg wrote: ‘It is time that something is done. But whoever dares to act must realise that he will probably go down in German history as a traitor. Yet if he fails to act, he will be a traitor to his own conscience.’
Ewald von Kleisr-Schmenzin told Freisler (the President of the Peoples’ Court); ‘Yes, I have pursued high treason since 30th January,1933, always and with every means. I have made no secret of my struggle against Hitler and National Socialism. I regard this struggle as a commandment from God. God alone will be my judge.
Once von Stauffenberg had travelled from the Wolfsschanze and arrived at the War Ministry in Berlin, he learned to his amazement that Hitler had survived the explosion and that his co-conspirators were too frightened to take any further action. Hitler reacted quickly and efficiently as by 10.30pm, men loyal to Hitler had taken control of the War Ministry and arrested the conspirators.
In view of the rapid drop in morale in the first half of 1944 and the evident unpopularity on the Nazi regime, the registered popular response to the news of the plot against Hitler appears surprising. Summary reports complied by the SD, based upon observations of reactions in all parts of the Reich immediately following the attack provide a more or less uniform picture of deep shock, dismay, anger, and outrage about the attempt on the Fuhrer’s ;life and immense relief at the outcome. ‘Very many peoples’ comrades’, continued the SD Digest, ‘connect directly mystical, religious notions with the person of the Fuhrer. Hatred of the officer clique responsible, and shock that such treachery could occur were equally common responses’. The bonds with the Fuhrer were said to have been depended, the trust in the leadership strengthened.
Unfortunately the German resistance, that clearly existed at the time, received no support either from within Germany or outside. The possible thousands and perhaps millions of Germans who were secretly critical/disapproving of the Third Reich behaved as the vast majority of people do when in a dangerous situation, and earned Sophie Scholl’s rebuke at her trial in 1943; ‘What we have written and said is in the mind of all of you, but you lack the courage to say it aloud.’
According to Joachim Fest even if the July Bomb Plot had been successful, (it is sobering to realise that) virtually ‘nothing would have changed.’ It would not have caused the allies to modify/diversify/alter their aims, they would have remained demanding for unconditional surrender and they would still have made the decision to occupy and divide Germany, as settled on at Yalta.
In his broadcast to the German people on the night of 20th/21st July, 1944, Hitler stated that he survived with only minor scratches, bruises and burns. He said ‘ I regard this as a confirmation of the task imposed on my by Providence…’ He continued to speak of the tasks he had undertaken on Germany’s behalf and his vision for the future.
On the day of the attempted assassination, Mussolini arrived in Rstenberg for a previously announced visit. When speaking to Mussolini Hitler implied similar views of his survival as he did during his broadcast later that evening. Impressed by Hitler’s words and in response to Hitler’s survival, Mussolini added, ‘This was a sign from Heaven.’ This implies that it was not only Hitler himself that believed his survival may have been due to Providence yet a common belief.
Previous attempts on Hitler’s life all failed for a variety of reasons many of which ironically contributed to the failure of the July, 1944, Bomb Plot = technical failure (von Stauffenberg and von Tresckow, 1943(, Hitler’s unpredictability (Army Command at Kharkov, 1943, von Gersdorf, 1943).
Additionally the bomb plot was badly organised and for this reason it has been argued that it had not chance of success even if Hitler had been assassinated. According to German general tank expert Jeinz Guderian, ‘the officers and men assembled for Operation Valkryie had not the slightest idea of what was going on….’ However conspiring such an event in a police state is a decidedly/profoundly complex matter. More attention was needed on the small important details in the crucial aspects, such as co-ordination, timing and communications. ‘Nothing had been done about blowing up the communication centre at the Fuhrer headquarters otherwise putting it permanently out of action.’ No actions had been taken to acquiring/obtaining control of the radio stations in Berlin and other cities amongst other steps that had not been made. Among the conspirators there was too much uncertainty and hesitation and so the initiative was lost. Collectively all these factors may have contributed to the failure of operation valkryie.
Albert Speer, Hitler’s armaments Minister questioned the conspirators misjudgement of the inevitable failure. He went on at ask, ‘how could they not know the extend of the loyalty Hitler still commanded?’
According to Weitz ‘a series of coincidences saved Hitler’s life.’ These coincidences consisted of the fact that the conference was held in an aboveground wooden hut instead of the usual underground concrete bunker. Also, the briefcase was moved from its original spot which diverted the explosion, thus saving Hitler.
The Bomb Plot of July 1944 can be regarded as a plan fated/condemned to failure. Realistically the majority of the plotters’ realised they had little chances of success. Living by simple codes of honour and sacrifices, they effectively elected to die by them, realising that, as Von Stauffenberg put it: ‘Even worse that failure is to yield to shame and coercion without a struggle.’ For whatever motives, the conspirators set aside their doubts and took a huge leap in the dark.(Despite this awareness they were willing to sacrifice themselves.) Tresckow put the matter succinctly when he told von Stauffenberg: ‘the assassination must be attempted…. Even if it fails, we must take action in Berlin. For the practical purpose no longer matters; what natters now is that the German resistance movement must take the plunge before the eyes of the world and of history. Compared to that nothing else matters.
Heinrich Fraenkel The July Plot, 1966
Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis, 2000, pg 676-679
Alan Bullock, Hitler – a Study in Tyranny, 1952, pg 744-751
Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth, 1995 pg 445
Joachim Fest, Hitler, 1973, pg 711
Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945, 1966
As recorded in a BBC monitoring Report of 21st July 1944
D. G. Williamson, The Third Reich, 2002, pg 122-123
Jackson J. Spielvogel, Hitler and Nazi Germany, 1992
John Hite and Chris Hinton, Weimar and Nazi Germany, 2000
Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop, 1992, pg 440-441
David Evans and Jane Jenkins, Years of Weimar and the Third Reich, 1999……………
Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death, 1994
Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopaedia of the Third Reich, 1976
Jackson J. Spielvogel, Hitler and Nazi Germany, 1992
Based in detail provided in the guide to the Plotzensee Memorial, 1973
Michael Burliegh, The Third Reich, 2000, pg 714-716
Heinrich Fraenkel, The July Plot, 1966
Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth- Image and reality in the Third Reich, 1987, pg 215
D. G Williamson, The Third Reich, 2002, pg 122-123
Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death, 1994
A recorded in a BBC Monitoring Report of 21st July 1944
Joachim Fest, Hitler, 1973, pg 709
David Evans and Jane Jenkins, Years of Weimar and the Third Reich, 1999
Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, 1953
??? Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945 – Nemesis, 2000, pg 676-679
Gitta Seremy, Albert Speer:His Battle with Truth, 1995, pg 445
John Weitz, Hitler’s Banker-Schacht, 1997, pg 284
Michael Burliegh, The Third Reich, 2000, pg 714-716