After evaluating each argument about whether Stalin had a right to be suspicious of his western allies over the delaying of the Second Front, it would seem Wolfson is most credible here because Lightbody does not consider the other commitments of the west to show why there was a delay. It is without this consideration it would appear that Wolfson is strongest in his argument.
Historian James Fitzgerald argues that the independence of post-war Poland was undermined by decisions taken at the Teheran Conference in November 1943. His view was that the Western Allies created a situation which no independent Polish government could accept and ensured that a puppet government would have to be installed as a result of agreeing to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Polish boundary in the East. At the conference, Churchill argues that the USSR should be allowed to keep the areas of Poland that the USSR had seized in 1939. However, at the Yalta Conference of 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt do not agree with the suggested boundaries proposed at the conference by Stalin. By going back on their word at the Teheran Conference, this makes Stalin suspicious of his western allies, perhaps out of fear that in post war Europe, Stalin will try and spread the ideology of Communism. In his writing, Fitzgerald says, “there was discussion over the boundaries of post-war Poland, in effect, Poland was moved westward” and that Poland would be, “compensated by receiving territory on her western border from Germany.”
Historians Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing strongly challenge this when they describe the actions of the Red Army in Poland in 1944 and argue that the hopes for post-war independence for Poland were crushed by Stalin. They argue their view that hopes for genuine democracy in Eastern Europe after the war was destroyed in the ruins of Warsaw. They give their evidence in their writing by saying, “the Soviet troops unexpectedly waited at the Vistula River, and allowed the Nazis to return and crush the Poles.” This therefore adds weight to the argument that Stalin cannot be suspicious of his western allies as he is doing as much harm to the hopes of independence for Poland at the end of the war, as much as he thinks the west are doing as well. It must also be considered that a defenceless Poland would be easier for Stalin to control post-war, but since this is for personal gain it cannot be justified.
It appears that after evaluating both arguments in this factor, it would seem that Isaacs and Downing are most credible because although Fitzgerald can give more evidence in his reasoning for Stalin’s suspicions, he does not consider the damage that Stalin himself is doing to the situation and for this lack of consideration this is why Isaacs and Downing are more credible in their argument.
Historian Scott Harrison argues that the alliance between the USSR and the Western Powers was liable to collapse in 1945. If the given view is true then one would assume that perhaps the west would purposely affect relations with the USSR as the alliance was only a marriage of convenience. This view is understandable as realistically the only reason as to why these two unfamiliar allies are working together is the fact that they have a common enemy in Nazi Germany. Once the Germany had surrendered, this loss of common enemy would surely mark the end of the relationship, given that the ideologies of the wartime allies were completely opposite. In his writing, Harrison explains why the alliance was going to collapse. One of the reasons he gives links in with the first factor about the Second Front. Harrison states how, “Stalin had asked the Allies to set up a Second Front to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union.” In Stalin’s eyes, the Allies had been slow to act and therefore forced the USSR to make an even bigger sacrifice. The second reason being the Western powers feared the expansion of Communism, and especially how Stalin was committed to world domination. The last reason is basically a reverse of the second reason; the USSR feared an expansion of capitalism, especially with how weak post-war Europe was and the power of the USA.
Historian Mike Sewell challenges this when he argues that there were tensions between the wartime allies but a collapse of the alliance was far from inevitable. Historian Oliver Edwards argued that Roosevelt thought that the Soviet Union might be a more important ally than Britain and that Stalin genuinely wanted to remain on good terms with the USA. Having worked together successfully in defeating Nazi Germany, it appears that Stalin’s suspicions cannot be justified as the west are helping the USSR remove a threat of invasion, a theme that Stalin had been paranoid about even since the day he became dictator of the USSR. In his writings Sewell says, “deals were possible, especially with the British.” This is shown in the alleged percentages agreement between Churchill and Stalin at the Fourth Moscow Conference, about how to divide south-eastern Europe into spheres of influence. He also adds, “Roosevelt remained confident that he could deal with Stalin in the basis of the mutual trust that had been built up during the war. The British and the Americans remained confident that they could do deals with Stalin.” The argument given by Oliver Edwards to support Mike Sewell’s view works well in showing that relations between the east and the west were perhaps not as bad as often shown. They both argue that deals could be done between the two and that they both shared post-war objectives. This also helps in concluding that Stalin’s suspicions cannot be justified as he wants to remain on good terms with the west.
After evaluating the two arguments, it appears that Harrison gives the stronger argument as his evidence proves more realistic. The fact that the ideologies of the countries were completely opposite proves that post-war relations would have been difficult and this is why Harrison is more credible.
Historian Steve Phillips argues that the bomb caused both sides to harden their views of the other. In his writing Phillips says, “Stalin saw the failure of Truman to at least inform him of the bomb as a deep insult.” Stalin already knew that the US had an atomic bomb, through the means of spies. This adds weight to the argument that Stalin could be justified in his suspicions of his western allies because this made him further distrust US motives. This can be supported when it says that Truman wanted Stalin take more notice. It must also be considered that although America say the bomb was used to defeat Japan, the United States immediately attempted to turn the atom bomb to diplomatic advantage.
Historian Oliver Edwards strongly challenges this with the view that the bomb was dropped because the Americans didn’t want to spend the money on developing it without testing it, and because it would defeat Japan. Stalin had known that the reason in which the USA had entered the war was for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, meaning that the main enemy from the American point of view was the Japanese. Although by May 1945, Germany had surrendered in the war, there was still fighting going on between the USA and Japan, for example the Battle of Okinawa. In his writing Edwards says, “the bomb was dropped because $2 billion had been invested in its development and because it was seen as the best means of defeating the Japanese.” The bombs dropped on the 6th August and 9th August 1945 at Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced the Japanese to surrender and it was for this sole reason that the bombs were dropped.
When one considers the arguments the historians have given, the common theme appears that Stalin could not be justified in his suspicions of the west. This view is more convincing, not only because the historians have given better evidence or considered more events that could alter any suspicions Stalin might have, but also because Stalin himself acted in ways that were just as bad if not worse than the west, which cannot justify his suspicions of his western allies in the period 1941-1945.
Bibliography:
Edwards, O (2002) The USA and the Cold War 1945 - 1963
Edwards, O (2002) The USA and the Cold War 1945 - 1963
Fitzgerald, J (1989) The Cold War and Beyond
Harrison, S (1987) World Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Isaacs, J and Downing, T (1998) Cold War
Lightbody, B (1999) The Cold War
Phillips, S (2001) The Cold War
Sewell, M (2002) The Cold War
Wolfson, R (1978) Years of Change
Bradley Lightbody, The Cold War, published in 1999
Robert Wolfson, Years of Change, published in 1978
James Fitzgerald, The Cold War and Beyond, published in 1989
James Fitzgerald, The Cold War and Beyond, published in 1989
Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, Cold War, published in 1998
Scott Harrison, World Conflict in the Twentieth Century, published I 1987
Mike Sewell, The Cold War, published in 2002
Mike Sewell, The Cold War, published in 2002
Steve Phillips, The Cold War, published in 2001
Oliver Edwards, The USA and the Cold War 1945-63, published in 2002