Assess whether any moral principles have relevance to warfare.

The key principle underlying just cause, is the vindication of fundamental rights and the protection of rights from serious threats such as aggression. Self-defence, from rights violating aggression are thus prime just causes for resorting to war. These rights are traditionally understood as the rights of states to political sovereignty and territorial integrity: states have the right to make their own political decisions.  Only if these rights are violated for instance, through an armed invasion across the border is a country justified in resorting to a war of self-defence in response.  Other countries may join the war on the victim’s side, since the aggressor forfeits its state rights when it violates the victim’s.

The most important of the jus ad bellum rules, therefore, is the rule that the moral use of military force requires a just cause.  A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of a just cause.  Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate.  The war must be fought with right intention, meaning that the defending nation must use only that amount of force, which is necessary for it to achieve its just cause.  It therefore follows from this qualified insistence on moral motivation in the political leadership that political leaders must be able to justify their decisions on moral grounds.  The motives of those engaged in making the decision to go to war must not be tinged with vengeance or a desire for retribution.  Rather, the decision to go to war must be essentially protective; the goal of war is to obtain a just and durable peace.  

Right intention serves to reinforce the requirement that the state, which seeks to justly use force, be acting in a truly defensive capacity.  The principle of the non-combatant immunity, in its usual modern formulation, prohibits any direct military attack on non-combatants.  In view of the absolute status recently accorded the principle, it might appear that modern proponents of the just war theory would be obliged to conclude that most wars past and present have been unjust since they have caused substantial civilian casualties.  The principles of just war tradition therefore incorporate legitimate targets.  The principle of double-effect has enabled modern just war theorists to carry out acts, which are not morally permissible, provided that the act is carried out in the sake of good effects, legitimate result, that the consequences are unintentional and not disproportionate to the good aimed at.

The Just war principles also incur that the decision to engage in war must be enacted by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process.  A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives, legitimate means, to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation.  Thus, International agreements have led to a clarification of natural precepts, and made certain what the laws of humanity would leave uncertain, and made definite and particular what the law of nature contained only in a general way. 

The core proposition of just war theory is that, sometimes, states can have moral justification for resorting to armed force in the international system.  Optimism and Realism, by contrast, sport a profound scepticism about the application of moral concepts, such as justice to the key problems of foreign policy.  On the other hand, for the pacifist, it does make sense to ask whether a war is just.  Nevertheless, the result of such normative application, in the case of war, is always that war should not be resorted to.  Where just war theory is sometimes permissive with regards to war, pacifism is always prohibitive.

Optimists like Immanuel Kant are of the belief that ‘perpetual peace’ can be obtained, that war is only a temporary feature of human life and of international relations.  Thus, diplomacy and negotiations can replace warfare, such famous examples include the longstanding Israeli peace process.  It is on the basis that warfare can be replaced by peaceful relations that optimists believe there is no need for moral obligation.   Realists believe moral concepts should be employed neither as descriptions of, nor as prescriptions for, state behaviour on the international plane.  Realists emphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to maximize its expected self-interest and, above all, their view of the international arena as a kind of anarchy, in which the will to power enjoys primacy.  Referring specifically to war, realists believe that it is an intractable part of an anarchical world system; that it ought to be resorted to only if it makes sense in terms of national self-interest and that, once war has begun, a state ought to do whatever it can to win.  

Walzer, the just war theorist, offers arguments that states are in fact responsive to moral concerns, even when they fail to live up to them because they are the creation of individual persons, who hold moral perceptions.  Walzer goes so far as to say that any state, which was motivated by nothing more than the struggle to survive and win power could not over time sustain the support from its own population.  He also argues that all the pretence regarding the necessity of state conduct in terms of pursuing power is exaggerated and rhetorical, ignoring the clear reality of foreign policy choice enjoyed by states in the global arena.  States are not frequently forced into some kind of dramatic struggle, as the choice to go to war is a deliberate decision backed by political interests.  If it were true that war is the continuation of the business of politics by other means, then war is not an autonomous activity but one constrained by the requirements of policy.  This demands at least that the conduct of the war be directed to the political objectives of the war and that the means employed be in some proportion to the expected political gains.

The pacifist belief is not only that violence is evil but also that it is morally wrong to use force to resist, punish or prevent violence.  Pacifists reject war believing no moral grounds justify the option of war.  The right of a state, as of an individual, is to protect itself against an actual or threatened attack is beyond dispute.  It is affirmed in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’  Straightforwardly, it is the specific kind and degree of violence that war involves which the pacifist objects to.  It is contended that the pacifist is a free-rider, gathering all the benefits of citizenship whilst not sharing all its burdens.  Another inference drawn is that the pacifist constitutes an internal threat to the over-all security of his state.

Walzer, contends that pacifism’s idealism is excessively optimistic.  In other words, pacifism lacks realism.  More precisely, the non-violent world imagined by the pacifist is not actually attainable, at least for the near future.  Another objection to pacifism is that, by failing to resist international aggression with effective means, it ends up rewarding aggression and failing to protect people who need it.  It is left to the nonpacifist to argue that the killing of soldiers and the civilians in war is in the end justifiable in order to obtain great moral goods.  Civilians right to life may be outweighed by national objectives, provided those objectives are morally acceptable.

What these examples suggests is that situations can arise in which there is a clash between the moral requirement to prevent evil, if it is readily in our power to do so, and the duty to refrain from killing the innocent.  In addition, that if the only way to prevent a much greater harm, is to take life, this may be morally licit and even right.  Moreover, traditional double effect cannot plausibly be invoked to disguise the fact that alleged absolute moral rule has thereby been breached.  The main discourse of this essay is therefore dominated by three major traditions of thought: optimism, realism and pacifism.  The interaction between these three traditions thus structures the contemporary discussion of wartime issues.  The rules of Just war theory provide a rational framework for moral reflections on war.  Just war theory has been recognized and widely used in the twenty-first century in an attempt to limit the horrors of war.  It has been also incorporated into international law through the United Nations Charter, the Nuremberg Charter, and the International Court of Justice.  Generally construed, just war theory consists of two basic categories: jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amstutz, Mark R.  ‘International Ethics: Concepts, Theories & Cases in Global Politics,’  (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Oxford, 1999).

Buttle, Nicholas.  ‘War, Justice & Morality,’   Politics, (Volume 11, Number 2.)  October 1991.

Clarke, Ian.  ‘Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction,’  (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988).

Fisher, David.  ‘Morality & the Bomb: Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence,’  (Croom Helm: London, 1985).

Fullinwider, R.  ‘War & Innocence,’  Philosophy and Public Affairs,  (Volume 5, Number 1.) 1975.

Glover, Jonathon.  Causing Death and Saving Lives,’  (Penguin Books: London, 1977).

Hare, R. M.  ‘Essays on Political Morality,’  (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989).

Lackey, Douglas P.  ‘The Ethics of War and Peace,’  (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1989).

Luban, D.  ‘Just War & Human Rights,’  Philosophy and Public Affairs,  (Volume 9, Number 2.)  1980.

Mavrodes, G.  ‘Conventions & the Morality of War,’  Philosophy and Public Affairs,  (Volume 4, Number 2.) 1975.

Murphy, Jeffrie G.  ‘Retribution, Justice & Therapy,’  (Reidel Publishing: London, 1979).

Nuttall, Jon.  ‘Moral Questions: An Introduction to Ethics,’  (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1993).

O’Connor, D.  ‘A Reappraisal of the Just War Tradition,’  Ethics,  (Volume 54.)  1973-1974.

Teichman, Jenny.  ‘Pacifism & the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy,’  (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1986).

Walzer, Michael.  ‘Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War & Citizenship,’  (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1970).

Walzer, M.  ‘World War II,’  Philosophy and Public Affairs,   (Volume 1, Number 1.)  1971.  

Wasserstrom, Richard A.  War and Morality,’  (Wadsworth Publishing: California, 1970).

---