The NVA had very limited technology on the battlefield. They relied on primitive ways of fighting their battles. They used cheap weaponry from China and the Soviet Union including assault rifles, machine guns, SAMs, and mortars. The Americans however had the latest technology at their disposal. Close air support included Huey and Cobra attack helicopters and various navy jets. No tanks or APCs were used in this battle due to the terrain. America had the technological advantage in this battle, but the NVA’s tactics and doctrine evened out the advantage that the Americans had over the NVA.
Logistics played a big role in the fight for Dong Ap Bia. The Americans used helicopters to transport supplies and reinforcements to and from the front lines. Rations and ammo were among these supplies transported to the front lines to help win the battle. Although helicopters provided an advantage of logistics, the NVA shot down several transport helicopters and attacked LZ’s to prevent the Americans from being re-supplied. The NVA used trails under triple-canopy to move personnel and supplies at night. The ridge which Dong Ap Bia sat on was along a major trail network that supported the infiltration on the NVA supplies and personnel. Even though the NVA took measures to prevent the re-supply to the Americans, the U.S. has the advantage in availability of supplies and transportation.
Much of the command that took place during the beginning of the battle was lead by Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt, commander of the 3d battalion, 187th Infantry. Battle command was decidedly decentralized. Though Honeycutt constantly prodded his company commanders to push on, he could to do little to direct their tactics as they fought through the jungle. Only in the closing days of the battle, when his companies maneuvered in close proximity over the barren mountain top, was he able to coordinate mutual support among his subordinates. Fire support for units in contact with the enemy was also decentralized. Artillery, ARA, and close air support were responsive to units down to platoon level. Yet in the evolving, often confusing, maneuver battle, it was inevitable that command and control of supporting fires suffered. Fighting on Ap Bia Mountain produced no less than five incidents of air-to-ground fratricide over a ten-day period. Pilots were unable to distinguish friend from enemy in the intense and confusing fighting around the mountain.
Both opposing forces had similar ways of gathering intelligence. Since the Americans could not see through the triple-canopy jungle, the U.S. aircraft could not report any intelligence. Intel was gathered by means of small patrols and forward observers. The NVA would sneak behind enemy lines during the night to attack and to also conduct reconnaissance missions. Since the NVA were familiar with their territory and used tunnels, they were virtually undetectable during the night. The NVA could report back to higher command about the size of the American force, and send in reinforcements if necessary.
The NVA’s tactical doctrine for this battle was a defensive position. The North Vietnamese had many troops in the A Shau Valley and intended to defend it with troops massing on the hills surrounding the valley. The NVA commander's demonstrated tenacity and willingness to replace heavy losses indicated he intended to put up a stiff fight for Hill 937. The Americans however needed to flush out all NVA of this region for operation APACHE SNOW. The commanders were told to take the hill at any cost. This decision would later come back to question whether the hill was important enough to take with as many Americans who died taking the hill. Many of the NCO’s in the 101st Airborne Division were veterans from the Korean War or previous battles in the A Shau Valley. The higher ranking officers all had experience in the previous conflicts also. The soldiers who did not have experience in war were the privates, who some had been sent to the front lines straight out of boot camp.
Morale was something that played a big role in the fighting for Dong Ap Bia. Before the fighting began, morale among the American troops was pretty high. Some soldiers had just released from R&R. Once the American soldiers had encountered the enemy and realized that they were in for a hard fight, morale began to decrease. The terrain was the major factor in this. The hill was so steep that when thunderstorms came, it was nearly impossible to have forward movement under enemy fire. Honeycutt’s decision to keep sending the soldiers back up the hill affected the morale as well. Many were dying and many more were being sent to their death with each attack on the hill. The NVA’s morale was high before and after the fighting began on Hill 937. They had a cause for their war, and believed in the war they were fighting (unlike many Americans who did not want to fight). Victory also increases morale among the troops. The NVA repulsed the Americans over and over again back down the hill.
Lieutenant General Richard Stilwell was the commander of XXIV Corps. XXIV Corps was responsible for operation APACHE SNOW. Major General Melvin Zais was the commander of the 101st Airborne Division. Under him was Colonel Joseoh Conmy, commander of the 3rd Brigade of the 101st. He controlled the main effort in the battle for Dong Ap Bia. Next in the chain of command was Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt, commander of the 3d battalion, 187th Infantry. All of these commanders were well trained and had a high level of experience in both the Vietnam War and the Korean War. The commanders of the NVA were very experienced. They had been fighting in the A Shau Valley for most of the war. Along with the Vietnam War, many of the commanders fought in the resistance against the French.
In May of 1969 the American command planned to clear out the A Shau Valley using ten battalions of infantry, including the 9th Marine Regiment, the 3d ARVN Regiment, the 3/5th Cavalry, and three air assault battalions: 1/506th, 2/501st, and 3/187th. The overall plan of attack called for the Marines and the 3/5th Cavalry to combat-assault into the valley and RIF [reconnaissance in force] toward the Laotian border while the ARVN units cut the highway through the base of the valley. The 501st and the 506th mission were to destroy the enemy in their own operating areas and block escape routes into Laos. The NVA constructed bunkers, trenches, spider holes, and tunnels throughout the mountain side. Their mission was to hold their ground and defend Dong Ap Bia. This would come easy to the defenders because terrain was in their favor. The Americans were to attack and overrun this mountain. Withdrawing was not an option.
In the early morning hours, eighteen hundred men from five battalions - 1/506th, 2/501st, and 3/187th from the 101st Airborne Division, and 4/1 and 2/1 ARVN-were assembled at Firebase Blaze to await liftoff. On 10 MAY 1969 at 0730, H-Hour, sixty-four Hueys and the first four hundred men and the lead companies of 1/506th and 3/187th covered by Cobra gunships, were on their way to the northern A Shau Valley. The Hueys flew to the south across the A Shau Valley, and then, using the walls of the valley as a screen, turned to the north along the Laotian border to their LZs. The NVA were at Dong Ap Bia ready to defend Hill 937. The NVA were spread out along the ridge covering the entire mountain side.
In the hour before the helicopter launch, fighter-bombers had bombed the LZs for fifty minutes; the artillery followed with a fifteen-minute barrage. Next came aerial rocket artillery helicopters for a one-minute "frosting on the cake." This gave an advantage to the Americans to cut down enemy forces before troops are deployed on the ground. At 0844, the 3-187th Infantry combat assaulted into an LZ in the vicinity west of Son Ap Bia. Delta Company immediately made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Approximately two hours later while moving from the LZ, Bravo Company made contact, returned fire and killed two NVA. Initial impressions were that the NVA were probably trail watchers, but after sustaining three wounded the battalion concluded that the firing was too well controlled and that stiffer resistance might be encountered.
On 11 May, the 3-187th placed artillery and TAC air on a large bunker complex located astride their axis of advance. RIF operations followed the strikes as the 3-187th moved to the southwest toward Hill 937. While searching the hut and bunker complex, the 3-187th found five NVA bodies killed by the artillery/TAC air preparation. A significant discovery in the area was a group of documents identifying the unit as the 29th NVA Regiment. The documents showed that the 29th NVA Regiment had returned from North Vietnam in April and had been conducting reconnaissance operations between Laos and Route 548 in the A Shau Valley.
On 12 May the 3-187th continued their push along the rough, canopied ridges. By 0905 they made heavy contact with a well disciplined force estimated at two companies dug in about 200 meters to their front. The maneuvered against the force and killed three NVA. The battalion called in the ARA and artillery fire in order to dislodge the enemy from his fortified position. The enemy held fast, however, and throughout the day the 3-187th received heavy automatic weapons and RPG fire and limited mortar fire. Heavy TAC air and artillery fires were placed on the enemy positions.
The situation remained unchanged on 13 May as the enemy stayed in bunkers and employed small arms, RPG, automatic weapons and mortars against maneuvering elements of the 187th.
On the morning of the 14th B, C, and D companies of the 3-187th once again began to slow and deliberate maneuver under artillery, TAC air and gunship support. Under this heavy attack the enemy fell back. Contact terminated about 1700 and the 187th swept the bunker area to find 13 enemy killed in action by artillery, 47 be killed by small arms fire and 29 killed by air strikes.
The 187th continued its drive along the ridges to Hill 937 on the morning of 15 May. As the line companies maneuvered toward their objective they discovered 14 NVA bodies from the previous day’s contact. By 1500 they were in heavy contact and realize the force was more than a normal battalion sized element. Rates of fire were extremely heavy and the enemy troops skillfully employed command detonated claymores in large quantities. Any reinforcements were being brought into the contact zone; new troops had fresh haircuts, clean uniforms, and new weapons. The enemy was deployed in concentric rows of bunkers which afforded maximum utilization of the terrain available. The intense bunker to bunker fighting left 62 more NVA dead and the 1-506th Infantry Was directed to move north to reinforce the 3-187th in order to take Hill 937.
At 0110 on May 16th, Charlie Company of the 3-187th Infantry began receiving grenades, satchel charges, small arms fire on their position. Spooky was employed from 0200-0600 resulting in three secondary explosions. At first light check revealed 14 NVA killed. The 1-506th directed to move north to reinforce the 187th when it received heavy fire from Hill 916. The 1-506th continued their movement toward the 187th with the support of air strikes.
On 17 May, the 187th occupied an overwatch position and directed CS gas strikes. The 1-506th continued to maneuver to reinforce the 187th. Although the enemy had gas masks, the CS attacks were effective and caused them to leave some of their bunkers.
By 0715 on 18 May, Bravo Company of the 1-506th began closing on the southern base of Hill 937. Alpha and Charlie Companies of the 1-506th closed in on either flank. At 1330 the 3-187th having been under continuous fire, took up positions northwest of Hill 937. Artillery, TAC air, ARA and gunships then proceeded to pound the hill. Alpha Company of the 2-506th was alerted and deployed to Firebase Blaze to be available if required.
On the morning of 19 May, with the 1-506th on the south and the 3-187th on the north, the enemy positions were subjected to continuous artillery and TAC air fires. The 2-501st and the 2/3rd ARVN were alerted to prepare to assist in the final sweep of the enemy’s fortified positions surrounding the entire ridge line. By late afternoon an additional 175 enemy bodies had been accounted for.
Late in the morning of 20 May, 4 battalions executed a coordinated assault on Hill937. The 3-18th, with Alpha Company of the 2-506th attached, assaulted the hill from the north, the 1-506th from the south and southwest; the 2/3d ARVN from the southeast; and the 2-501st from the north east. The 3-187th swept up the hill from the north, while the 1-506th and the 2-501st blocked possible routes of escape. The 2/3d ARVN moved onto Hill 937 from the south. By 1200 battalion objectives on the Dong Ap Bia ridge were taken. The determined enemy resistance disintegrated as friendly forces overran enemy positions resulting in a total body count of 109 on 20 May.
On 21 May allied forces swept over the hill to check the enemy base area in detail. After ten days of hard fighting the 3-187th Infantry had earned a well deserved rest and returned to the coastal plains. The 1-506th secured the abandoned enemy positions while the RIF operations to the east. Friendly reconnaissance of the area encountered only isolated and sporadic resistance. An additional 59 enemy killed were discovered and 89 weapons were captured.
The Dong Ap Bia operations cost the enemy a total of 630 NVA KIA. In addition to these confirmed casualties, a POW captured during the operation indicated that 89% if the units in his area were casualties. The massed firepower took a devastating toll on the NVA. The 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment were virtually wiped out. On 22 May the 2-501st and the 2/3d ARVN continued search operations in the vicinity of Hill 937, accounting for 77 NVA killed and 3 crew served weapons captured. The Americans won the battle but at a heavy cost. The ten day Battle of Hamburger Hill had cost 70 American dead and 372 wounded. To take the position, the Americans eventually committed five infantry battalions, about 1,800 men, and ten artillery batteries. The battle was crucial for the occupation of the A Shau Valley.
The repercussions of the battle were more political than military. Questions raised by the press concerning the necessity of the battle stirred controversy for weeks after the fighting stopped. These issues flared up again when the 101st Airborne quietly abandoned the hill to the enemy in June. Eventually, the investigation into the Battle of Hamburger Hill reached Congress and led to a reappraisal of American strategy in Vietnam.
The Battle of Hamburger Hill was fought twenty-six years ago. Over the intervening time, the U.S. Army has changed a great deal. Its doctrine, equipment, and organization have developed to support a rapidly evolving mission. Modern day commanders, nonetheless, can still glean some important insights from the Battle of Hamburger Hill. To be successful in such operations, commanders must see the enemy, themselves, and the terrain in order to visualize the successful conduct of the battle. On Dong Ap Bia, the rugged terrain clouded the American commanders' abilities to see themselves and their enemy.
For a commander to see himself on the battlefield, he has to be able to do more than merely track the locations of friendly units. A commander must know how his unit (or units) will behave on the battlefield, and he must understand how the impact of terrain changes the way his unit or units operate, the tortuous terrain of Dong Ap Bia reduced light infantry maneuver to a crawl. The 1-506th Infantry spent five days en route to support 3-187th Infantry, a move the 3d Brigade initially expected to take one day. Similarly, Delta Company, 3-187th, spent two days trapped in a ravine, which delayed the concentration of Honeycutt's combat power. Besides reducing ground maneuver, the terrain practically negated the tactical advantage of the lift helicopter. Up until the end of the battle, helicopter operations around Dong Ap Bia were hazardous in the extreme. It was not until 19 May, when most of the NVA had been killed or driven up the summit of the mountain, that helicopters were used to position the reinforcing battalions tactically.
Besides hampering the commander's ability to predict his unit's performance on the battlefield, the dense terrain made it difficult to know the enemy. While the Americans knew an NVA regiment was in the A Shau Valley, the densely jungled terrain concealed the fact that the enemy had up to two entire battalions on the mountain itself Actual enemy strength on Ap Bia was only confirmed by military intelligence on 18 May, long after Zais realized that there were too many enemy for 3-187th Infantry to handle without support.
American tactics in Vietnam relied on overwhelming firepower--chiefly close air support, artillery; and ARA--to reduce friendly casualties while overcoming the enemy's advantage in numbers and, in some cases, dismounted maneuver. But while fire support contributed significantly to the victory at Dong Ap Bia, it proved a two-edged sword. Although American firepower created staggering enemy casualties and limited his ability to mass maneuver forces, preparatory fires seldom neutralized the NVA positions. The dense jungle and the sharp relief of the hill attenuated the concentration of firepower, as did the enemy's well-prepared defenses. Honeycutt also held that ARA was chiefly responsible for crippling two U.S. attacks that might have succeeded based on the courage and gallantry shown by the ground maneuver forces.
Ultimately, the Battle of Hamburger Hill proved that the key ingredient in successful battle command is the commander himself. At Dong Ap Bia, Honeycutt met a highly skilled enemy in unexpected numbers who displayed unprecedented determination to fight. This enemy had carefully chosen the battlefield terrain to neutralize the effects of American technology while maximizing the remarkable light infantry skills of his own soldiers. Only Honeycutt's drive and determination kept his battalion fighting despite crippling losses, sagging morale, bad press, and crashing pressure from his chain of command. His strength of will (with support from Conmy and Zais) overcame every adversity the terrain, weather, enemy, and fate could heap on him and helped him see the battle through to a successful conclusion.
Bibliography
E.M. Flanagan, The RAKKASANS – The Combat History of the 187th Airborne Infantry. (New York: Oxford UP, 1987)
Samuel Zaffiri, Hamburger Hill, May 11-20, 1969 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988),
Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),
The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Copyright © 1999 by Oxford UP
The French were compelled to accede to the creation of a Communist Vietnam north of the 17th parallel while leaving a non-Communist entity south of that line. (Chambers)
The Ho Chi Minh trail was an elaborate system of mountain and jungle trails linking North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. (Lewy)
As part of the overall operation, the area in the vicinity of Dong Ap Bia – Hill 937 was selected as one of the areas to be searched following the initial assault. (Flanagan)
Hamburger Hill was so-named because the soldiers said the mountain "turned men into hamburger" during the battle. (Zaffiri)
“Aerial Rocket Artillery” Used mostly by Cobra helicopter gunships. (Lewy)
Not even the helicopter, the transcendent theme of American technological superiority in this war, offered much hope of speeding up maneuver. (Lewy)
When the NVA moved, they did so at night along trails covered by triple-canopy jungle, again confounding observation from above. (Zaffiri)
In at least one incident, the pilots themselves became lost and attacked more than a kilometer off their intended target (Chambers)
Though Honeycutt had a long and distinguished record as a combat commander in both Vietnam and Korea, he underestimated Ap Bia Mountain and the NVA facing him. (Flanagan)
Firebase Blaze, five hundred by a thousand meters, was twenty kilos south of Ap Bia Mountain. (Flanagan)
Spooky is the nickname given to the Air Force C47 flare ship with mini-guns