"Blundering to glory". How far is this an accurate description of the campaigns of Napoleon 1800-1809?

Authors Avatar

SHAMIMA SHALLY

13ZB

“Blundering to glory”. How far is this an accurate description of the campaigns of Napoleon 1800-1809?

The term “Blundering to Glory” seems to imply that Napoleon achieved military success in his campaigns through sheer luck and the ineptitude of his opponents rather than through his own skills as a military leader.

Barnett can be said to have been extremely anti-Napoleon in his views and although many of his points may be compelling, it is important to note that they may be exaggerated to be more in line with his biased view. Connelly on the other hand, can also be said to have been critical of Napoleon’s military skills and points out what he sees as several flaws in the Guibertian approach implemented by the French “military genius”. Both historians also have varied definitions on the term “Blundering to Victory”. Barnett believed that the French side were just fortunate to have won those military campaigns, but that that luck was unsustainable and that it was only a matter of time before it would eventually fail the French side. Connelly, on the other hand had said that although potentially there was great risk for failure and that errors did occur within the “Grande Armee”, in the end Napoleon could have been successful with this strategy i.e. the Guibertian system had its defects and could fail the army, unless those problems were sorted out.

The ultimate aim of Guibertian warfare was quick, decisive victory by penetrating the enemy and destroying their ability to continue the fight. Mass bombardment of the enemy meant that the opposing force could be destroyed quicker, as the Guibertian idea involved being aggressive, whilst still maintaining firepower. Both Guibertian strategies used by Napoleon (i.e. the “attack on the rear” and the “central position”) are of an offensive design and can be successful when implemented correctly by the “Grande Armee”.

Napoleon Bonaparte can be said to be an “overrated military genius”. If we look at the overall result we can see that the French “Grande Armee” was very successful. Apart from Austerlitz, which was a masterpiece of military art, most of his battles were drawn, won or lost by his second-in-command, Marshal Davout. Napoleon usually managed to divide his forces before a crucial battle, as at Marengo and Waterloo. However, at Jena, Marshal Davout was left to defeat the main enemy force with inferior numbers because Bonaparte (about six miles away) mistakenly fought the wrong Prussian army and sent Marshal Davout to fight what he thought was the smaller army. This error could have been costly for Napoleon had not Davout used his initiative and defeated the Prussians with his exceptional military strategies/skills.

Join now!

After his victories over the Austrians and their Allies in 1796, and having just ended a strategically brilliant and dangerous crossing of the Alps to surprise his enemies, an over confident Bonaparte spread his forces thinly in the Marengo campaign to prevent the Austrians from escaping. He did not however plan for any aggressive movement from the Austrians under the experienced, General Melas. This underestimation of the enemy almost cost him his army and the Marengo campaign as Melas launched an early-morning attack that Bonaparte initially dismissed as a ruse, but as his forces came under more pressure, he ...

This is a preview of the whole essay