"Britain's appeasement policies in the years 1933 to 1939 were well-intentioned, but totally ineffective in preventing war." Assess the validity of this judgement.
"Britain's appeasement policies in the years 1933 to 1939 were well-intentioned, but totally ineffective in preventing war." Assess the validity of this judgement.Whether Britain's appeasement policies were effective in preventing war depends on how far one expected them to prevent war - on how temporary the policy was meant to be, and whether Britain saw appeasement as a real solution to the problems facing Europe during the 1930s. Early examples of "appeasement" were quite effective at preventing war, simply in that "appeasement" meant a lack of military action on some issue or other (for example, on Abyssinia or remilitarisation of the Rhineland), which, if it had happened, could have resulted in war; and when war did eventually happen its timing was largely because there was a limit to the extent to which Britain -would- appease Hitler, and to the extent to which Britain saw that appeasement was an appropriate policy for preserving European security. Appeasement, then, was effective at preventing war for as long as the British (and French) wanted it to be, and
no longer. The fact that Hitler was convinced that Britain would not declare war when he invaded Poland meant that he, at least, was persuaded of the lengths to which the policy could be carried.One could argue further to that that it was a failure to act according to the policy which instigated general war when it happened - particularly when one considers the Danzig crisis, during which Britain made lengthy attempts to convince the Poles to concede, which all failed, probably in no small part due to (justifiable) Polish obstinacy. The result was war, at least between Germany and ...
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no longer. The fact that Hitler was convinced that Britain would not declare war when he invaded Poland meant that he, at least, was persuaded of the lengths to which the policy could be carried.One could argue further to that that it was a failure to act according to the policy which instigated general war when it happened - particularly when one considers the Danzig crisis, during which Britain made lengthy attempts to convince the Poles to concede, which all failed, probably in no small part due to (justifiable) Polish obstinacy. The result was war, at least between Germany and Poland: here it was not so much that British appeasement failed as that the British failed to appease.Such a view is appropriate considering there was no real, long-term strategy which envisioned each event and responded with appropriateness to the theory (although there were long-term considerations which shaped policy - aversion to war, lack of armaments, sympathy with some German grievances, the need to preserve the European balance of power), but it does have drawbacks. Firstly, it fails to consider that appeasement was also an active conciliatory policy (for example the Anglo-German Naval agreement was not simply a response to some German act of aggression or other but it did appease their demand for the lifting of restrictions on armaments and the destruction of the Versailles Treaty), and not merely a failure to act on Britain's part. Secondly, it does not acknowledge that the likelihood of war actually occurring if France or Britain had employed force or the threat of it on various occasions before 1939 (e.g. during the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, or the Anschluss) was actually quite low. Had they done so it is likely Hitler would have backed down and war been avoided without concession. In this case, then, appeasement was not only ineffective but actually made war more likely, as it encouraged Hitler and Mussolini to take bigger risks which were a greater threat to the European security system and the position of the Great Powers. Although one could also suggest that appeasement continued for as long as it was necessary in order for Britain to rearm to a point where she -could- fight a war against Germany, and thus was as effective as it was meant to be, this also falls to the criticism that it is not certain that the British considered appeasement to be more of a delaying tactic which viewed war as inevitable than a method of conciliation which viewed war as unthinkable (certainly Chamberlain was of the latter persuasion, and was apparently convinced of the success of the Munich agreement in that respect). If it were the case, however, it would undermine the judgement's characterisation of appeasement as "well-intentioned".This, then, means that the judgement in question is somewhat valid: appeasement from 1933 to 39 obviously helped Nazi Germany because it enabled large-scale rearmaments, territorial acquisitions etc which brought it into a position threatening to that of France and Britain; thus damaging the stability of European relations and making war more, not less, likely. (It is not correct to say, as both the judgement and its opposite imply, that had appeasement occurred or not occurred war would have happened either way. It is, however, -more- incorrect to argue that British appeasement policies were better at preventing war than some other policy might have been.) Thus, that appeasement was ineffective in preventing war is true, because cumulatively it increased its likelihood.While it is possible to posit that appeasement was an effective policy insofar as it prevented war -up to- 1939, such an argument does not stand when one considers whether war was altogether very likely before 1939: neither Britain nor France (nor Germany) had rearmed satisfactorily before then, and none of the instances or developments of appeasement presented themselves as occasions to go to war over before possibly the Sudeten crisis (particularly not to a Europe anxious to avoid that very eventuality.). The point that the instigation of war by the British and French was the result of a -lack- of acquiescence to German aggression and the decision -not- to appease (implying that appeasement -was-, in its way, effective) is valid, but it is open to question as to how politically (Britain had guaranteed Poland), economically (Britain had been warned that sustaining armaments for much longer than 1939 was economically dangerous) -possible- it was to -not- declare war at that point. (One may also say that an invasion, even if endorsed by the agreement of some outside parties, is still an invasion.)