Chinese (Prc) Foreign Policy - the Character of PRC’S Foreign Policy

Authors Avatar

CHINESE (PRC) FOREIGN POLICY

THE CHARACTER OF PRC’S FOREIGN POLICY

Domestic turmoil was always the important issue for China, which was aggressive and

suspicious of the foreign powers.  Dislike for foreign powers demonstrated by attack on the

British embassy in Beijing and by Chinese embassy staff of London policemen.  

China often capable of breaking off relations on the smallest pretext, and heaped praise on

countries which spoke well of it.  They valued individuals who valued China, such as Nixon and

Heath, despite the fact that they were not well regarded within their own countries, as both

were percieved to be pro-Chinese.

There are three dominant features in Chinese foreign policy which were evident from 1949 to

1990:

i.         Fear of the USA

ii.         Rivarly with the USSR

iii.         Wish to be perceived as champion of the oppressed peoples of the world.

In addition to this

iv.         Wished to consolidate its own territorial sovereignty.  

There were three areas which were not part of PRC in 1949 which the CCP wanted control of

and influence over, but plans for this were cut short by their embroilment in the Korean war.  

These three regions were:

i.         Tibet

ii.         Taiwan

iii.         Hong Kong

CHINA AND THE KOREAN WAR

WHEN: 1950-1953

BACKGROUND:

 1910-1945 Korea had been occupied by Japan.  Following the Japanese defeat in 1945, Korea

had been divided up along the 38th parallel, with the US controlling the land to the South of the

line, and the USSR dealing with what lay to the North.  In 1950, the North Koreans invaded the

South, aiming to establish Communist control over the whole country.  There are several

possible reasons for this:

i.         Initiated by Mao and Stalin- a joint venture to expand the communist influence in the

area.  This was the US state department theory, which was crap, since Mao was just as

surprised by the invasion as the US was, and Sino-Soviet relations were nowhere near that

friendly.  Also, Chinese military expenditure and plans were concerned with Tibet and Taiwan,

the so-called ‘domestic’ projects.

ii.        Stalin worked with Kim Il Sung to organise the invasion and only asked for Chinese

control once the fighting had started, expecting the US to be drawn into a conflict it could not

win, yet without the direct involvement of Soviet troops.  Gromyko later claimed that the USSR

boycotted the UN security council meeting in June 1950 in which it was decided to send troops

into Korea to draw the US into the conflict.  If they had been there, they could have vetoed it.  

CHINA’S ROLE IN THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT:

Mao never fully understood the situation, and never truly realised what Stalin’s motives were.  

Stalin believed that if all of Korea were to fall to come under communist control, the US would

be humiliated, and the Soviet position in Asia would have been yet stronger.  

-China helped out, unwittingly, in all this by giving the USSR control of the ports and railways of

Manchuria, and by 1950, it was basically a vassal state of the USSR, giving Stalin even greater

control in the region.

-Mao was at first hesitant to commit China to Korea, but felt obliged to enter.  It was impossible

to remain detached from the affairs of its neighbour.  

-Also a sense of following the Soviet lead in foreign affairs.  

-Some discussion within China, with leading military commanders Gao Gang and Lin Biao arguing

that the priority should be the internal enemy, whilst Mao’s counter argument was that a US

victory in Korea would allow it to gain a foothold in a part of Asia which was very close to China.

-When the UN entered Korea in 1950, Zhou Enlai called it an imperialist invasion.  ‘North Korea’s

friends are our friends, North Korea’s enemy is our enemy, North Korea’s defence is our

defence’.  China fully entered the war in October 1938 as MacArthur’s US troops pushed

Northwards.

CHINA’S ROLE IN THE WAR:

-By the end of 1950, 500,000 Chinese (PLA) troops were in Korea, under the command of Peng

Dehuai.  This number increased dramatically as the conflict progressed.  They were conscripts,

not volunteers. By 1953, almost 1 million men had been lost, in part due to the flawed tactic of

attacking positions in concentrated numbers, and as a result of the superior US technology and

firepower.

THE OUTCOME AND CONSEQUENCES:

-Korea remained divided after Panmunjom Amnesty of 1953

-USA pledged itself to defence of Taiwan, and continued to support Nationalist China’s

Join now!

membership of the UN

-War was a drain on the already screwed up economy, took a long time to fix it

-National unity helped CCP and Mao to crush the remaining GMD elements.  

-Hardened China’s resolve to stand alone in a hostile world.

-Chinese blood, not Soviet blood shed for the cause of international communism, resulting in a

loss in prestige for the USSR.  

-The war basically ended in a draw, demonstrating that the Chinese did not have to fear the US,

but there were now deep differences between the two countries.

THE ORIGIN OF ...

This is a preview of the whole essay