Christian Rakovsky wrote the above in 1926 while serving as the Soviet ambassador to France. It is the most pertinent paragraph of a long article written in order to explain more fully the foreign policy position of the Soviet government.

The mutual assistance pacts the Soviets had managed to secure with France and Czechoslovakia sound impressive but in the detail they proved ineffectual. Poland refused point blank to allow Soviet troops passage through her territory in the event of an attack even to face the common enemy. British and French diplomatic pressure on Poland to allow this was not pursued seriously (because it was contrary to appeasement) and came to nothing. Poland never moved from that position. The USSR was frozen out of the negotiations at Munich despite her requests [on the grounds that the Germans would not accept it]; it is clear she was politically isolated.

Fundamentally the Soviet position changed for the worse because of the events at Munich. The democracies demonstrated that they would not honour their agreements and would not include the USSR in significant diplomatic events that effect her even when she has agreements with the main party’s involved.

That the Soviet Union was isolated is not in doubt. Dallin’s interpretation written in 1942 states this clearly. “It was soviet Russia’s policy to stand alone. Distrustful of all other governments, obsessed by the idea of her world-wide mission, she sought to maintain the position of a third power outside and apart from the two contending coalitions”. However Dallin’s assertion that Soviet isolation was self imposed, that she sought exclusively to be a ‘third power’ is not consistent with the evidence of continued Soviet attempts to obtain a meaningful (i.e. one that would be honoured) military agreement with the Anglo-French group of the ‘two contending coalitions’ before and after Munich.

On the 10th of October 1938 the comments of Lord Winterton to the effect that the Soviets had not wanted to be involved in the Czech crisis prompted Moscow to send an official protest. As Max Beloff argues “The Soviet Government seemed extremely concerned to impress upon the public mind the belief that it was the only power whose devotion to collective security was unwavering.” The Germans quickly banned the communist party and press in Bohemia and Moravia. In Slovakia the rump state came under immediate Nazi pressure to formally repudiate the Soviet alliance. These events represent further pressure on and deterioration of the Soviet Union’s international position.

On the 18th of April 1939 the Soviets replied to French and British proposals for ‘bilateral agreements‘ against aggression. In their document: Soviet Proposals to Britain and France for Joint action against Aggression.  The soviets make clear their desire that the military assistance protocols have indeed to be mutual. “England, France and USSR … [would] oblige themselves to render mutually forthwith all manner of assistance, including that of a military nature…”

Stalin’s belief that he could secure effective military agreements with Britain and France waned further as the weeks pass. On the 10th of May 1939 and then again on the 15th the Soviets point out in response to further proposals by Britain, that the military Guarantees are still not “reciprocal.” As point 3 of the Soviet reply to British proposals for Joint action against Aggression, state: “…there is a risk that, as [the] experience of Czecho-Slovakia proved, pacts of mutual assistance may be ineffective.” 

The replacement of the urbane well-travelled foreign minister Litvinov by Molotov a confidant of Stalin is very significant. The German charge d’affaires in Moscow reported to Berlin on May 3rd 1939:

“…Molotov, who is not a Jew, has the reputation of being the ‘most intimate friend and collaborator’ of Stalin. His appointment is obviously intended to provide a guarantee that foreign policy will be conducted strictly on lines laid down by Stalin.”

William Shirer, whose credentials as a journalist outweigh his abilities as a historian, nevertheless makes a strong point as to just what Litvinov’s dismissal might mean for Soviet foreign relations. “The significance of Litvinov’s abrupt dismissal was obvious to all. It meant a sharp violent turning in Soviet foreign policy. Litvinov had been the archapostle of collective security, of strengthening the power of the League of Nations, of seeking Russian security against Nazi Germany by a military alliance with Great Britain and France.” 

His argument has a basis in fact as the future speeches and actions of Molotov bear out. The newly appointed foreign minister lambastes the British and French in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31st May 1939. He reminded them that the British and French [went]…”further in making concessions at the expense of Czechoslovakia than they had any right to go.” He called Munich a ‘disaster’ pointing out that far from averting a European war, the events at Munich instead led to further German aggression. [German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia] Germany he argues, was able to do this “so smoothly, that the question arises, what was in fact the real purpose of the Munich negotiations?” This may have been ‘posturing’ by the Soviets but it came from the highest level. And there is a distinctly cool tone toward the democracies throughout the speech. “But we must remember the principle as enunciated by comrade Stalin that we [the USSR] must be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them.” As regards the ‘new European equilibrium’ that is evident after Munich, immediately the situation worsens for the Soviet Union as Germany and Italy sign the ‘pact of steel.’

Alan Bullock concisely defines the Soviet [Stalin’s] position at this time. His interpretation is logical given the international situation, and it is also consistent with the overall argument of this essay so far.

“On his side, Stalin’s priority was to avoid or at least postpone any clash with Germany, certainly as long as he was threatened with a war on two fronts by the Japanese. In default of an alternative, Stalin had supported various schemes for collective security, but he had an inveterate distrust of the Western Powers, whom he suspected of trying to embroil the Soviet Union with Germany as a way of weakening both regimes. The hesitations with which the British in particular had shown during the recent negotiations had done nothing to remove his doubts. While Chamberlain had been willing to make three visits to Germany in 1938, no British minister had offered to take part in the Moscow talks, although the Russians had specifically asked for the foreign minister, Lord Halifax.” 

In contrast to the foot dragging of the ‘non aggressive’ democracies, Germany after initial hesitations is seen to be very keen to get an agreement with the USSR. “It now became the great object of German diplomacy to bring about such a meeting.” 

What alternatives were open to Stalin? How could Soviet security be obtained? The USA was not interested in the affairs of Europe at this time that could in any way be meaningful for the USSR. The Soviets had been completely excluded from the Munich affair. The Anglo-Soviet talks initiated by Molotov as one of his first acts were by June 15th bogged down over the difficult question of guarantees to Finland and the other Baltic States. Also the Soviets could not help but notice that the British sent William Strang to Moscow. He was a low ranking foreign office official who did not have the authority to sign any agreement. The diplomatic comings and goings across Europe that summer are too complex and discursive to examine in detail in this essay but a distinct picture emerges. The hesitant French and British approaches to Moscow are mirrored over the summer by a massive German diplomatic effort to gain at least Soviet neutrality. In June a Pravda article appeared entitled: The British and French Governments do not want an equal agreement with the USSR. The article shows “The irritation and distrust which the British attitude provoked in the Kremlin. This is clearly true and Soviet irritation is further compounded when the Anglo-Soviet military discussions are due to get under way in August 1939. The British mission (which was coming by boat and took six days to get there) did not include General Sir Edmund Ironside [Chief of the Imperial General staff] as had the earlier British mission to Poland in July. In contrast the Russian attitude was much more serious even at this late stage being headed by: “Marshal Voroshilov who was Commissar for defence, General Shaposhnikov, Chief of the general staff of the red army, and the commanders of the Navy and air Force. 

Building on the summer diplomatic machinations of Dr Schnurre [German foreign ministry] and Astakhov [Soviet charge d’affaires in Berlin] Late in August Hitler wrote personally to Stalin. Hitler offered to send his highest-ranking official [Ribbentrop] to Moscow almost immediately with full authority to sign a non-aggression pact, economic pact and settle the ‘questions of the protocol.’ Stalin when comparing this approach to the British and French efforts, could not fail to be impressed, especially as Bullock points out, Hitler’s prestige would be very much on the line. After years of prevarication by the democracies and his own failed effort at collective security Stalin has a new choice. He can guarantee the security of the USSR by dealing with the devil. At the same time as gaining German neutrality, Stalin can obtain significant territory at the expense of Eastern Europe (the division of Poland is the clearest example of this) there is also the enticing prospect of Germany France and Britain fighting themselves to exhaustion. “If all went well, he could look forward to seeing both the ‘Imperialist camps’ he had spoken of in his March speech-Germany and Italy, and the Western democracies-involved in war, while Russia stood aside and reaped large territorial gains without risk and without cost.”

Stalin gained 196,000 sq. km of new territory at the expense of Poland through the Nazi-Soviet pact, an area twice the size of Austria. He also gained time, he could not know how much time of course but in the short term the pact secured the security of the USSR. The USSR’s ‘sphere of influence’ was greatly extended westwards. This is paradoxical certainly because although eastern Poland can be viewed as a ‘buffer zone’ between Germany and the Soviet Union proper before Soviet occupation, afterwards it meant that the two powers faced each other directly on a much longer front. Stalin could be pleased too at the prospect of a possible political backlash by Italy and Japan. In Japan this happened very soon, the Government resigned feeling betrayed and dishonoured by Germany. In July Zhukhov defeated the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol and in August the whole Kwangtung army. The Nazi-Soviet pact and this double defeat of the Japanese removed very quickly over the summer the main security conundrum that had been confronting the USSR for years. “Taken together with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, this removed the danger of war from both Russia’s exposed fronts, in the east as well as in the west.”

In conclusion this essay can only say that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was rather a ‘stunning success’ (as it would have appeared to Stalin in 1939) than a failure. For years the USSR struggled to obtain recognition and maintain the status quo. After the failure of the Soviet collective security policy at Munich, barely one year later the USSR can boast that threats from Germany in the west and Japan in the east (at least in the short term) are over. Germany, Britain, and France are at war with each other. The USSR has gained significant territory and also extended her sphere of influence greatly over Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia. She also regained those parts of the Ukraine and Byelorussia lost to Poland in the 1920-21 war.

Bibliography

Bellof, max, The Foreign policy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941, Volume 2 (Oxford University Press 1949).

Bullock, Alan, Hitler and Stalin Parallel lives, (Harper Collins 1991).  

Rakovsky, Christian, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, From: The Soviet Union 1922-1962, Philip Mosely (ed), (Frederick A. Praeger, Inc 1963).

Dallin, David J, Soviet Russia’s Foreign policy 1939-1942, (Yale University Press 1944).

Degras Jane, (ed) Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume 3, 1933-1941, (Oxford University Press 1953).

Shirer William L, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (Redwood Burn Limited 1985).

Sword, Keith, (ed) The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939-41 (Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd 1991).

 

Colin Dunlop

His II

The History of the Soviet Union 1917-1991

Dr Roger Munting

17-03-03

Q13 “A diplomatic error of stunning proportions on the part of the USSR.” Discuss this characterisation of the Nazi-Soviet pact

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