In 1965 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2065 specifying the Falkland/Malvinas as a colonial problem. They invited Britain and Argentina to hold discussions to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. However the Argentines would accept nothing less than full sovereignty, and in 1980 the islanders rejected the one remaining solution of lease-back for a fixed period. The discussions continued up to February 1982 just before the Falkland War began.
2)How and why did the policy of the British Government toward the Falkland Islands change after the Argentinian invasion of April 1982?
In the 17th century when the Falklands had been founded and captured for the crown, and when people began to settle into the islands in 1833, Britain felt a strong link with the islands. They felt proud to own them, even if they were so far away. However prior to the 1982 war, Britain had started to drift away from the islands becoming less positive, thinking that the Falklands were a liability. Some people had even forgotten about the islands for example John Nott, UK Secretary of State for Defence during the war said, “I must confess that I wasn't much aware of the Falkland islands before the invasion”. Britain's economic situation was poor and the government felt there was less of a need to preserve the islands when the issue was causing so much trouble and hostility with Argentina. The idea of giving away the islands became a considerable issue and Britain felt that doing this would improve their relationship with Argentina and South America. It appeared that Britain did not much care for the islands, and in 1981 a new military government in Buenos Aires set the return of the Malvinas as a high priority. They believed that Britain was losing interest in the islands. They also thought that Britain would never be bothered to argue over the island or pay for defence to protect the islands because there was such economic problems at that time. So the Argentinians saw a chance they could take.
More and more reasons for giving away the islands were being introduced, such as handing over the islands would then mean the hassle of supplying necessities, and such services as the police and post would be handed over to the Argentinians. Britain now believed that giving away the sovereignty of the island was the best idea - it would mean that Britain would pay Argentina to keep the Falklands British and the Argentines would supply everything the Falklanders needed and be in control over the islands. It was thought that after an number of years the residents would have settled to the idea of the Argentinians owning their islands.
However the Falklanders had other ideas. They wanted to stay British and nothing else. They had fought for Britain in previous wars and wanted their heritage to stay the same. Some people back in Britain were also against the hand over, especially the majority of the MP's in the House of Commons. They didn't feel it was right to “dump” the Falklanders with a country that had such a bad situation and regime at the time. So they stood up for the Falklanders and fought to keep them.
Originally the British policy towards the Falklands was to leave them be and let them stand on their own if they were to be attacked. In 1980 a meeting was held between the British and Argentine governments. This is an extract from the resulting report; “the Falklands represent no vital strategic or economic interest for Britain” and it seemed that Mrs Thatcher (current Prime Minister) agreed. So it was clear that to Britain the Falkland Islands were just a distant place that they had a distant relationship with and no need for. However in March 1982 when a group of Argentinian scrap metal workers arrived on South Georgia (a dependency of Britain) and the Argentinian flag was raised the British government suddenly changed their views. Britain swiftly became very involved and sent the HMS Endurance, an ice breaker with Wasp helicopters and 22 Royal Marines, from Port Stanley to South Georgia. So all of a sudden when before Britain was almost set on giving away the islands, they were now sending out protection and defence against the Argentinians. One of Mrs Thatcher's reasons for counter-attacking was that she did not want to look useless in front of her country. She did not want it to seem as if she would not try to protect her country when it was in trouble. Another reason was she did not want one of her own countries to be taken away by a poorly run country, it was also “the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can” as she said in a speech to the House of Commons on 3rd of April 1982. Previous to the Argentinian attack the House of Commons strongly believed in keeping the islands. Mrs Thatcher did not want to seem the “bad guy” and ruin her chances of being re-elected so she decided to go with her MPs and fight for the Falklands. A final reason for protecting the Falklands and getting involved was that Mrs Thatcher did not want her country looking weak and “easy”, she did not want other countries to get the idea that they were a walk over.
3)Why did the British win and the Argentinians lose the Falklands War?
The Argentinian invasion on April 2nd was successful and despite fierce resistance their forces captured the islands without killing any British Marines, who were sent home. On 3rd April Argentine troops seized the islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich, east of the Falklands. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 502 calling for the withdrawal of the Argentine troops from the islands. Within days a British Task Force was being assembled to sail and recapture the islands. Submarines had already sailed even before the invasion and a “Total Exclusion Zone” was declared, warning that any vessel or aircraft entering the area would be attacked. This war zone stretched 200 miles around the Falklands. Over the next month despite intense negotiations the British ships continued south. On April 25th, the Argentinian defenders on South Georgia surrendered without a fight and Britain recaptured that island. The main operation to recapture the Falklands was launched on 1st May and the Argentinians were attacked by naval bombardment and bombing from the air. The British forces landed unharassed on 21st May at San Carlos, at East Falkland. For the next week the British held up their front and after a bitter battle that lasted for two days the Argentinian garrison there surrendered. British forces marched overland to surround the Falklands capital. British reinforcements were landed and were then transported by sea to help in the south. The British were ready to begin to attack on the night of the 11-12 June. After two days of heavy fighting the British had captured Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown. With the high ground now in British possession and the capital firmly surrounded the Argentinian commander General Mario Menedez agreed to surrender to Major-General Jeremy Moore. Argentina surrendered on the 14th June 1982. The fighting had cost about a thousand dead, with about two thousand wounded.
After the Falklands War, military analysts began to study why the British had been victorious. The American State Department concluded; “shifts in tactics, or weather may have affected the outcome, but Britain's superior readiness, training and leadership did decide the outcome”. I agree with that statement and although there were many other factors I believe one of the key reasons for the British victory was the fact that they were so well prepared. One of Britain's best trained and most powerful task force of 25,000 men sailed from Portsmouth on the 5th April 1982. Every person, whether working in the navy, air or infantry force knew what their role was and exactly what they had to do. Even when they were so far away the armed services were still just as efficient and professional as if they were fighting on their own turf. Although the British were so organised and able the Argentinians had the upper hand where numbers were concerned. The 1000 troops that first landed on the islands had just a garrison of 80 British Royal Marines to contend with. However it does not seem that the Argentines used this to their advantage. The problem was that they did not have the strength within them. Although they were patriotic and proud many had been conscripted and had no wish to actually be fighting. They had little training or mental preparation and were ill-equipped. The officers were feared and despised. They bullied the soldiers and were well fed, whereas the conscripts had to find their own food whether stealing from supply depots or raiding Stanley. Due to the weather, hunger, realisation of onslaught and British bombing, morale was low; even before the British attacked some of the Argentines wanted to escape. Compare this to the British who were singing “Always look on the bright side of life” after carrying 100lbs for 50 miles through treacherous conditions (“The Falklands War 1982” by Duncan Anderson). But the Argentines were not cowards and if the chain of command became confused they would still stand even without any backup and fight. When stories had been going around of mistreated British prisoners and knowing that they were in a bad position surrendering seemed the best option.
The weather is also a main factor to consider - the wet , cold islands created terrible, inhospitable conditions. It caused mobility problems and helped in causing confusion in communication. The terrain was also poor to march across. The Argentinians could only move troops forward by helicopter at night because the British dominated the sky so much. This made it much more arduous and demanding.
The Argentinian equipment and artillery was also a let down. Because so many bombs failed to go off the damage and loss of lives for Britain were a lot less than they could have been. As the planes were forced to fly so low due to British missiles and guns the bombs did not have enough time to fuse before landing. Unlucky for the Argentines but very fortunate for the British. The Argentinians also had to contend with the Sea Harrier and its side -winder missiles, which caused utter chaos in itself.
It also seems that neither side was realistic enough, however for the British it still didn't matter. From a journalist's interview with Royal Marine Captain Peter Babbington MC, recorded in 1985, apparently he and the others were expecting three of them to every one Argentine in the Mount Harriet attack. But instead it was completely the opposite and although this must have come as a great shock he says that “morale wasn't a problem”, and they just continued. On the other hand, the Argentines misjudged the British from the start thinking in the beginning that they (Britain) “would never really send such a force to capture the Malvinas” (This quote is taken from an interview on 15th June 1982 with an Argentinian POW and thought by the majority of Argentina). When all the defensive mountains around Stanley were recaptured by the British the war was effectively over. Even though Menedez's army outnumbered the British he did not wish for a street battle in Stanley and instead chose to surrender.
I believe that the British superiority of technology and leadership overruled and led to victory. Perhaps if the Argentine bombs had gone off or the troops had pushed on and not surrendered, than the Falklands would not now be British. Nevertheless the real answer is that the Falklands war was not won because the Argentines fought badly although this obviously did help, but because the British had the higher morale and knew that they would be triumphant when it came to the fight.
