Kerensky’s handling of the “Kornilov Affair” hammered down the nail of his political coffin. After the failed June Offensive pressure began mounting on the Commander in Chief General Brusilov, reactionary Generals were calling for his replacement and General Kornilov (a very militaristic disciplined General) was being beckoned to replace Brusilov. When Kornilov came into his new position he began to dictate terms to Kerensky, and this is where the Kornilov affair really starts. Kornilov’s first demand was the restoration of the death penalty which was implemented with immediate effect. This was a move to the right of the political spectrum which was an interesting move, Russian politics was becoming increasingly polarised between socialists and right wingers. The appointment of Kornilov and the implementation of the death penalty showed Kerensky’s ideology shifting rightward which could be considered a “Kerensky failure”. Kerensky believed that Kornilov was trying to overthrow him; however this theory was noted as “the most enduring myths of the Russian revolution” by Orlando Figes. One reason for Kerensky’s suspicion is the growing support Kornilov was gaining, people like Guchov endorsed him and he had a way of appealing to the right wing. Kerensky was an aspiring dictator; Kornilov could be a threat to Kerensky’s power which is why he was so eager to dispose of him. Kerensky was not the only one suspicious however, Kornilov was become increasingly frustrated with Kerensky’s failure to adopt his new policies, one day he even turned up at the Winter Palace uninvited and armed and demanded that Kerensky implemented his policies. This clear aggressive behaviour again would have fuelled Kerensky’s suspicions. After their meeting Kornilov did indeed move his troops towards the capital; however historians have suggested that this was to protect the Provisional Government from the growing threat of the Bolsheviks. Within the capital Kerensky’s political ideologies were again being tested as the chasm between the Left and Right was growing so he called a State Conference in Moscow. This conference was an embarrassing failure, not only did the two political wings fail to reconcile but also Kornilov arrived and mesmerised the right wing. His speech was poor but his ideologies and vigour was enough to steal the show from the lacklustre long winded speech of Kerensky. Kornilov was the right wings choice and Kerensky was liked by neither. He played second fiddle to Kornilov on the right and the left thought he was counter-revolutionary. Personally I feel at this point a coup d’état by Kornilov would have been popular and expected as the Moscow conference emphasised his popularity. However Kornilov was not plotting a coup, as suggested by Alexeev he had the “brains of a sheep”, instead he was trying to save the Provisional Government from the left. At this time appeared an unscrupulous character V.N. Lvov (former Procurator of the Holy Synod). He acted as a messenger between Kornilov and Kerensky, he went to meet Kornilov and the General asked Lvov to invite Kerensky to meet him to discuss political matters. Lvov returned to Kerensky and told him Kornilov was demanding Kerensky be removed from power and a military dictatorship be formed, obviously Kornilov had said nothing like this but Kerensky believed Lvov despite other members of the Provisional Governments suggesting that he should speak personally to Kornilov. Kornilov was arrested later after more miscommunication and Kerensky handed arms to the Bolsheviks to stop his troops. The main failings of Kerensky were to arrest Kornilov, one of the few competent Generals who were aware of the Bolshevik threat as well as very popular. Give arms to the Bolsheviks, who at the time had support but no arms therefore this charitable offer from Kerensky handed them power. And finally to trust Lvov, which simply highlighted his total ineptitude and incompetence when handling political matters. The Kornilov threat simply highlighted the governments bad handing and instability.
The final failing of Kerensky has to be his failure to appease the Bolsheviks, peasants and workers. Kerensky was hired as the successor of Prince Lvov due to his handling of the July days and his suppression of the Bolshevik agitated troops. Although when he came to power his oppression was non existence, scared of angering the Soviets (which were now becoming Bolshevik dominated) and the fact he didn’t control the troops (as they were heavily influenced by the Bolsheviks and controlled by the Soviets) made it impossible for him to try and oppress the growing influence of Lenin. After the July Days the Bolsheviks were experiencing mass support, they were now controlling factories and squeezing out the Mensheviks and SR’s. The Bolsheviks were becoming the alternative to the Bourgeoisie government, as I noted political polarisation was taking place and this was mirrored in the September Duma elections which saw 51% go to the Bolsheviks and 33% to the Kadets. Bolsheviks support was growing and the idea of a Bolshevik revolution was well known however Kerensky simply stood by and did nothing to stop them. Kerensky even handed arms to the Red Guard, he was asking for them to overthrow him by failing to appease them or crush them, to let them remain growing in popularity was idiotic, a revolution was seemingly inevitable. Orlando Figes notes that he had a “paralytic fear of the Left and his fatal indecision in taking suitable measures against it”. Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, an advisor to Kerensky, urged him to arrest the leaders of the Bolsheviks but he simply refused saying he did not know where they were meeting. By this time one can infer that Kerensky had given up, he had realised his utter incompetence as a leader. By September 1917 the countryside was turning into a battlefield, violent revolts from the peasants against estates were not a new phenomenon but a persistent threat to authority that was overlooked by the Provisional Government. Kerensky had to stop promising land and actually give them land; he could not continue to treat peasants like fools. However he did and this resulted in them forming personal armies which would threaten the Provisional Government. Workers we being organised by the Bolsheviks to strike and generally cause nuisance and the new military style leaders of the Bolsheviks were arming there soldiers and strikes turned into bloody rebellions, something again which Kerensky failed to address.
Although can we blame Kerensky entirely for the collapse of the Provisional Government, in all fairness there had been two leaders before him that are seemingly innocent. Milyukov, leader of the Kadets, started off as a fine leader. His idealism, consolidation of the Provisional government and appeasement of opposition was fantastic although he did make a fatal mistake. Order number one. This handed control of the soldiers to the Soviets, by doing this he was sacrificing force, which had been used in Russia for the past hundreds of years as a means of retaining order. Milyukov fatal decline came when he was embarrassingly two faced, promising to the Allies to continue the war effort and also promising the Soviet that “revolutionary defensism” was his war aim. Prince Lvov again had a short spell as leader and after the July Days was forced to step down and install Kerensky as leader. Now neither Milyukov nor Lvov addressed the land question, appeased the workers or crushed the Bolsheviks, they didn’t end the war but are they blamed for the downfall of the Provisional Government? Kerensky was simply being used as a scapegoat by the Russian middle classes because they didn’t want to admit that the idea of the Provisional Government was a failure in itself, Russia wasn’t a democracy. Russia was not a free thinking, liberal country but one that had been reigned by terror and religion, the concept of the intelligentsia leading alienated the masses. Kerensky didn’t fail but the concept of a Provisional Government failed.
The role of the Bolsheviks however does pardon Kerensky a little, for Lenin was a superb leader and pushed the party into power, Orlando Figes notes that “without Lenin’s intervention it would probably never have happened at all” (referring to the October Revolution). They had made headway in both the Soviets and the Duma which gave them unprecedented power. By September 1931 the Bolsheviks were the majority party in the Duma, with 51% of the vote, this support had come from the former powerful Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, the simple ambition of Lenin and the Bolsheviks meant they outshone any party when it came to elections, they were one of the few parties who relished the prospect of power. As well as success in the Duma Bolshevik support was also growing in the soviets. The former Soviet leaders had alienated the masses by forming a coalition with the Provisional government, attendance at votes (the Soviets were a democratic organisation so everyone in the assembly voted) was declining meaning important decisions were being handed over to the Soviet “executives”. Soviet power was now being centralised and the Bolsheviks took full advantage of this, they could not gain enough support in the assemblies so they simply controlled the Soviet executives (which were making all the Soviet decisions). The Kornilov crisis as well meant the Bolsheviks could grow in the Soviets as the workers were looking to radicalise, after the Kornilov affair the Bolsheviks took power of the Riga, Saratov and Moscow soviets and eventually the Petrograd Soviet (which was the icing on the Bolshevik’s revolutionary cake). Trotsky took power of the Petrograd soviet and Sukhanov (a member of the Petrograd Soviet) noted that the Petrograd soviet was “now Trotsky’s guard, ready at a sign from him to storm the coalition.” Trotsky was the Bolsheviks orator, although Lenin was a fantastic leader, he was working tactically behind the scenes, Trotsky was the face of the Bolsheviks, and his persuasive oratorical powers meant support for the Bolsheviks was snowballing. Historians suggest that the reason for Bolshevik support’s growing was they were the only party that stood up for Soviet power, workers wanted fair wages, good working conditions and at the time the Bolsheviks were seemingly the only party offering them this. The Bolsheviks succeeded in politicising the workers again (after the coalition between the Soviets and the Provisional Government the workers were disillusioned) by doing this it meant they now had guns, support and leadership. The Bolsheviks were ready to take power.
The October Revolution was not the result of Kerensky. Although his failings were gargantuan and his idiocy was immeasurable we cannot overlook the role of the Bolsheviks. Their control of the Soviets and military progression meant they were an uncontrollable force, and with the leadership of Lenin a revolution was inevitable. This was not the first time the Bolsheviks had the chance to take power, personally I feel at the July days they could have walked into the Winter Palace unchallenged, so Kerensky wasn’t the first leader to fail to stop Lenin. Kerensky was simply incapable of grasping the social situation of Russia, his troops were deserting, the peasants were uprising and the workers were striking, yet very little action was taken to suppress any of these groups. As Richard Abraham put it in his book “Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution” Kerensky was in “isolation from real Russia”. Kerensky’s attitude was also something to be sceptical about, he was building himself off the image of Napoleon, I think posing as a despotic leader was bound to have repercussions after the downfall of the Tsar. When Kerensky came to power Russia was in massive problems, it would have taken a hero to solve them, the war was straining all their resources, the workers were in constant rebellion and the army were no longer under the Provisional Government’s control, also the polarisation of political Russia was worrying. Kerensky came to be a leader because he was a bridge between the right and left, but that bridge burned and Kerensky was left alone with no support. His handling of the Kornilov affair was his biggest downfall, personally I think he should have never appointed Kornilov as Command in Chief, he was reactionary and had a past record of disregarding rules, Brusilov was a better option because of his democratic appeal. When Kornilov came into the picture the left support of Kerensky disappeared as well as the right, at this moment the Provisional Government was over. Kerensky didn’t give the Bolsheviks power but made it exceedingly easy for them.
