Did the Confederacy ever have a chance of winning the war, or was it a lost cause from the beginning?

Did the Confederacy ever have a chance of winning the war, or was it a Lost Cause from the beginning?

The idea of the “Lost Cause” only appeared in the closing stages of the war, and it became more formalised in the 1870’s and 1880’s with the emergence of the “New South”, in order to lift the morale of a shattered people and transform the Southern soldier living and dead, into a true hero. Historians continue to argue over whether the Confederacy was a “Lost Cause” from the beginning of the war, however, although the North had its advantages – better resources and more men - Confederate defeat was not inevitable.

In 1861, most Southerners, and European observers, were confident that the Confederacy would triumph and even after the war people recognised their advantages and high hopes of victory, as General Beauregard said “No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages than the Confederacy”. The fact the North had more resources was an obvious and key advantage, however the Northern financial structures were not ready for war, as there was no national bank and in 1862 the Northern banking system seemed near collapse. Besides, the outcome of war is not only dependent on numbers or productive capacity. History offers many examples of a society winning a war even when the odds were stacked against them. Prime examples are the American War of Independence and the Vietnam War, so it is unfair to label the Confederacy as a “lost cause” from the start, just because it had fewer resources. The sheer size of the Confederacy - 750,000 square miles - made it difficult to blockade and conquer, and even if Northern armies managed to occupy it they would have difficulty holding down a resentful population and maintaining their supply lines. The Confederacy’s aim was to defend its land, an easier option in war than attack, in a bid to wear down the Northern will to fight; if the Northern will collapsed the Confederacy would win by default.

Geography gave the Confederacy an important strategic advantage as the crucial theatre of war was the land between Washington and Richmond, Virginia, which had fast flowing rivers like the James and the York which could provide an effective barrier to Union armies intent on capturing Richmond. Also the important and fertile Shenandoah Valley ran the wrong direction from the Northern point of view and the Confederacy could use the valley for striking into the heart of the North. The fact that the war was to be fought on Confederate land gave Southerners a psychological advantage as they were fighting to protect their land, possibly encouraging them to fight much harder than the North, who were fighting for the more abstract pursuit of reunion. Southerners were confident they were better soldiers than the North, and this was helped by the fact that seven of the eight military colleges were in the slave states and Southerners usually dominated the posts in the US army. General Lee was to be invaluable to the Confederacy, as despite being outnumbered in every major battle and campaign in which he fought, he won victories which gave the Confederacy hope of victory, and there is no doubt that he was instrumental in the Confederacy’s survival for so long. The Confederacy's interior lines of communication meant that Davis could concentrate his dispersed forces, first against one enemy army and then against another, using their manpower to maximum effect.

There was pockets of Confederate support in the four Border states which seceded - Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri – and thousands of men from these states served in the Confederate army, which was a great benefit to the Confederacy, considering it had so few men, compared to the North. As a result of the pro-Confederate feeling in these Border States, they had to be treated with care by the North, in order to remain in the Union.

Historians argue that slaves may have been used to better effect in the Confederacy, but as slaves were a potential fifth column ...

This is a preview of the whole essay

Historians argue that slaves may have been used to better effect in the Confederacy, but as slaves were a potential fifth column in the Confederacy, they were not permitted to enlist until 1865. However, it was of great benefit to the Confederacy that slaves could be left to work on the home front and perform invaluable military tasks such as transporting goods to the front, building fortifications and digging trenches, because then the Confederacy could raise more of its white manpower to fight.

Similarly, historians continue to argue over how well the Confederacy used their greatest economic weapon, “King Cotton”. The Confederacy relied on their cotton sales to buy weapons and supplies from Europe. She hoped that Britain would break the Union’s blockade to ensure that raw cotton got to the textile mills, and then war might break out between Britain and the Union.

The Confederacy’s best chance of victory was if Britain and/or France joined the war on their side, therefore Davis tried to secure European recognition and support. Similarly Lincoln had to try to remain on good terms with Britain and France because of a fear they would enter the war on the side of the Confederacy. Lincoln’s administrations made it clear that the conflict was an insurrection, not a war, to try and deter foreign powers from getting involved and Seward, although praised for his blunt and often threatening attitude to Britain, made it clear the Union would declare war on any European nation which recognised the Confederacy, which may have been counter-productive as it served only to alienate the British government. Both Britain and France had economic interests that tied them to the Confederacy. The long-term self-interest plan was that if the USA broke up then a potential rival was weakened but also the Confederacy would have strong economic links, as it would provide Europe with raw cotton in return for manufactured goods. The French Emperor Napoleon III was keener to get involved in the war than the British, as Napoleon had imperialistic ambitions in Mexico and was aware that he stood a better chance of realising his dream if the USA splintered, however he was not willing to take on the Union without Britain’s support and only if the Confederacy looked like winning would Britain recognise her.

The early battles of the war, saw the Confederacy perform much better than the North, and their string of successes gave the impression that they were not a Lost Cause, and in fact had a very high chance of succeeding. Early Confederate victories at Bull Run (July 1861), Fredericksburg (December 1862) and particularly Chancellorsville (May 1863), saw the Union lose thousands of men as Lee daringly divided his army twice and forced Hooker to retreat. General McClellan, was much to blame for the North’s failure to win any battles initially; he was over-cautious, always demanding more men believing that the Confederacy would outnumber him, even though his army was twice the size of the Confederate forces and his hope of winning the war without hard fighting was unrealistic. An example is after the seven actions around Richmond in July 1862, which were Union “victories”, McClellan refused to counterattack Lee and instead withdrew and pulled back to Washington, allowing Lee to outgeneral and outmanoeuvre McClellan in just one week. If the Confederacy had managed to sustain their victories, there was a good chance foreign powers would have intervened on their side. But after his victories Lee had developed a false sense of his own invincibility. He planned to invade the North, in the summer of 1863 and threaten Washington in a bid to draw Grant away from Vicksburg. However his plan failed and the Confederacy lost the battle at Gettysburg. This together with the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863, and defeat at Chattanooga in September of that year, marked a turning point in the war as Lee’s invincibility had been broken and never again was he strong enough to invade the North. The Confederate defeats of 1863 coupled with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation issued in the same year, convinced the British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, that it would not be wise to intervene in the war, especially now it had become of such moral significance, and now it would be very difficult, but not impossible, for the Confederacy to win.

However, even though the Emancipation Proclamation had ensured that foreign powers would not intervene in the war, there were many risks involved, as many Northerners were not willing to fight a war to save the slaves. There were a wave of desertions from the Union armies and Lincoln had to counter criticism in the North with harsher measures such as the continued suspension of habeas corpus and restrictions on freedom of speech, giving him a reputation as a despot. The need to introduce conscription increased Northern resentment towards him, which led to the New York Draft Riots. Lincoln also had to deal with the problems of a deeply divided Republican Party and fierce opposition from within the Republican Party, and the Democratic Party. In the early 1860’s many Northerners saw his as irresolute and ridiculous; even his nearest colleagues like Chase and Seward doubted his capacity feeling that they would make far greater Presidents. He was often blamed when things went wrong and he was so unpopular in 1864 that it was doubtful whether he would be re-elected President. Thus, it can be seen that the North was far from united, during the war, and also had its own share of problems.

After the defeats of 1863, and the fall of Atlanta, the centre of the Confederacy’s railway network in July 1864, the last hope of success for the Confederacy, was if Lincoln was not re-elected in 1864. The Confederacy hoped that by continuing to inflict heavy casualties on the Union there was still chance that the North would become war weary, and in the 1864 election the Northern electorate would vote for peace. However, Lincoln was re-elected giving clear signs to the Confederacy that the North had no plans of giving up. It was at this moment that the Lost Cause was born; Mary Chesnut, likened this point in the war to “living in a Greek tragedy”, proving that Southerners were coming to the realization that peace would only be attained if they surrendered.

It is fair to say that the Confederacy with their advantages had a chance of winning the war, and they were definitely not a Lost Cause from the start. It proved itself resilient on many occasions and throughout the war the tide constantly shifted, and with that, so did the political, economic, and military strength of either side. But by 1864, the Confederacy’s military, political and social will was drained due to heavy losses, defeat in battle and the invasion and occupation of its territory. Southerners who had engaged in battle for four years, determined to win, realised there was no longer any chance of victory, and the problem of limited resources and men, began to take its toll.

Louise Terallis