Discuss Hobsbawm's view that Britain Waged war in the Long Eighteenth Century for economic ends.

Discuss Hobsbawm’s view that Britain Waged war in the Long Eighteenth Century for economic ends.

Britain in the long eighteenth century was a nation, which was for the most part, at war. Between 1689 and 1815, Britain was involved in military conflict for 126 years. Whilst this is a historical phenomenon in itself, this period is also marked as the age of the ‘Industrial Revolution’, and hence the wars and their economic impact come at a time when economically Britain was emerging from its pre-industrial confines. The nature of warfare in eighteenth century Britain is, therefore, hard to disentangle from other factors, having both a hindering and positive affect on different elements of non-military economic processes. The effects of war were such that they affected both the short term but also long term economic activity. Britain suffered the obvious losses of war, and accumulated massive war debt. In general however war did not impede on private economic activity and can be seen to have compensated for short term depression by facilitating long term growth.

It is Hobsbawm’s view that Britain waged war for economic means, but also, that war created a prosperous situation as a by-product. He argues that the war machine benefited the country through the coming of a mercantile outlook. That he who controls trade, controls the world. In this regard therefore Britain directly gained through the traditional aims of winning war, the acquisition of property and also through the dominance of Britain’s naval fleets, hence the security of overseas markets, and the elimination of foreign competitors. Hobsbawm also suggests that the impact of war had other positive effects on the economy. Despite the massive burden that war imposed on the economy both in the immediate cost of waging war, but also on supporting allies with concessionary grants. Hobsbawm argues that war affected the long-term economic prosperity of the country by stimulating economic development, which ‘normal’ conditions would have neglected.

This view is, however, contended and the debate centres on an argument of balance. War is, in principal, against that of economic growth, it gears the economy for a destructive purpose, in which no capital is formed or transferred. Creating a sap and diversion of resources, in manpower, land, mineral and capital, the capital of organisation, plant and transport. Therefore war can be seen as a detriment to the natural progression of the economy, leading to a fall in the volume of investment, the effects of capital depreciation due to neglect and the effects of immediate post-war slumps, which see unemployment and disinvestments in redundant war-industries. What is important to keep in mind when looking at the eighteenth century however is our conception of both war and the nations economics. Unlike the wars of the twentieth century, war played no contentious impact on society in general, albeit bar indirectly through the burden of taxation, and slight disruption to commercial trade. The economic situation of the country whilst in the midst of industrialisation, was not fully developed, there were important advancements yet to be made in both technology and the economic system. Warfare, it can be argued, played a major part in moulding this system, and furthering advancement, especially in such industries as iron and steel. In deliberating over the impact of war, in the eighteenth century, we have to invoke a sense of balance, between the counter-productive affects of conflict and the improvements resulting from it. In addition to this it is necessary to try and evaluate both the long and short-term impact of these changes. War whilst creating immediate effects, a relatively slow and low level of growth, did, arguably, in the long-term pay for these downturns, by advancing otherwise under-appreciated industries, and by the securing of overseas markets.

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That Britain was changing through the eighteenth century is clear. Although the vast series of wars through the period have been accredited to being the direct result of the Glorious Revolution, the formation of a hatred of the French, wars began to take on new meaning. As Britain moved from the early modern period to the modern, money and power became intrinsically linked, politics became the more so the preserve of the landed class, and from 1688 monied men were the men of power. It was also around this time that property began to be recognised in law, and so followed a sharp increase in laws to secure it. In essence then what Britain was entering was its transformation into a capitalist society, and this in coincidence with an increasingly expanding export industry. Trade increasingly relied on naval forces for protection, and therefore war and trade became fused in a ‘mercantilism’.

Of course in evaluating the economic ‘success’ of war, we have to view this amongst the massive war-debt that Britain suffered under the weight of prolonged war. War debt grew massively being around 16.7 million pounds in 1697, it grew to around 238 million in 1780 and reached around 1, 003 million by 1816. Far more than aiding the economy, this debt has been accredited with accounting for slow growth during the industrial revolution. It has been argued by Williamson that ‘the war debt crowded out civilian accumulation, inhibited growth and contributed to the dismal performance in the workers’ standard of living’. He goes on to imply that economically Britain would have been better off without the effects of war, ‘Britain tried to do two things at once - industrialise and fight expensive wars, and she simply did not have the resources to do both’.

There is much debate over whether or not ‘crowding out’ ever came into play as it assumes certain conditions, mainly that of full employment, that without war, the workforce used for military ends would be otherwise employed in a productive capacity in the economy. Under war conditions there would thus be an increase in the difference of the amount of resources used for government means and those released through tax and inflation. The surplus then would have to come from investment and therefore at the expense of the non-military economy. Whilst this argument has taken much credit in explaining the slow growth of the British economy until after 1820, when the effects of war could no longer be felt, it is somewhat of generalisation of events. Firstly it is unlikely that Britain was ever running at full employment, British agriculture proved adept at remaining self-sufficient with a lower workforce than the European average, meaning that vast numbers of men were available to labour for the new industries the ‘Industrial Revolution’ had created for the economy. The navy and armies also took large numbers of prisoners, as an alternative to gaol, and the British army was made up from large numbers of foreigners as well as English. The war effort of course had an impact on other factors other than manpower, with civilian industries being drained of resource, capital and investment. On the whole, however, these industries did not suffer to the extent we would imagine. The needs of war being such that the burden fell on shipbuilding, and heavy industries, which far from diverting resources, were relatively under-invested industries. War provided the impetus for growth and created new demand.

War in the eighteenth century then, did not necessarily ‘crowd out’ the economy. It may have in fact ‘crowded in’ by providing the impetus for creating new industry. By the end of the seventeenth century the metal industry was limited, characterised by growing cost and relied heavily on import. War further disrupted this process; it increased demand whilst making imports more difficult. Manufactures had to revaluate their technology, and this gave rise to the revebetory furnace for smelting. Despite an increased home demand for copper, brass and iron, export grew and importantly manufacturing costs fell. Exports of copper being at 482 tonnes in 1756, had reached 1,247 tonnes by 1770. The export of brass, which had been at only 91 tones 1713 – 14 was at around 960 tonnes in 1761 – 2. Iron was, also, now mined far more extensively than before with exports being 50 per cent higher by the end of war, than they had been prior to it. What is probably most significant about these industries is that they represented not only war demand, but that they gave rise to new trades, it is a marked change that the copper trade began extensively making guns, toys, buttons and brasses, and that new industries ran parallel with the old industries of wool and textile. The rise in iron production had similar connotations, and gave rise to forge work. These new industries were not then subject to suffer boom and bust with the demise of war markets. Between 1749 and 1755, years of peace, the iron industry witnessed immense capital development to meet demand. Shipbuilding became one of the biggest industries during the eighteenth century, and whilst most of this trade was directly concerned with supplying the navy, it also facilitated to manufacture of larger quantities of merchant vessels, which increased massively during the period. It is fair to assume that military demands never exhausted the industry, or hindered merchant growth. Of course these developments also led to other direct consequences as these ‘war’ industries grew, the use of coal grew in lines with the massive amounts needed for iron smelting, and thus the coal industry and the advent of the steam-engine pump were also witnessed in this period. Cheaper forge works meant that it was cost inefficient to let the forge grow cold, and so, iron rail tracks were produced as a surplus, with the idea that if later needed they could simply be taken up again. They never were and what developed was the capital investment in the railroads.

War therefore had some positive impact on the economy, as a by-product of waging war. To some extent though the nature of war it-self was beneficial to the economy, as the merchant fleets prospered under the protection of an all mighty navy which dominated the waves, ‘the dominance of British naval power ensured access, not only to our major markets in Europe, India and the rapidly growing colonies of North America, but also those of France and even Holland… there can be little doubt that this factor of naval power increased the carrying trade of England’. Trade ultimately was what made Britain great, the fact that the military might of the country helped safeguard markets and win trading rights cannot be overlooked in importance.

War did create slow growth in the economy throughout the industrial revolution, whilst it may not have led to crowding out, its economic effects must have been felt. The high levels of taxation in Britain obviously reduced the wealth of its population, taking money away from capital and reducing demand. Whilst these affected the short term, however, in the long run war and taxation may have been what made Britain great. The ‘fiscal-military state was not necessarily harmful to industry, for wars extended markets…and the national debt…(and) public borrowing created a range of securities which gave merchants, banks and trading companies a more varied and flexible outlet for funds’. There was no sector, other than government, whose bonds could be used for the same purpose, the short term impact of war on the economy can therefore be justified as the creation of a financial centre in London, which the absence of would have held up industrialisation and English financial development.