In 1874, Disraeli - to his own surprise - won the first clear Conservative victory since Sir Robert Peel in 1841. What really mattered to Disraeli, was not home affairs but foreign and imperial policy. He was a strong supporter of empire and of English nationalism. This was a traditional Conservative ideology, but as long as Palmerston was leader of the Liberals it was hardly possible for the Conservatives to outbid them in terms of patriotic self-assertion. In Disraeli’s eyes, Russia was the real enemy, and in a private letter to the Queen he proposed “to clear central Asia of Muscovites and drive them into the Caspian.” Disraeli accepted, although perhaps not to a realistic scale, that the Turks must enforce reforms on the treatment of their people after the Crimean War. He sent Lord Salisbury to the conference of Constantinople, and signed the “London protocol”, which all show his acceptance of Turkeys problems, yet the reforms proposed were weak, and in April 1877, the Ottomans refused. As Disraeli feared most, Russia thus invaded Turkey probably to force the London protocol onto the Turks. However, Disraeli was certain the Tsar wanted to capture Constantinople for himself, which would in result endanger British trade routes, and so in return sent the entire British Mediterranean fleet to Constantinople. The result was a tremendous victory for both Disraeli and Imperialism, as the Russian army halted. He scored another success in the 1878 Congress of Berlin, by preventing Bulgaria gaining full independence, thus limiting the growing influence of Russia in the Balkans. In return, the Sultan gifted Cyprus to Britain, another gain for an imperialistic Disraeli. What the eastern question showed the most about Disraeli was that he was willing to fight to protect his interests, however, some argue that this willingness was not so well thought out, and perhaps more “childish” and ruled by his heart rather than his head. His determination to protect Turkey was in essence, simply to protect British imperial interests, and his refusal to sign the Berlin memorandum in 1875 showed his complete disregard for what others viewed as more pressing issues, such as those of the Armenian massacres, in favor of his own “plan for Britain”, which was only really a rough idea of the general direction he wanted the Empire to go, and lacked sufficient detail and thought for an effective government.
William Gladstone on the other hand often took the moral high ground in his foreign policy – his religious and political principles led him to support oppressed peoples, such as the Christians under the harsh rule of the Sultan. He believed that an international code of law and hard negotiations was the way to deal with conflicts, and not war as Disraeli would suggest. After Disraeli’s bad decisions lead to the slaughtering of 12000 Bulgarian Christians, Gladstone published his pamphlet on “the Bulgarian horrors and the question of the east” which was very critical of the prime minister, highlighting how the sultan interpreted Disraeli’s decision to not sign the Berlin memorandum as effectively giving the go ahead for the massacres. In essence Gladstone’s principles were to foster the strength of the empire by well thought legislation and economy at home .
It is fair to call Disraeli’s foreign policy brash and ill thought out especially in comparison to Gladstone. Disraeli’s focused on more spur of the moment issues, and although these often paid off like with the acquisition of Cyprus, they often went wrong. Gladstone was certainly more of a textbook politician, and approached his challenges with caution and detail. Despite his respect for freedom of rule, there was actually more imperial expansion under Gladstone than Disraeli, showing that Disraeli’s methods of foreign policy were not just ill though out, but also less effective, despite the fact that much of the Gladstonian expansion was not necessarily his doing, and often unavoidable in Gladstone’s eyes.
