Do Kehr's essays imply a coherent theory about the origins of the First World War?

18th February 2003

Do Kehr’s essays imply a coherent theory about the origins of the First World War?

Eckart Kehr is often described as the father of revisionist thought concerning imperial Germany and the road to war. His seminal collection of essays, Der Primat der Innenpolitik, was dismissed at the time and for a number of decades subsequent to its publication, for the primacy of foreign policy continued to dominate historical thinking. Kehr argued that Germany, for a number of domestic reasons, was pursuing a Weltpolitik that eventually led to the First World War. She rearmed and reorganised because of internal political tensions and squabblings, not because of any real provocation or threat from abroad. This theme has been taken up by other revisionist historians, most notably Fritz Fischer in 1961, but it is a rather one-sided view. It is impossible to view Germany’s actions purely in isolation, and Kehr fails to take into account the activities and manoeuvrings of Germany’s neighbours and rivals. She was not necessarily following a unique course, nor was she always the first to adopt certain measures. More recent historians, such as David Blackbourn and V.R. Berghahn, whilst not necessarily returning to the views of the orthodox school so violently rejected by Kehr, argue nevertheless that his theory presents only one side of the debate.

Kehr implies that Germany’s reckless and unnecessary armament build up, from the 1890s onwards, was the result of a misguided and clumsily executed Weltpolitik that antagonised her neighbours and ultimately led to war. One of the most contentious aspects of this development was Tirpitz’s risk fleet. There was no real need, in foreign policy terms, for Germany to establish such a force. It was, instead, the product of German domestic politics: in return for the industrialists’ support for high protective agricultural tariffs, they were allowed their ‘horrible’ fleet to further their international trade and expand their markets denied to them at home. Another reason for the development of the navy stemmed from more social factors. Germany’s officer corps was amongst the most segregated and privileged in Europe, and, by the turn of the century, there simply were not enough suitable officer candidates to cope with a continued rapid expansion in troop numbers. Rather than make moves to democratise the military, it was preferable to reduce increases to a slow and steady rate and divert funds to the navy. However, Tirpitz’s dream is not referred to as the ‘risk fleet’ for no reason. It was obvious at the time that such extensive – not to mention unprovoked – enlargement would raise suspicion and hostility in London; which it inevitably did, making hopes of British neutrality in any forthcoming war even more unlikely. Germany’s determination to build up a naval force the size of the French and Russian navies combined also served to increase their fears of a possible German attack, leading them to expand as well. Thus it was Germany’s internal situation that prompted the growth and development of her fleet to such an extent that it galvanised others to do likewise, and contributed greatly to anti-German feeling, which made the prospect of war more probable.

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The development of the fleet also had consequences for the army. Political wranglings and tensions meant that before long, they were soon demanding a similar expansion. The military’s abandonment of the policy of steady troop increases was also due to the shrewd realisation that the extent of the navy’s enlargement was such that it would inexorably lead Germany into conflict in the near future. Again, according to Kehr, it was Germany’s sudden rearmament which prompted her neighbours to follow suit, in order to defend themselves from possible attack. Kehr also claims it was internal pressures which led to an increase in tensions in Germany’s foreign relations. She had, towards the end of the nineteenth century, begun to import vast amounts of Russian grain and rye, which was vital to fund the Tsarist Empire’s push for progress and modernisation. However, once the East Elbian landowners had introduced tariffs to protect their own agricultural interests, the effects on the Russian economy were dramatic. Thus domestic policies influenced Germany’s foreign affairs, for this new policy led to a severe deterioration in Russo-German relations, and meant that, because the adage “countries who trade with one another do not fight each other” no longer applied, it was more likely that, in any future conflict, the two would be on opposite sides. When it came to the decline in the Anglo-German alliance, it was not just due to naval rivalry. Many of Germany’s industrial liberals looked towards England as the home of liberalism and modernity – with the SPD also strongly pro-Britain for similar reasons. The ruling elites were not predisposed to encourage such sympathies, and thus pursued an Anglophobic world policy in an attempt to repress calls for greater liberal reforms. In this way, it could be said that Kehr presents a coherent theory on the origins of the First World War, purely in terms of German domestic policy.

However, it could be said that Kehr’s analysis is too simplistic. Whilst he is right to look at how Germany’s internal situation affected her foreign policy, other factors must also be taken into consideration. This is not necessarily a return to der Primat der Aussenpolitik, but Germany alone cannot be blamed for the increase in armaments in the early years of the twentieth century. David Blackbourn, amongst others, points out that, as a proportion of their GNP, Russia and France continually spent more on arms and the military than their neighbour (4.6% and 3.9% respectively, compared to Germany’s 3.5%) and this pre-dated Germany’s expansion. There had been a number of imperial disputes, notably over Egypt, Morocco and Samoa, that had undermined the stability of Europe in the years leading up to 1914; suspicion of Germany did not start with her armaments programme. Nor was her fleet the only one giving Britain cause for concern. As Russia rebuilt and prepared her navy following the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905, there were rumblings of discontent from London. Neither, according to Blackbourn, was Berlin the only European capital facing serious domestic problems during the July Crisis: London was crippled by strikes and suffragette militancy, as well as facing civil war over Ireland, whilst France and Russia also faced significant unrest. This disputes the idea that Germany escalated the crisis into war simply because she was subject to internal disorder. Volker Berghahn is, in opposition to Kehr, of the belief that it was the breakdown of both Germany’s economic and foreign policies in 1913-14 that led her towards war, which is a much more balanced, and arguably more coherent – view.

Kehr’s essays do present a coherent theory as to the origins of the First World War. It is possible to see how Germany’s domestic actions could have led her towards war, and to go even further, as Fischer does in his Germany’s Grasp for World Power in 1961, that 1914 was the outbreak of a world war that she had been actively working towards since 1912. Kehr does not go quite so far, but he refuted the previously held belief that Germany was innocent in the build up to war (indeed, his claims have a curious resonance in Friedrich Meinecke’s Die deustche Katastrope, when he holds Prussian-German militarism for the event of World War One – curious because Meinecke was one of the historians Kehr had in mind when countering the orthodox point of view). However, Kehr’s theory, no matter how coherent, is not necessarily correct. This debate has raged for decades, and will, no doubt, continue for many more, but the behaviour of other European powers, and their impact on Germany and the outbreak of war should also be taken into consideration. Placing the blame on Germany alone is to be as one-sided as those who Kehr was contradicting in his essays.

Bibliography:

Eckart Kehr, Der Primat der Innenpolitik, Berlin (1970)

Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy (trans. Grete Heinz; ed. Gordon A. Craig), University of California Press (1977)

David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, Fontanta (1997)

V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Macmillan (1993)

Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire 1871-1918, Berg (1985)

V.R. Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, economy and politics in the twentieth century, Cambridge University Press (1987)