Does the issue of nuclear proliferation still matter in world politics today?

Essay Title: Does the issue of nuclear proliferation still matter in world politics today?

Mutual nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 jolted the world back into realizing that the long-standing problem of nuclear weapons proliferation had not gone away. In the immediate post-Cold War environment, there appeared to have been an actual reversal of nuclear weapons proliferation in some respects, with the denuclearization of all former Soviet republics except Russia; the dismantlement by South Africa of its small covert arsenal of nuclear weapons; an apparent end to the nuclear weapon ambitions of Brazil and Argentina; a freeze in the observable part of North Korea's nascent nuclear weapons program; and the eradication—at least for now—of Iraq's costly nuclear weapons infrastructure. Going further back, both Taiwan and South Korea had been persuaded to curtail efforts that were underway at one time to acquire nuclear weapons, while nations as diverse as Sweden, Switzerland, Romania, and Australia failed to pursue incipient programs. In general, the number of nuclear weapon states—whether declared or not—had not grown nearly as much as predicted by some observers back in the 1960s, when it was expected that two dozen or more countries would have acquired nuclear weapons by now. However, while the numbers have not changed in the near-term, several developments, including the embryonic nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and the uncertain future of the North Korean nuclear weapons program—could conceivably cause other states to initiate or accelerate their own such programs, as well as generally making the world—and in particular, South Asia—a more dangerous place.

Nuclear weapons which can be over a million times more powerful than the same weight of conventional explosives—are considered "weapons of mass destruction" in the truest sense. In addition to killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people or more, a nuclear weapon can obliterate the entire physical infrastructure of a large city and contaminate a much larger area with radioactive fallout. Although nuclear weapons have been detonated on adversaries only twice—against Japan in World War II, but states have continued to pursue their development for a wide range of reasons: as a deterrent to attack by others, in the hope that they will never actually be used in combat; as an instrument of diplomatic influence, where the mere threat of their use is assumed to confer certain advantages on their possessor; or purely for prestige, and recognition as a regional or global power of the first order. Some analysts credit the existence of a nuclear "balance of terror" for having prevented an outbreak of hostilities between the superpowers in the Cold War. However, most consider that the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities in general, and in particular to less stable or conflict-ridden regions of the world, would be harmful to international security by increasing the likelihood of nuclear weapons again being used in wartime; imposing heavy costs on states preparing for such an eventuality; and potentially increasing immeasurably the suffering to be incurred in future conflicts.

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Individual judgments about the likely result of proliferation will differ, since no proposed theory of the future can be proven. While such judgments inevitably colour views about the seriousness of proliferation and about what should be done to impede it, they do not provide a sufficient basis for determining policy. Equally important is the range of uncertainty around the best estimate. Most consider that the likely result of greater proliferation would be a world not much or perhaps any more prone to nuclear war than today’s world must admit that the uncertainties are large and mostly involve the possibility of greater danger. The chances that proliferation will reduce the likelihood of nuclear war are quite small. The risks therefore, are large, large enough to preclude much serious advocacy of widespread proliferation, large enough to make worthwhile efforts to understand the underlying dynamics of nuclear proliferation and to seek means to inhibit it, and, most important, large enough to justify attention and preventive action by individual states and the international community. (Ted Greenwood, Harold A. Feiveson and Theodore B. Taylor, P.28)

The world now has about 20,000 nuclear weapons; there were once 65,000. It must be counted as a major miracle of the modern age that in the 60 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki none of them has been used in anger. North Korea already claims to have nuclear weapons; estimates are from six to eight, though the claims and estimates could be wrong. Iranians deny pursuing nuclear weapons, but their denials are doubted by outside experts and undermined by Iran's incomplete compliance with nuclear inspections. There are now eight nuclear powers: the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, India, Pakistan and Israel (suspected). The danger is not mainly increasing that number by two. It is that if North Korea and Iran have nuclear weapons, other countries would ultimately go nuclear. Then, every nuclear danger would rise dramatically: miscalculation, pre-emptive attacks, theft, a global market in weapons technology, and use by terrorist groups. Nevertheless, Libya was reported to have attempted to purchase nuclear weapons from China in 1970, but to have been rebuffed. It currently operates a small nuclear research reactor at Tajura near Tripoli, and Qadhafi has been reported to have attempted to recruit Russian and other foreign nuclear scientists to assist in developing nuclear weapons. March 2001 press reporting that Iraq had successfully tested a nuclear weapon prior to the Gulf War and currently possesses a small nuclear stockpile has been discounted by official Western sources. According to a May 2000 assessment by the FAS, "The total Israeli nuclear stockpile consists of several hundred weapons of various types, including boosted fission and enhanced radiation weapons ('neutron bombs'), as well as nuclear artillery shells." Such rapid proliferation could cause instabilities that might be too great for political systems and institutions to handle, making nuclear use or nuclear war more likely. Thus any strategy for non-proliferation should especially attempt to prevent a rapid spread of nuclear weapons and to avert acquisition by states in the high-risk categories.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was brought into being in order to prevent an increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons, since the United Nations considered that such an increase would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. (Taylor & Francis Ltd, P.272) Undoubtedly the NPT is one of the most important arms control measures. However, the main concern about the NPT is that over 50 nations have so far refused to join the Treaty. These include a number of countries which are engaged in significant nuclear activities and which already have the technology and means to make nuclear weapons. The division of the world into two classes, the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, which is inherent in the NPT, is one of the main reasons given by some nations for their refusal to join the Treaty. As long as the possession of nuclear weapons offers special privileges to a nation, the tendency to join the nuclear weapon club will be irresistible. (Taylor & Francis Ltd, P.419) Nuclear weapons will remain widely spread in non-NPT states, if this problem being unsolved.

In conclusion, the tide of nuclear weapons proliferation has actually been reversed in some cases in recent years, several developments-including the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and the uncertain future of the North Korean nuclear weapons program—could conceivably cause other states to initiate or accelerate their own such programs, as well as generally making the world—and in particular, South Asia—a more dangerous place. A few other states remain of concern as well. Iraq, with its demonstrated history of a large-scale program, appears determined to acquire a nuclear weapons capability at the earliest opportunity. So does Libya, albeit being considerably less advanced. Meanwhile, Israel shows no willingness to give up its substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons despite widespread criticism. In the short term, despite the South Asian testing, the number of states aspiring to have nuclear weapons is unlikely to grow. However, in the medium to longer-term, recent developments on the Subcontinent and on the Korean Peninsula, depending on how they play out in coming years, could have a serious impact on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, in terms of both increasing the number of states contemplating the development of nuclear weapons, and increasing the risks of such weapons actually being used in combat.

Bibliography & References

John Baylis and Steve Smith (2001), The Globalization of World Politics—An introduction to international relations, 2nd edition, Oxford University press.

Taylor & Francis Ltd (1979), Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, Stockholm International Peace Resaerch Institution.

Ted Greenwood, Harold A. Feiveson and Theodore B. Taylor (1980), Nuclear Proliferation—Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control, Macmillan Press Ltd.

John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (1984), The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System, Macmillan Press Ltd.

Tom Sauer (1998), Nuclear Arms Control—Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Period.

Eberhard Meller (1978), Internationalization—An Alternative to Nuclear Proliferation.