Some of the supporters of the motion that the German high command’s changes led to the failure of the plan take another view. An example of this was the historian and publicist Hans Delbruck, who brought the Schlieffen plan to the attention of the German public. Delbruck wrote that Germany and more importantly Von Moltke had been wrong to use the plan Schlieffen had devised at all. He supported a plan ironically thought up by Commander Von Moltke’s uncle, which said Germany should attack in the east and defend in the west. Field Marshal Von Moltke said an offensive in the east would have produced a quick victory over the Russian armies in Poland. This way Germany could respect neutral Belgium, which would weaken British enthusiasm for the Entente and mean they were unlikely to become involved. He and Delbruck shared the same overview as well that with Germany initiating the Schlieffen plan in 1914 they could be sure of defeat. So why can the German high command be blamed for the failure of the Schlieffen plan in 1914. Many believe they can be blamed for the alterations made, going against Schlieffen’s whole concept of a swift attack on France using a huge number of men. However if you share another view you may argue the failure of the plan was the fault of Von Moltke, Bulow (the 2nd army commander) and Hentsch (Moltke’s liaison officer at the battle of Marne) because of its use, or even consideration in World War One.
On the other hand, the alterations the German high command made in 1914 are seen by some as only a contribution to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. Other factors need to be considered when forming an opinion.
The first factor that needs to be considered is the building of railways in Russia. The plan depended on Russia being slow mobilising its huge army, giving German forces time to attack the French and have time to head east. Before the war, Russia began to build railways spanning the whole width of the country. This affected the outcome of the war as it gave mobility to the Russian army. With this new transport links large numbers of both troops and peasants could be bought in quickly from the countryside to fight. Another major event that lead to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan was Britain’s protection of Belgium and involvement in the war. Schlieffen had not anticipated Britain’s eagerness to defend a country of which the protectorate was signed almost a hundred years before. This contributed to the failure of the plan as it held up the German advance. The 100,000 strong British Expeditionary Force reacted quickly to the invading of Belgium. They met the German forces at Mons, and managed to slow up the advance considerably. This is described in Source B and the problems it caused e.g. allowing mobilisation of Russian troops are also stated.
It was expected by Germany, that on invasion Belgium would simply hand over its power. This however was not the case and the comparatively insignificant Belgium army were able to hold up German forces from breaching the French boarder. At the modern-design fort of Liege the Germans were held up by Belgian artillery positioned in this stronghold. The reason this contributed to the failure of the plan was because it again slowed down the Northern army going against the whole concept of Schlieffen’s plan: speed. In all types of warfare logistics, food and munitions etc. play a huge part in the outcome, no different in World War One. The problem they posed in this case was that the supplies were too slow to keep up with the rapidly advancing forces. Source F explains how some men “went for 48 hours with only one piece of bread, one cup of soup, one cup of coffee and a raw turnip” after walking 35 kilometres in a day. This created a new problem in itself. With all emphasize on a quick victory in France, soldiers were made to walk great distances in a day resulting in exhausted men when their destination was reached. In turn this is partly why trenches were built. The trench-system was yet another factor contributing to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. This achieved just what German high command did not want, a war of attrition. This contributed to the defeat of Germany in the war as it gave time to Russian forces to mobilise and subsequently resulted in a war on two fronts. The reason why logistics resulted in the failure of the Schlieffen Plan is because they counter acted the ground made by the advancing German troops. The men would take a lot of land in a day; however lose the advantage gained as they waited days for the logistics to arrive.
The final factor that influenced the failure of the Schlieffen Plan was the “old” style of warfare employed by German troops early on in the war. Source D shows German soldiers walking across open fields in a flat line. The point is also illustrated in Source E, “On the 23rd of August we were attacked by waves of German infantry advancing over open fields. Such tactics amazed us…” the source continues to say how the first wave of men fell helplessly as they were hit. If a modern style of warfare had been in use at this battle near Mons, would Germany of lost as many men? This contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen, as it created unnecessary loses to German platoons early on in the war. This could of resulted in Germany not having the man-power to capture Paris quickly as they had hoped.
On the whole I do not believe that the German high command can be blamed completely for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. The mistakes they made in August and September of 1914 were a definite contribution, however I believe factors such as logistics, Belgium defending itself, Britain becoming involved, building of railways over Russia etc. are also major factors to be considered when forming an opinion on this topic. However if the original German plan was enforced; the predicted 90% of their forces had been sent through Belgium and Holland into France, who knows if the world of today would look as it does now?
