Examine The Claim That Between 1945 & 47, The US And The British Failed To Understand The Fears And Needs Of The USSR.

      An ideal starting point top assess this fundamental failure to understand the ‘fears and needs’ of the USSR by the British and The US is Winston Churchill’s famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech which was made in March ‘46.  Displaying the traditionalist ignorance he passionately describes how an ‘iron curtain’ of ‘Soviet influence…and increasing measure of control from Moscow’ has descended on the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. He uses aggressive words to describe their actions such as ‘Russian-dominated’, ‘pre-eminence and power’, ‘enormous and wrongful inroads’. He then goes from attacking their perceived expansionist actions to the politics of their actions, by proclaiming how they are ‘seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control’ with ‘no true democracy’ which ‘show special favours to groups of left-wing leaders’.  Although this speech is seemingly understanding of the USSR’s policies and needs, however paradoxically reiterates the fundamental misunderstanding of the  British and the US of the USSR’s needs, as not once in this speech is there one reference as to ‘why’ they  may be attempting to do what is being propagated. This failure to deal with the ‘why’ only adds allegations to subjectivity and impartiality from the British and American sides, and only add to the argument that they did fail to understand the ‘fears and needs’ of the USSR.

      A reiteration of this basic denial of the ‘fears and needs’ is shown in Stalin’s rebuttal a week later after this speech in early march. Published in state paper Pravda he explains how ‘Germany invaded through Finland, Poland, Romania, and Hungary’ because ‘governments hostile to the soviet union existed in these countries’. Immediately he offers a rational explanation as to why the USSR, or any state, would want ‘friendly states’ across their borders. Stalin also states that the USSR’s loss of life was ‘several times greater than that of Britain and the United States of America put  together’. By stating this he contrasts the experiences of the British and US and with the USSR’s, and why this is a basic factor in why they have failed to understand their ‘fears and needs’ and why they may have been so quick to regard their actions as ‘expansionist’ and as Churchill describes, an ‘Iron Curtain’ of ‘Soviet influence’. The source finishes with Stalin asking ‘how can anyone describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies on the part of our state?’. This line is in direct rebuttal to Churchill passionately describing the ‘wrongful and enormous inroads’ to ‘pre-eminence and power…seeking totalitarian control’. Stalin effectively highlights and exploits this failure to understand their needs, and Churchill’s speech only emphasize this denial. However it should not be disregarded the personality of Stalin and his history, and the source of this rebuttal, part of the state propaganda machine influencing and winning over the hearts and minds. Fundamentally where Churchill relies on noble, rallying words to mobilize an ideological battle to justify possible future actions against the USSR, Stalin in fact provides a logical explanation to their perceived ‘expansionist’ tendencies, and does highlight the basic failure to understand the ‘fears and needs’ of the Soviet Union.

      Besides the aforementioned examples of state propaganda, the economic actions of the US also reiterate this failure to understand the ‘fears and needs’ of the USSR. George C. Marshall’s speech announcing the Marshall Plan show the early attempts to polarize the European continent through the means of economic imperialism with ideological undertones to reinforce these goals. He explains the need to ‘assist in the return of normal economic health in the world’ and ‘the revival of a working economy in the world’. By immediately stating the economic goals of the US in a post-war world, Marshall fails to understand the post-war needs of the USSR in Europe economically, and thus adds to the mounting case that the USA did in fact fail to recognise the ‘fears  and needs’ of the Soviets. He continues to explain that ‘our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine’ however then mentions there must be the environment for ‘free institutions to exist’. Here is the first undertones of the traditionalist thought, by highlighting the contrast ion their ideology with the USSR’s ‘totalitarian’ nature as Churchill argues. These ideological undertones reappear as he states there ‘must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of this situation’. These references coincide with the declining relations between the three states, over the German and Polish questions, as well as the eastern European ideological battles, and this announcement only merely adds to this decline. Once this diplomatic language is unravelled, the clear picture is that the US are attempting to assert their hegemony through economic imperialism, and make the ravaged European states dependent on them and their aid, in compete defiance of the paranoia that the USSR is feeling after the devastation of the war, and because of this blatant piece of economic expansionism , it again shows the basic failure to understand the ‘fears and needs’ of the USSR.