Churchill’s strong friendship with Roosevelt meant Britain could always rely on the USA’s support. However as most Americans were not keen on getting involved in what they thought as a ‘European War’ Britain did not receive America’s direct support. Instead America sent escort vessels to protect trade, arms, tools, machinery and most important of all financial aid. In 1941 the ‘Grand Alliance’ was formed due to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour and Operation Barbarossa. The alliance, described as a ‘marriage of convenience’, was bound together by the desire to defeat the common enemy (Germany). Prior to the Anglo-American alliance, Britain was hostile to the Russia because of the freezing of her assets when the communists took control, Stalin’s Purges and the Soviet Union’s policy of expansion into Europe. However despite this Britain was the first nation to give the Soviet Union international recognition after the revolt with the signing of a preliminary trade agreement in 1921. The Soviet Union’s relationship with the USA was seen as more questionable due to contrasting ideologies. As the USA was now supplying vast amounts of resources into the Alliance she realised the reliance of Britain on them. The opportunity was therefore taken to change British Foreign Policy with this influence. At the first meeting in Canada, Britain and the Soviet Union were made to sign the Atlantic Charter which complied with the USA’s views of self-determination. The document, laying out the founding principles of the UN, prevented territorial enlargement contrary to the wishes of the peoples concerned and demanded the right of people to select their own form of government. The Soviet Union were most reluctant to sign because they wished to spread their Marxist ideas across the world.
As the War progressed there were further differences expressed at Grand Alliance meetings. First, although they all agreed that the defeat of Germany was the paramount issue, Stalin wanted the creation of a second front in Europe to take the pressure off the struggling Red Army. However no front would be opened until the German presence in Europe was weakened. When it became clear in 1943 that the Soviet Union would dominate Eastern and Central Europe after the War, Churchill became suspicious of Stalin. In October 1944 Churchill and Stalin signed the ‘Percentages Agreement’ in which Churchill hoped to prevent the establishment of a ‘Soviet Bloc’ by creating spheres of influence.
At Yalta the Western Powers conceded Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia to Soviet Union, knowing that once the Red Army entered those countries they would be reluctant to withdraw. Churchill realising that the other Eastern European countries were likely to fall to communism was still adamant that Poland should be free and democratic. Polish borders and a constitution of a Polish Government of National Unity drawn up. There was also agreement over the dividing up of Germany into four zones. However Potsdam, following the defeat of Germany did not go so well. Settlements on Italy, Poland and Germany were not agreed and a final reparations bill was not drawn up. The Soviet Union did not stick to their promises and eventually exiled the Polish government after forming a communist coalition government. Churchill’s predictions seemed to have been unerringly accurate. On the one side was a strong Russia, desperate to increase its influence over war-ravaged central Europe. On the other side was an economically confident USA, capable of producing unimaginably powerful bombs. In the middle stood Britain and Western Europe, dependent upon American generosity but worried about Russia’s expansionist plans. Britain’s foreign policy was aimed at strengthening the ties between these European nations, for example in the Treaty of Dunkirk with France, in order to create a “United States of Europe” (Churchill), perhaps serving as a useful buffer zone between Britain and Russia. Yet, although our links with the USA held centre stage, the USA was far more interested in finishing its military engagements in the Far East and Japan. However, the allies had learnt that appeasement did not work with their experiences with Hitler and Mussolini. So after signing off Eastern Europe they decided to draw the line there and not concede any more territory to Stalin. Allied Zones in Germany and Austria were fortified and plans drawn up for the reviving of Europe.
The growth of Russian and USA influence seemed to highlight the dwindling status of Britain in world politics. Britain did not even get to discuss the terms of Japanese surrender. Indeed, Keynes argued that “We are a great nation, but if we continue to behave like a Great Power we shall soon cease to be a great nation”. This was shown by the post-war situation in Greece. For some time Britain had supported the non-communists in a civil war raging in Greece, but in February 1947 Bevin reported to the USA that Britain could no longer afford to sustain this effort, even though it was about to re-establish military service. Truman demanded money ($400 million) from the US congress to help Greece and Turkey resist communism in what was known as the ‘Truman Doctrine’. The Marshall Plan followed in which the USA again pumped money into a war torn Europe to prevent the spread of Communism. Stalin and Eastern European allies refused the program denouncing it as a trick. Another example is that the British Zone in Germany had to be fed which was the main cause for a bread ration in Britain. This resulted in the amalgamation of British and American Zones in 1947.
It seems clear that Britain’s foreign and defence policies from the outbreak of WW2 were fundamentally linked. Attacked by Germany, with a powerful Soviet Union on the sidelines if things went wrong after the war had ended, Britain seemed destined to forge closer links with the USA (which had almost limitless access to weapons and armaments). Although it saw the importance of a stronger Western Europe to stem any further Soviet Union advances, it made very few attempts to become part of any future European organisation. However, in aligning itself closer to the USA, a country which always worried about Britain’s imperialistic past (and future aspirations), the cost for Britain was the loss of her empire.
Bibliography
Hope And Glory by Peter Clarke
British History since 1914 by Jack Watson
The Fontana Economic History of Europe series by A.J. Youngson
Access to history series Stalin and Khrushchev, The USSR, 1924-64 by Michael Lynch