“...the nature and extent of foreign espionage that is at present taking place within this country and the danger to which it may expose us.” (Andrew, 2009, p.3)
In another meeting in July 1909 it reported that,
“...the evidence which was produced left no doubt in the minds of the subcommittee that an extensive system of German espionage exists in this country and that we have no organisation for keeping in touch with that espionage and for accurately determining its extent or objectives.” (Andrew, 2009, p.3)
This finding from the subcommittee underlined the fear of the enfeebled state of British intelligence.
It can be seen that the early years of the Security Service was plagued with many problems. This included the lack of funding and the continuing friction between the two heads of sections, Kell and Cumming. Evidence of the lack of money can be seen in the letter from Macdonogh to Kell on 28 February 1910:
“My Dear Kell,
We are and shall be very hard up until the end of this month. Will you therefore please cut down your expenses to a minimum and not incur any travelling expenses without previous reference and then only in cases that will not wait till April.
Yours Sincerely
M[acdonogh]” (Andrew, 2009, p.27)
The turbulent relationship between the two heads continued until the complete separation of the two organisations was fully recognised on 28 April 1910. This noticeably reduced the friction between Kell and Cumming.
Due to Kell’s section being run on a shoestring and the minimal resources, he had to enlist the help of chief constables from around the country to help his initial counter-espionage strategy. It was Kell’s good fortune that the Home Secretary for most of 1910 and 1911 was Winston Churchill. Christopher Andrew writes,
“Winston Churchill, who in the course of a long career showed greater enthusiasm for the understanding of, intelligence than any other British politician of his generation.” (Andrew, 2009, p.29)
With the help and influence of Churchill, Kell managed to obtain a ground of personal contact with many of the chief constables around Britain,
“...all of whom expressed themselves most willing to assist me in every way.” (Andrew, 2009, p.30)
It is evident that without the help and co-operation from chief constables around the country, the Security Service would not have been effective in its fight against any German espionage. It is also evident that Kell’s earlier report which stated that he had,
“no doubt...that an extensive system of German espionage exists in this country,” (Andrew, 2009, p.31)
was far from the truth.
- The Beginnings of German Pre-War Espionage in Britain
By the late 1890s, the German Navy had the second largest fleet in the world, only second to the Royal Navy. The German Navy had strong links to Germany military intelligence (‘Sektion IIIb’) and can be said to be the underlying reason for the creation of the German naval intelligence organisation (‘N’). From 1897, The Secretary of the Naval Office was Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. German naval intelligence, or ‘N’ as it had now been abbreviated, had become a focal point amongst the Kaiser as the German military intelligence was reasonably well documented. Prior to this any contingency plans created by Germany against its foes did not include Britain. In fact Germany saw Britain as a potential ally and the German navy even counted on British naval support against France.
“As soon as the English fleet can be regarded as hostile to the French, we will only have to focus on Russia in the European theatre.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.42)
Once Tirpitz joined the Naval Office he changed his mind and explained to the Kaiser that the largest threat was actually from Britain.
The extent of German spying in Britain before 1914 was not nearly as dangerous as many British at the time thought. Like the Security Services, the German navy intelligence organisation was relatively small and poorly funded. Boghardt writes about how the German spies were also looking at the wrong things as they were mostly interested in technical information about the Royal Navy and did not pay much attention to the British Expeditionary Forces.
We can see that in comparison to the British attempts to combat potential espionage their German counterparts were having similar problems. German spying within Britain produced few tangible results.
- Pre-War Espionage attempts
The idea of espionage had been a concept from an early age. This idea was increasingly beneficial to many authors of this period. William Tufnell Le Queux and Erskine Childers profited from the growing unease with Germany by publishing scare stories in which Germany replaced the traditional enemy, France. It can be said that the absence of spies did not stop the British from perceiving spies. The reasons for the British government’s creation of MI5 and MI6 can be said to have been due to the popular pressure contributed by the books by Le Queux and Childers. Le Queux and his readers had managed to produce incredible amounts of information on German spying in Britain although Kell,
“possessed virtually no valid information on any de facto foreign espionage.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.39)
Although there was this miraculous amount of information, the Bureau didn’t examine these claims and they weren’t taken seriously. Although as we already know, Kell and the subcommittee already had their minds made up in regards to the idea of German espionage in Britain.
“True to his preconceptions about German intentions, Kell operated on the assumption that Germany was contemplating invasion.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.39)
During the first two years of the existence of the Security Services, the organisation was unable to apprehend or even detect a single German spy. There had been many cases like this, one of which claimed to have discovered two Germans who had been signalling to each other by lamps by night. This soon turned out to be lamps used by campers rather than German spies.
On the other hand the German authorities had unearthed a complex British intelligence operation in 1910. Vivian Brandon, codename ‘bonfire’, was arrested by German police within a restricted area on the island of Borkum. Bernard Trench, codename ‘counterscarp’, was apprehended two days later in Emden. The German investigation into the two officers revealed that they both worked for the Royal Navy and had been instructed to spy on the German coast and the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Channel. Much to the credit of the two officers, they had successfully managed to gather any necessary ‘intel’ even though they had been caught. The court’s findings left no doubt that they were guilty and found that,
“The defendants had been supplied with excellent equipment and gathered intelligence on fortifications, militarily important economic relations and especially on such facts that would be vital for an English attack on Germany.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.40)
The two officers received a sentence of four years’ detention in a fortress.
In the years just before the war, the Security Service did finally find a few genuine spies, but as Boghardt shows on the basis of careful analysis of court records and documents in German archives, these spies were merely small fish.
“a sober analysis of the information provided by the handful of genuine German spies arrested should have informed the British government that Berlin was primarily interested in technical naval intelligence and that the German pre-war espionage apparatus was not very extensive.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.80)
The first case investigated by Kell which led to prosecution was that of Dr Max Schultz. Schultz was originally working for the British government, operating a spy ring in Germany. It is said that,
“Despite convictions in Germany for embezzlement, he (Schultz) was used by ‘N’ to gather intelligence on the Royal Navy at Portsmouth.” (Andrew, 2009, p.38)
Although Schultz was a complete failure, it outlined the ease at which agents were being manipulated and even turned to work for the so called, enemy.
- The ‘Ernst’ ring
The capture of the German spy ring is said to have been one of the most crucial moments in Kell’s career as head of the Security Service. He created a ‘special war list’ with the names of spies that the Security Service had been following. Kell is said to have masterminded an operation that eventually round-up Germany’s spy network in Britain.
The German intelligence had placed long term ‘sleepers’ in Britain with Karl Gustav Ernst one of the more prominent. Ernst was said to have been,
“...the central post office for all German espionage papers in the UK.” (www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-german-spy-ring)
A British citizen of German descent, Ernst was seen by Germany as a major asset. The ‘Kaiser’s postman’, a name quite fitting to the role he played during this period, helped Steinhauer communicate with his agents around Britain. The Security Service intercepted any correspondence going from Ernst and managed to gather information relating to 22 German agents which were working in Britain, of which 21 were captured in August 1914. This is seen by many in favour of Kell, as the defining moment where he managed to stop a mass espionage campaign in Britain. It was said that,
“The arrests wrecked German efforts to establish a regular stream of intelligence from Britain, just at the moment when it was most needed.” (www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-german-spy-ring)
On the other hand, could this have been a fabrication by Kell and Security Service to prove that an adequate amount of espionage did exist in Britain to justify the establishment of the organisation. Boghardt writes about how out of the 21 arrested; only 9 were actually spies.
“In a political crisis, the arrest of persons with known links to enemy espionage organizations is a routine matter of precaution, but Ernst and the others on Kell’s ‘special war list’ hardly presented a threat to British security.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.78)
This means that the existence of a ‘vast German espionage organization’ was actually slightly fabricated and all the theories about a major German ‘spy ring’ was blown out of proportion.
- Conclusion
“During the run-up to the First World War and during the war itself, German spies sought to obtain political, military and industrial secrets that would have benefited their country’s war effort.” (www.mi5.gov.uk/output/1909-to-world-war-1)
We know that the creation of the Security Service was in essence created to combat the threat of German espionage in Britain. The Security Service believed that the efforts of Kell and others had been successful in their efforts against German espionage. The MI5 website writes,
“The Service proved effective in combating this threat. It successfully broke up the German spy network in the UK on the eve of the declaration of war.” (www.mi5.gov.uk/output/1909-to-world-war-1)
The stance that the British Security Service took comes across as if they succeeded in their efforts to quash German espionage, but what was the reality behind this?
The evidence shows arguments from both a German perspective, in Thomas Boghardt, and one from the British perspective in Christopher Andrew. They both evaluate valid points and seem to reach one conclusion that both country’s failed to implement the concept of espionage adequately and ultimately failed to make a large difference. Boghardt closes his book by saying,
“the history of German espionage in Great Britain reveals a curios double failure: the incapacity of ‘N’ to make a significant contribution to the German war effort and the inability of British counter-espionage to produce a realistic assessment of German espionage.” (Boghardt, 2004, p.143)
To say that the establishment of the British Security Service (MI5) was a complete failure would be harsh, as we can see that it clearly helped quash the major expansion of German espionage. If the British Security Service hadn’t been created, there was the realistic probability that German espionage would have been a big threat to Britain. In regards to the effectiveness of the Security Service, there are many factors which tell us that Kell’s unrealistic forecast of there being an extensive amount of German espionage only helped the expansion of MI5. The mere creation of the organisation can even be said to have caused a deterrent to any possible German espionage from 1909. The pressure from Le Queux and other authors at this time can be said to have been a defining reason for the foundation of the Security Service and also the fever which gripped Britain during this period, of espionage on home soil.
References
- Andrew, Christopher (2009); The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, Penguin.
- Boghardt, Thomas (2004); Spies of the Kaiser: German Covert Operations in the First World War Era, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Farmer, Alan (2000); An Introduction to Modern European History 1880-1990, Hodder Education.
- Jeffery, Keith (2010); MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Bloomsbury.
- Le Queux, William (1909); Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England, London: Frank Cass.
- www.mi5.gov.uk/output/1909-to-world-war-1 (Date Accessed: April 2011)
- www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-german-spy-ring (Date Accessed: April 2011)
Bibliography
- Abrams, Lynn (1995); Bismarck and the German Empire 1871-1918, Routledge.
- Andrew, Christopher (2009); The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, Penguin.
- Boghardt, Thomas (2004); Spies of the Kaiser: German Covert Operations in the First World War Era, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Farmer, Alan (2000); An Introduction to Modern European History 1880-1990, Hodder Education.
- Jeffery, Keith (2010); MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Bloomsbury.
- Le Queux, William (1909); Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England, London: Frank Cass.
- Stiles, Andrina; Farmer, Alan (2001); The Unification of Germany 1815-90, Hodder & Stoughton.
- www.mi5.gov.uk/output/1909-to-world-war-1 (Date Accessed: April 2011)
- www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-german-spy-ring (Date Accessed: April 2011)
