" How far can British policy towards China between 1839 and 1860 be characterized as 'Gunboat Diplomacy'? "

“ How far can British policy towards China between 1839 and 1860 be characterized as ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’? ”

I feel that British policy towards China between the years 1839 and 1860 can be characterized as ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’ through several cases between those years. ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’ refers to the use of brute force by a nation to secure their interests/ desires elsewhere, such as using warships as a threat to another nation’s security in order to achieve what they want. There is, however, selected evidence that suggest Gunboat Diplomacy was not used throughout the period, with Britain adopting their policy to deal with the Chinese instead of using only brute force to ensure their interests were met.

British policy towards China between 1839 and 1860 involved several cases of Gunboat Diplomacy. 1839 was the year that the first Opium war broke out between Britain and China. The war broke out due to hardened attitudes of both the British and Chinese regarding free trade, the issue of opium smugglers and Chinese reluctance to comply with British demands. October 18, 1939 the real signal of war saw the Secretary of State for British Foreign Affairs, Lord Palmerston, order the blockade of several key Chinese ports and cities including Canton, Pei-Ho, Amoy, Shanghai and Ningpo. Historian June Grasso describes Palemerston’s push for the use of force against China, describing him as stating, “the only way to deal with China is to give it a good beating” along with stating that “…in England, members of parliament and several municipal Chambers of Commerce openly push for a declaration of war”. British war ships surrounded the coast of Canton, clear evidence of Britain using force to ensure Chinese compliance and the first use of Gunboat Diplomacy during the time period. British use of Gunboat Diplomacy in this first Opium war is further shown by the introduction of Sir Henry Pottinger as the Commander in charge of this British-led war against China. Historian Immanuel C.Y. Hsu states in his published study of China that “Pottinger carried out his instructions meticulously…Pottinger, refusing to negotiate until Ch’I-ying produced his ‘full powers’, poised his ships for an attack on Nanking on August 9.” This shows that Pottinger used Gunboat Diplomacy as a threat to get the Chinese to comply to whatever the British wanted, and did not attempt to negotiate with the Imperial Commissioner of China, Ch’I-ying, on a neutral, peaceful term even though the former was prepared to do so. The fact that Pottinger prepared his war ships for attack at such short notice to the Chinese meant that it was highly possible he would strike the Chinese city if his terms were not met fully or if he was not satisfied by how the Chinese dealt with them – it was either the Chinese accepted them or they would stage a full-out war with the invasion of Peking. Historian Immanuel Hsu describes this force-fed situation as “This treaty was imposed by the victor upon the vanquished at gunpoint, without careful deliberation usually accompanying international agreements in Europe and America”. The use of Gunboat Diplomacy by the British was also evident from the period after the First Opium War till the start of the Second, the years 1842 to 1856. The first main incident involving Gunboat Diplomacy during this period was the ‘Davis Raid’ of 1847. John Davis, the replacement of Pottinger as Chief Superintendent of British trade in China, adopted a non-forgiving attitude towards the Chinese, and would not tolerate any ‘misbehavior’ or signs of resistance on their part. Immanuel Hsu describes the incident in his writings – “…the Canton populace became bolder than ever. Incidents of stoning and insulting British excursionists occurred repeatedly…In April 1847, Davis retaliated with his ‘famous’ raid of Canton, with 900 soldiers in three armed steamers and a brig, he captured the Bogue forts, spiked 827 cannons and occupied the Canton factories”. This was clear use of Gunboat Diplomacy on the British Military and Navy’s part, forcing China to give in to even more British demands. The year 1852 also saw use of Gunboat Diplomacy by the British side, this time relating to the British Consul Rutherford Alcock, described by historian Jack Gray as “forcefully maintaining the newly-established trade system” – he used British warships and military force at his disposal as a signal to China that she must maintain British demands fully. The Second Opium war also involved British adoption of Gunboat Diplomacy. On October 22 1856, the start of the war, British warships bombarded Canton in response to the Chinese Commissioner Yeh not apologizing for the incident involving the British-sailing ship the ‘Arrow’. The incident can be seen as an excuse by the British to use force against the Chinese to re-evaluate the terms of the terms of the Treaty of Nanking set after the first Opium war, thus evidence that Britain once again adopted a policy of force to deal with China as to meet her renewed demands – the use of force had been successful previously and would still be in 1856. 10 British war ships were sent to the bay of Daya and forced their way towards Tientsin. Jack Gray describes the British as using “warships in treaty ports against Chinese citizens and officials representing the Chinese government” in this second Opium war. Historian June Grasso further backs up this view of Gunboat Diplomacy used by the British at this time, stating that the Anglo-French military expedition under Lord Elgin and Gros proceeded with force towards the North, ceasing many key areas such as Tientsin and the Taku Forts. The final period up till 1860 also saw several examples of Gunboat Diplomacy used. Treaty terms of Tientsin were submitted to the Chinese government under force on June 11th 1858, with the British commander Elgin stating “unless the treaty terms are accepted on this day, there will be a march to Peking”. Fredrick Bruce further backed up this threat of force on June 26th 1858 by warning that “if the treaty is not signed this night, it will have to be signed at Peking” (quotes provided from ‘The Rise of Modern China’ – Hsu). The final example of Gunboat Diplomacy during this period is the foreign looting and destruction of the Emperor’s Summer Palace in Beijing. Historian Seagrave describes this event – “what could not have been carried off (from the palace) was smashed, stabbed or shot…Nothing like this has occurred since the barbarians sacked Rome”.