How far can the downfall of Napoleon be explained by the continuous opposition of Britain?

Throughout Napoleon’s reign, he was faced by a number of Coalitions set up against him which contained a number of different European states. However, the only constant in these coalitions was Britain, either through military opposition or economic support for the other elements of the coalition. Napoleon was obsessed with the need to defeat Britain, despite Britain not having any sizable power on mainland Europe, which led to, in a series of events, the introduction of the Continental System, the Peninsular War and the Russian campaign. Although it is difficult to assess Britain’s importance in strict military terms, and many other factors were involved in the downfall of Napoleon, it is clear that the continuous opposition of Britain plays a vital role.

Historians disagree over Britain’s direct role in the downfall of Napoleon; Brendan Simms sees the Russian Campaign as the turning point that destroyed the Grande Armée and this view is supported to differing extents by many other notable historians such as Jean Tulard and Martyn Lyons but Napoleon saw the start of his downfall as being “the Spanish Ulcer”, a war that hinged on Britain’s military presence. However this is the only instance of Britain waging a land war against France until the final campaigns of 1813-14. Using Napoleon’s own analogy, an ulcer is not a mortal wound merely an irritation that slowly saps your strength and this is perhaps the best way to view Britain’s military campaigns on the land. Simms states that “the Grande Armée was not bled to death by a thousand cuts” referring to Britain’s continuous small scale opposition, the majority of France’s Grand Armée veterans never faced the British Army in Spain as Napoleon was simultaneously fighting more important battles across the continent against Russia and Austria. In fact, Jean Tulard sees their major triumph as their total dominance of the seas, confirmed at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, a view echoed by Ellis who declares Britain to be “the masters of the seas”. Destroying the French fleet and putting an end to Napoleon’s plans to invade Britain are two clear outcomes of the battle but Tulard goes further still, declaring that after Trafalgar “no one knew yet…but the English had won the war”. This would certainly a strong argument that Britain was indeed the main cause of Napoleon’s downfall if this one battle had truly beaten Napoleon, but little evidence is given to support this claim and this is the only case of a historian claiming that Napoleon’s downfall began as early as 1805, mainly due to the ensuing victories at Austerlitz and Jena. Therefore, although Britain’s control of the seas may have forced Napoleon’s hand somewhat, ruling out an already unpractical plan to invade Britain, the destruction of a weak French and Spanish fleet cannot be seen as one of the major factors in Napoleon’s downfall.

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Far more important than their military contribution was Britain’s political and economic support for the mainland powers opposing Napoleon. The gold ploughed into Austria, Prussia and Russia, known as “Pitt’s cavalry”, was vital not only in supporting the continental armies but also in persuading them to take up arms in the first place. It may be pointed out that this could not have been a major factor as Britain had been following the same policy since 1793 without success, but the final victories in Napoleon’s later years could not have been achieved if Britain had not persevered with their approach. The harsh peace treaties inflicted on the major continental powers by Napoleon included huge payments to France that left these countries dependent on British financial backing but furthermore left these countries in such a poor state that long term peace was never a likely outcome. Austria was defeated in 1801, 1805 and 1809, each time declaring a fresh war with France in a matter of years. This is another factor contributing towards Napoleon’s downfall, as his “glorious peace with honour” never gave the continent a chance of stability, with fresh outbreaks of war inevitable even after such crushing defeats as that at Austerlitz and Jena, especially when Britain was still pulling the strings from afar.

The opposition of Britain can be seen as a long term cause of Napoleon’s downfall, without directly forcing his defeat. The mere existence of Britain as a threat galled Napoleon throughout his regime; as early as 1803 he is quoted as having said “the English want war, but if they are the first to draw the sword I will be the last to sheath it”. This desire to destroy Britain would lead Napoleon first to plan an invasion of Britain, then to implement the Continental System and even to attempt invasions of Spain and Russia. These events, particularly the invasion of Russia, were serious misjudgements by Napoleon that ended in his own abdication and although not the sole reason for his invasions of Spain and Russia, the desire to subdue Britain cannot be ignored as a factor. Following the Battle of Trafalgar, Napoleon realised the only way to defeat Britain and the rest of Europe was to bring the “nation of shopkeepers” to its knees economically. The Continental System was intended to do this but without full cooperation across mainland Europe it would be ineffective. With France unable to provide the resources needed to properly enforce the blockade it was dependent on its allies and satellite states to aid them and police their own ports. Napoleon could not allow those that did not comply to go on dealing with the British, and the common solution to this was to either appoint a relative as ruler of the country or simply annex it. The existence of the Continental System is not a factor in Napoleon’s downfall in itself, but the actions Napoleon takes to secure the success of it are.

Napoleon’s wish to prevent Portugal from trading with Britain was a primary reason for invading the Iberian Peninsula. A further reason must be Napoleon’s ambition and expansionist aims, which many historians believe made his downfall inevitable right from the outset. Initially, Napoleon’s wars had been fought to secure what the French population saw as their natural boundaries, the Alps, the Rhine and the Pyrenees, which had received the support of the French people. However, as Jean Tulard puts it, “the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were imposed upon her” but as they “conformed to the logic of the revolutionary wars” they were accepted by French opinion. The Peninsular War saw the first deviation from this theme, it was more to do with Napoleon’s dynastic interests than an enlightenment for “black Spain”. Public opinion greeted the Spanish adventure coldly and it was one of the first signs of a rift between Napoleon and the ‘notables’. Furthermore, the defeats inflicted on the French by the combined British and Spanish armies served to weaken the Grande Armée in terms of personnel and morale. Prior to the losses in the Peninsula the Grande Armée had an image of invincibility, especially when commanded by Napoleon, but their activities in Spain undermined this, and showed the other continental powers that France could be beaten. It was a major factor in Austria taking up arms again in 1812 and gave them the confidence to take on Napoleon. The Grande Armée was drained massively by the “Spanish Ulcer” which had engaged 250,000 men by the time of the Russian Campaign in 1812 and it was at the beginning of a terminal decline. Esdaile points out in his book ‘The Wars of Napoleon’ that “amongst the rank and file, exposed as they were to appalling conditions and the ever-present risk of a horrible death [prisoners were often stoned to death or castrated], resentment and demoralisation grew apace”. The formidable force of the Grande Armée was just a shadow of its former self soon to be destroyed by Napoleon’s disastrous Russian campaign of 1812. At the same time as the Grande Armée was declining the forces of the other major powers were increasing in stature and morale. All gained confidence from the French defeats in Spain and the repetitive tactics of Napoleon could now be countered by able enemy generals. Austria in particular had completely reformed its armies after the humiliating defeats in 1801, appointing Archduke Charles to oversee their reorganization, adopting many of Napoleon’s tactics to improve their own fortunes.

A combination of these factors left Napoleon’s chances of success in Russia as very slim, especially when it was an act of desperation. “Napoleon did not embark on his last, most ambitious offensive in a spirit of confidence or enthusiasm, but from a feeling of frustration which the economic crisis of 1810-11 was rapidly turning into desperation”. The Russians failure to engage the French army early on in the campaign in any decisive battle forced Napoleon to march further and further into Russia in terrible weather conditions that reduced his force by 150,000 in the first two months. What followed was described by Tulard as “one of the greatest disasters in history” whilst Ellis describes it as “without doubt his greatest single miscalculation, one from which he never fully recovered”. It is clear to see why both of these historians believe the Russian campaign to be the greatest reason for Napoleon’s downfall. His Grande Armée was decimated, a mixed nation veteran fighting force of 700,000 men had been reduced to 80,000 with nothing achieved, the economic situation was worsening and public opinion was turning against Napoleon. Broers puts across a different point of view, that “although the Russian catastrophe should have been the end of Napoleonic hegemony…it was only the beginning of the process”. Broers places the turning point as the decision of Prussia to defect from Napoleon’s camp, which in turn persuades Alexander to march into Germany and accept Britain’s help, tipping “the military scales against Napoleon decisively”. This once again highlights Britain’s primary role against Napoleon as providing support for other countries’ offensives against France, rather than actual resistance from their forces.

Additionally, although Jean Tulard states that the Russian campaign was “the logical outcome of the Continental System” which in turn was created to defeat Britain, the opposition of Britain cannot be seen as the decisive factor in Napoleon’s downfall.

The progression of the 6th Coalition’s advances against Napoleon through his defeat at Leipzig and his eventual abdication in April 1814 can be seen as the time of finalising Napoleon’s defeat. Although it may be argued that Napoleon’s defeat was not inevitable after he had raised a new army of 200,000 men, the strength of numbers and resources brought to bear against him were simply too big to overcome. Napoleon did not abdicate from the throne in 1814 simply because of one defeat in battle, it was the combination of many various factors that brought the Napoleonic Empire to an end. In explaining the downfall of Napoleon, no one reason can be pinpointed as the most important, especially considering the degree of variation among historians’ views. The role of Britain is a vital one in bringing down Napoleon, especially as it remained the only constant threat to France, excepting the uneasy peace of Amiens, and persuade the other continental powers to repeatedly take up arms against Napoleon. The Continental System is a further long term cause, as it forces Napoleon into actions that proved disastrous for France and Napoleon’s own aspirations and sparked his downfall. The “Spanish Ulcer” drained much of France’s resources and caused a split between Napoleon and the bourgeois but would not have brought down Napoleon on its own. If one factor has to be isolated to most explain the turn around of Napoleon’s fortunes, it would have to be the Russian campaign, as it destroyed Napoleon’s forces whilst galvanising his opponents, but it was not until Russia gained British support that it actually advanced outside its own borders to defeat Napoleon. Britain is like a cancer on Napoleon’s empire, an ailment that Napoleon had no way to cure which constantly allowed the more potent scourges of Russia, Austria and Prussia to batter Napoleon’s defences until eventually he was too weak to continue; the Napoleonic Empire dead.