Under the Helsinki Accords more evidence cooperation can be found. The eastern nations wished to secure US recognition of European borders, and American saw this as an opportunity to extract concessions from Russia. Three main ‘baskets’ were agreed. The first involved confirmation of European borders. Although this met some resistance from American neo-conservatives, it was merely a confirmation of what had existed since the 1940s. The second involved trade agreements. The period of détente as a whole saw improvements in trade: in 1971 trade between the two superpowers was $67m, which rose to $470m in 1973. The Russians agreed to a third basket relating to human rights, and this represented notable cooperation in diplomatic relations with an otherwise immovable communist leadership.
Détente also brought new cultural and economic ties, and these undoubtedly aided cooperation. There were artistic and sporting exchanges and the western world was granted more access to Russia. Renewed economic links saw the USSR export oil and gas to the West, and technical experts exchanged. Further evidence included the joint space programme and the Apollo-Soyuz meeting, symbolic evidence of a closer, cooperative relationship during détente.
However, all the culminating evidence for cooperation is easily outweighed by the flaws within it, especially when compared with the evidence for ongoing conflict. Despite its apparent successes, SALT 1 failed to achieve its primary aim – to limit nuclear arms. The treaty failed to mention the new American multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and hence most nuclear weapons permitted were upgraded. There was also no range on long range bombers or satellite weapons. Nuclear stockpiles increased on both sides as a result. Under Nixon’s administration the Pentagon added 3 new warheads per day. By 1973 America had 6,000 warheads, to the Soviets 2,500. By 1977 America had 10,000 to the Soviets 4,000. Such restrictions were likened to ‘freezing the cavalry but not the tanks’. The public was submitted to a positive view of events. Nixon visited Moscow and Brezhnev visited Washington, with both sides promised to not take a unilateral advantage. However after meeting in Moscow, Nixon and Kissinger went to Iran, and offered the Shah unlimited access to US arms. The SALT I Treaty may have marked a significant step in cooperation in the sense that it was the first official agreement for years, but it did very little to address the tangible dangers and problems of the Cold War. Thus its cooperation did not have the capability to tackle the increasing risk of conflict.
As with its predecessor, SALT II was negated by loopholes and flaws, greatly limiting the cooperation brought about. It set limits on weapons, instead of introducing a production freeze. It omitted the development of new technology, including American Pershing II and Cruise missiles. It was signed by Carter as President, and the treaty’s eventual demise can be attributed to his unwillingness to meet the Russians halfway. By the time he signed it, in 1979, he had authorised the development of new missile technology and neutron bombs, and the USSR had accelerated production of the backfire bomber and SS-20 missiles. From 1978 to 1980, American warheads increased by 200 and Russia added 2,000 to their arsenal. This mathematically signals the failure of SALT II. It clearly failed to bring cooperation in any broader context than the frequency of meeting held between the US and the USSR. Carter was seen as weak on the communists, and as a result lost faith in the treaty. Instead he persuaded NATO to install Pershing II missiles in Western Europe as a response to Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe. NATO made a two-track decision to install missiles and continue talks. A similar problem ran throughout the decade on the part of decisions made by the two superpowers in these years. Despite never being ratified by the Senate after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the treaty’s terms were honoured until 1986. This invasion demonstrated SALT’s inability to prevent conflict and encourage cooperation.
The resulting conflict following the agreement of the third ‘basket’ in the Helsinki Accords overshadowed any progress made in cooperative trade. Predictably, the Russian politburo at the time decided to sign without the intention of following it through. This helped to heighten tensions, particularly as the US took to supporting Russian dissidents, who finally had something official to use against the party. Whilst Brezhnev saw the Accords as a way to gain support for his control, it provided the US with a justification for further conflict at the expense of cooperation; Soviet satellites had nowhere else to go but America when the Accords were not properly followed, bringing sufficient tension to US-Soviet relations to undermine any improvements made my baskets 1 and 2.
Along with nuclear arms statistics, another clear example of the lack of cooperation was the pursuit of wars by proxy. This was clearly demonstrated in Angola, the horn of Africa, Mozambique and particularly in the Yom Kippur War. Russia and the USSR had begun to see détente and the Cold War as identifiably separate, and that it was possible for the two to coexist. In the Yom Kippur war Russia supported Egypt and Syria whilst the US backed Israel. Whilst the USSR backed down following a US nuclear threat, there was a clear discrepancy between the rhetoric of the leaders and the activities of the military. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the most serious case of indirect war, and helped to kill détente by ending the possibility of further cooperation. Afghanistan was an important Russian buffer state after the Muslim uprising in Iran, and the CIA threatened to support an anti-soviet faction. Brezhnev sent troops in to counter this, and the President was more strident than expected towards the communists, funding Pakistan and the Mujahideen in opposition. After withdrawing from SALT II he encouraged a boycott of Moscow Olympics. By this point even diplomatic cooperation was out of the question. He increased arms spending, and his successor Ronald Reagan was elected mainly on campaign of anti-Russian policies. This brought the flawed period of détente, along with its unfulfilled aims of cooperation, to a close.
In conclusion, every significant agreement and treaty failed to effectively halt the arms race or fully discourage aggression or conflict. It introduced cooperation only in the most political and restrictively official terms. The arrival of Ronald Reagan and the situation in Afghanistan conclusively ended cooperation, and splits in the Communist bloc apparent then and would lead to its collapse. The failure of détente can be largely put down to problems from the start; the US misunderstood détente as simply a relaxation of tension whilst the Soviets considered the class war between communism and capitalism to be ongoing. Thus they never fully expected long lasting cooperation, explaining why it did not result. This is apparent in the insincere Russian acceptance of the third basket in the Helsinki accords. Whilst cooperation did improve economically and diplomatically, the very real threat of nuclear war did not fade during the 1970s. As such, détente’s flaws encouraged the development of indirect wars that merely opened a new channel (of conflict not of cooperation) during the Cold War.
by
fraghjar (student)
