How far did the reforms during the period 1826-39 contribute to the eventual fall of the Ottoman Empire?

The ‘Blessed Event’ was more revenge, than considered reform. As Cunningham notes, ‘years later a British general watched with his own eyes as the Sultan supervised workmen striking the Janissary bonnets off gravestones in a Pera burial-ground’. Goodwin substantiating Cunningham’s argument states: ‘Janissary headstones, topped by the cocky turban of the order, were knocked over’. Claims of acts of vengeance are supported by the eye-witness account of British Dragoman, Bartolomeo Pisani: Every corrner of the town is searched and every Janissary officer that is caught is conducted to the Grand Vizier and by him ordered to death [...]’.

The 1826 Janissary purge paved the way for further reform; without the Janissaries, the conservatives were powerless, and in a state of disarray. The abolition of the Janissaries impacted significantly upon Ottoman society. Suraiya Farooqhi et al propose that in Constantinople, the destruction of the Janissary corps had economic and social, as well as political implications: ‘in Istanbul [Constantinople] and many other cities, the Janissaries had played a crucial role in the Ottoman urban economy’. According to Maksudoğlu, ‘many shopkeepers held paid Janissary posts’. 

The Anglo-Turkish Convention (1838) abolished protectionist policies. Charlotte Jirousek, an expert in consumption studies, agrees that the convention ‘formally established a policy of free trade and removed the longstanding protections on domestic manufacturers.’ Suraiya Farooqhi et al argue that the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention ‘eliminated state monopolies and removed many of the barriers in the way of European merchants’. The convention had a devastating impact on Ottoman manufacturers and craftsmen, Mansel agrees that the convention ‘opened the empire to a flood of British goods and ruined many Ottoman crafts’.

The destruction of the Janissary corps (1826) and the Anglo-Turkish Convention (1838) further integrated Ottoman and European economies, just as the 1839 Tanzimat decree more closely aligned the Middle Eastern with Western political structures. Mansel argues, ‘it was the Sultan’s reason and his determination to save his monarchy, which drove him to modernise’. Ahmad suggests that the reformers ‘had become more convinced that the empire’s penetration by industrial Europe and its absorption into the expanding world market was the only way for the empire to survive and prosper’. Though a valid argument, attempting to achieve absorption into the world market without first addressing pressing domestic social concerns deemed the economic reforms counter-productive. Mansel agrees, as a result of the 1838 treaty, ‘beggars became more common on the streets of the city [Constantinople]’. 

Glenny cites a failure to industrialise as a principle cause behind the empire’s collapse. Though his argument is understandable, it isn’t entirely accurate. There were attempts to industrialise, in so far as to mirror European industrial development. According to Mansel, the phrases ‘English standards’ and ‘European standards’ were constantly recurring in official letters. The Armenian Dardian dynasty was central to the Ottoman industrialisation process. Hovhannes Amira Dardian, an international entrepreneur visited England and France at government expense to study the latest industrial techniques and to purchase steam engines. In November 1831, the first Ottoman newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events), or Moniteur Ottoman was printed in both Ottoman and French editions. Disagreement between Glenny and Mansel ought not to be seen as a weakness in my argument since Glenny is focusing specifically on the Ottoman guild system and not on general industrialisation.

Between 1826 and 1839 the Ottoman Empire struggled to control key provinces; Kinross describes the empire as continuing ‘to shrink in extent, retaining despite decay its internal organs while losing through disruption its outlying limbs’. Though, Maksudoğlu argues that ‘European powers decided to end Osmanli suzerainty over Greece’. Disagreement between Kinross and Maksudoğlu may be more apparent than real, since Maksudoğlu, as he confesses, is founding his assertions primarily on Ottoman sources. European influence proved pivotal in inciting the territories to rise up against Ottoman governance. The War of Independence exposed the weaknesses of the Sultan’s reforms. As Mansel agrees, ‘the Sultan’s reforms did not help the Ottoman Empire in its’ struggle against the Greek revolt’.

The War of Greek Independence began 25 March 1821 and is certainly one of the central elements in bringing about the case for reform. The War of Greek Independence, though initially taking the form of a Greek cultural renaissance, was in fact an attempt by the Greeks to actively destabilize the Ottoman Empire; as Glenny suggests: ‘the Greek rebellions of 1821 were not spontaneous reactions to deteriorating social and economic circumstances’. 

By June 1827, after six years of war, the Ottoman’s under the leadership of the commander Reshid Pasha, succeeded in subjugating continental Greece, this ought to have signalled the end of the war, instead occupation of mainland Greece prompted British, French, and Russian intervention; the Russians, in particular, put immense pressure on the Ottomans. Maksudoğlu, strengthening the line of argument, argues that the Russians were guilty of inciting the Greeks to revolt’. The Austrians under Metternich favoured the suppression of the rebellious Greeks. The British, encouraged by the ambassador Sir Stratford Canning, fought the Ottoman government. According to Mansel, in an effort to persuade the Ottoman government to recognise Greece, European ambassadors, who felt physically threatened in Constantinople, left for the island of Poros between December 1827 and June 1829. 

On 20 October 1827, the Ottoman fleet was completely obliterated at the Battle of Navarino. The support of British, French and Russian navies for the Greeks insurgents violated the 1827 Treaty of London in which the three great powers had committed themselves to securing an armistice between the Greeks and the Ottomans, ‘without taking part in the hostilities between contending parities’. The British, as suggested by Glenny, were ‘egged on by the philhellenic sentiments of Sir Stratford Canning’. Kinross agrees: ‘the great powers, the rival expansionist empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia, intrigued from behind their adjoining frontiers, marking out spheres of influence, stirring up satellites, and preparing to move when the moment was ripe’. The great powers crucially interfered in the affairs of the Ottoman provinces, destabilising the empire. Agreement between Glenny and Kinross reinforces the argument.

In 1832, the Ottoman Army was convincingly defeated in Syria by Mehmet Ali’s Egyptian army led by his son, Ibrahim Pasha. The Sultan’s new army made up initially of ex-Janissaries, proved just as ineffective. Kinross describes the Sultan’s new troops as being ‘not yet a match for so practiced an enemy’. Marshal Marmont, a former marshal of Napoleon I and Charles X proclaimed: ‘they are not troops; they are a reunion of men the character of whose general appearance is a miserable and humiliated air. It is clear that they are aware of their weakness’. Agreement between Kinross and Marshal Marmont strengthens the argument that the 1826 Janissary purge was, to a large extent, a failure. The Sultan succeeded in getting rid of the Janissaries, but failed to effectively replace them. As Count Helmuth von Moltke, who in 1835 was brought from Prussia to train the army, put it: ‘it was indispensable for him... to clear the site before setting up his own building. [...] The first part of his great task the Sultan carried through with perspicacity and resolution; in the second he failed’.

From the outset, Mehmet Ali was a thorn in the side of the Sublime Porte, as Kinross put it, he was the Sultan’s ‘menacing vassal’. The Sultan was forced to turn to the Ottoman’s traditional enemies, the Russians. According to Kinross, this was because British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, who at the time was pursuing a policy of retrenchment of his armed forces, rejected his plea for aid. Though on the other hand, Lord Ponsonby is said to have accused the Sultan of ‘throwing his crown into the lap of the Emperor Nicholas’ and reminded him of the power of the British to stop the Russians and Mehmet Ali. In 1840 the British forced Ibrahim Pasha from Syria and bombarded Alexandria. Mehmet Ali pulled his troops out of Crete and Arabia and accepted the hereditary governorship of Egypt.

By 1839 the Ottoman Empire had significantly deteriorated. The Tanzimat decrees (1839) were issued in exchange for support in Egypt. As Goodwin argues, ‘in 1839, in return for the powers putting pressure on Mehmet Ali to accept hereditary governorship of Egypt, he issued [...] a reformist charter’. Kinross describes the reforms beginning in 1839 as ‘nothing less than the transformation of Turkey from a medieval empire, based on the principles of Islam into a modern constitutional state, based equally on the secular principles of the West.’ The assertions of both Goodwin and Kinross strengthen my argument; the Tanzimat issued in secular principles, although it was promulgated in order to receive foreign support in Egypt.

Western powers used the artificial doctrine of nationalism as a means by which to incite the non-Muslim citizens of the empire to rebel against the Government. As Goodwin put it, ‘nationalism was a pretence’. My argument is strengthened by Maksudoğlu,  et al, and in part, by Glenny. Kinross adds, ‘inspired by nationalist feelings, they sought to break free of the empire and carve up the country between them’. According to Goodwin, the Philhellenic movement is often accredited with being responsible for revitalising the Greek spirit and alerting the western governments to the suffering of the empire’s Greek Christians. This argument is both misleading and certainly untrue. The majority of the Philhellenes were more driven by personal greed than by a desire to see Greek independence; all observers, both Greek and non-Greek, exempt Lord Byron from this criticism. Glenny also points out that: ‘Turkish rule over parts of Greece was no longer viable’. The tributes paid to Byron after his death, by both European politicians and literary figures ‘pressured the British government to adopt a more interventionist stance’. 

Most historians agree that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was in the best interests of the great powers. According to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, ‘barbarous as it is; Turkey forms in the system of Europe a necessary part’. Wellington declared: ‘The Ottoman Empire stands not for the benefit of the Turks but of Christian Europe’. A Russian secret government committee in 1828 came to the conclusion that ‘the advantages of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire outweigh its disadvantages’ (since it would probably be replaced by powers under influence of Britain or France). In the context of nineteenth century Europe, the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was a necessity for the great powers, but only in the sense that it was essential that the empire didn’t come under rival control. The agreement between Castlereagh and Wellington focuses specifically on retaining the balance of power, and not on preserving the empire as a goal in and of itself.

In conclusion, the reforms passed in the period 1826-1839 significantly contributed to the empire’s collapse. Although the Janissary purge, as argued by Ahmad and Mansel, was necessary as they were no longer effective; without them, the Sultan was allowed to accumulate debt unhindered. Debt led to inflation, soaring food prices and general discontent. The ulema, fearing similar treatment [as the Janissaries] were forced to remain silent. The Janissary purge failed to cure the problem of an ineffective army, and merely served to avenge the acts of disorder carried out by the corps. Without the Janissaries, and with the ulema now impotent, there was no defence against harmful reform e.g. the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention flooded the empire with British goods and ruined many Ottoman manufacturers, other reforms, though not necessarily harmful, proved nevertheless ineffective. As Kinross points out ‘by Metternich and others [...] [they] were cynically dismissed as an essay in window dressing’. If it were not for the Janissary Purge, then it is possible that the empire would have been in a better position to defend itself against foreign intervention and the Sultan’s excesses.

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