However, the emergence of Germany as an industrial power and an imperially ambitious rival was of far greater concern to the British. The way in which Bismarck chaired and dictated the Berlin Conference of 1884 seemed to signal the arrival of a new aggressive German foreign policy. Witnesses at the conference stated that the Germans looked prepared to annex any territory available to them. British East Africa, which had long been regarded as having limited economic importance soon became crucial as a buffer to German influence spreading towards Egypt from Tanganyika. Similar motivations led to Rosebery’s conviction that the British could not abandon Uganda in the early 1890’s. Bulow’s declaration of a ‘weltpolitik’ signalled German intentions to play a major role in the affairs of Africa and their disregard for spheres of influence helped to lead to the outbreak of the Second Boer War as the British sought to protect the route to India around the Cape, whilst ensuring her dominance and control of Southern Africa. Ultimately though, the importance of these strategic concerns can easily be traced back to their links to economic factors. Germany was by the 1880s surpassing Britain as an industrial power and dominated 22.5% of the world’s steel production in comparison with Britain’s 19.8% share. It was therefore vital that the British prevented Germany from increasing this economic dominance by defending her colonial interests. In this way the issue of strategy was fundamentally linked to the importance of economics as an imperative for British expansion.
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher have supported this idea further, arguing that the British preferred informal control but were often forced to take formal control as a result of local crises. The need to safeguard the Suez Canal and thus the trade route to India is explained as the cause of the occupation of Egypt and ultimately as a catalyst for the Scramble for Africa. Britain had seen Egypt’s reliance on Europe for economic support as being enough to maintain the security of the country. After Disraeli’s acquisition of shares in the canal though, financed by the Rothschild family, it was impossible for the British to remain a passive observer when the khedive’s authority collapsed in the face of nationalist riots. With 2250 of the 2727 ships using the canal in 1881 being British it is clear just how important this link between the West and the Orient was for the British. It similarly highlights the inseparable link between economic and strategic imperatives. The British occupation of the Sudan, seen as the weak underbelly of Egypt, accentuates this further, with economic and strategic investments in Egypt being secured further as a result.
However strong the case may be for the importance of strategic imperatives, where they are at their most compelling is when they are intrinsically linked to economic imperatives. The British saw Africa as a continent of unfulfilled economic potential, and one that could alleviate domestic economic problems brought about by the ‘Long Depression.’ The Depression had led to the promotion of tariffs (erected by Russia in 1877 and France in 1878) and the abandonment of free trade in Europe. Africa, thus, represented a new, captive market to manipulate. As the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has stated, economic expansion into Africa was dictated by economic pressures at home and the need to find an outlet for the mass of manufactured goods that the Industrial Revolution had made possible. Indeed the expansion was made possible through the innovations of the Industrial Revolution. Hobsbawm described the Gatlin gun, machine gun, the telegraph, the railway and the steamship as the ‘tools of Empire’ and provided an impetus to seize territory in Africa which had been lacking previously. This mutually advantageous link between the metropole and periphery was augmented through the discovery of many natural resources around the continent, many of which were required as raw materials in the factories across Britain. Palm oil, wild rubber and ivory were crucial to the manufacturing of consumer goods in Britain and thus of key importance in explaining the expansion of British control across the continent.
Although placing the emphasis on a far more capitalist focus, Cain and Hopkins have similarly identified economic factors as being the main driving force behind British expansion. They cite the influence of ‘Gentlemanly Capitalists’, operating in the social circles as politicians as encouraging greater formal expansion in order to protect the massive investments they had made in Africa. They have stated that it was as a result of these pressures and the need to protect his own sizeable investments that Gladstone was forced to reluctantly occupy Egypt in 1882. Economic pressures though were not just domestic. Concession hunters frequently took advantage of Africa’s economic potential and vulnerability for their own benefit and often forced British officials to take responsibility for previously ignored regions. These ‘wild, seedy adventurers’ were frequently able to exploit African tribesmen such as King Mbandzeni of the Swaziland who conceded the total land of his kingdom and sold all of his private revenues to John Harrington for the small sum of £12,000 a year in 1889. On a far greater scale, but often no less scrupulous, the mineral magnates in South Africa were extremely keen to see the expansion of British control. Cecil Rhodes in particular was a central figure in advocating this British economic expansion, stating that ‘the colonies would also provide a dumping ground for the surplus goods produced in our factories.’
The need to construct a framework of legitimacy for expansion led to the British relying on a humanitarian pretence. The reality is that these humanitarian motivations acted as a veneer to justify British expansion into Africa. Britain aimed to Anglicize Africa and ‘spread light over the dark continent.’ Egypt was upheld as proof of the success of this British civilizing mission, with Arthur Balfour praising the record of Lord Cromer in raising Egypt to stand ‘absolutely alone in its propensity, financial and moral.’ The reality was that British interest in the civilizing mission was minimal in comparison with a British hunger to dominate the capital of the country and notably the Suez Canal. Whilst some individuals such as Mary Kingsley and David Livingstone really believed in the civilizing mission, British politicians saw it as a convenient justification for economic and strategic expansion.
The Scramble for Africa was therefore the culmination of many different considerations. Humanitarian motives played a small part in the minds of British politicians, how ultimately used the civilizing mission as justification for economic exploitation. In contrast with this strategic imperatives were most important for encouraging the British to extend their influence in Africa. However, apart from the over-zealous land grabbing carried out as an expression of power, these strategic imperatives were usually related to the protection of trade routes, essential for financial profit. In this way money can be seen as the largest driving force in compelling the British to expand into Africa between 1870 and 1902. Strategic imperatives and to a lesser degree humanitarian motives helped to give these economic motives legitimacy.
