The US foreign policy becoming more assertive implies that the origins of the Cold War did in fact owe much to the role of personalities, as this decision was influenced by others besides Truman, namely George Kennan in his Long Telegram and Churchill in his Iron Curtain Speech. In an influential telegram of 8,000 words from the Moscow Embassy to Washington in February 1946, George Kennan described Russia as ‘more dangerous and insidious than ever before’ and stated that inherent conflict existed between the two superpowers which could only be stopped by force. According to historian Daniel Yergin the telegram was heavily influenced by ‘Riga axioms’: anti-Bolshevik, upper class intelligentsia based in Riga. George Kennan’s motives were also questionable as following the telegram he became very well known in Washington and was promoted. Revisionist historian William Williams further challenges the validity of his writings and suggests that the telegram unfairly exaggerated the Russian threat, stating that it ‘spawned a vast literature which treated Stalin as no more than a psychotic’ and ‘created imaginary foreign dangers in order to stay in power at home’. Paradoxically, Kennan also criticized anti-communism describing it is ‘hysterical’ and opposed US attempts to re-arm and American intervention in Korea suggesting that his views were inconsistent, flawed and not, therefore, a source which Truman should have considered reliable and used as inspiration for US Foreign Policy.
Churchill, on the 5th March 1946 delivered a speech at Fulton in the US state of Missouri, which confirmed American fears and prejudices in his warning that communism presented a threat to capitalist countries. It demanded firmer action by the West and called for an alliance between Britain and America in order to prevent Soviet expansion. The speech had limited influence, however, as Attlee had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister. Attlee did share Churchill’s views though and later thanked him as, despite being Socialist, he strongly disagreed with Stalin’s policies and was suspicious of his motives. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was also of the same opinion and made numerous attempts to convince the US of the threat Russian presented to Iran and Eastern Europe and secure further aid from them. Truman was present when the speech was delivered, which mirrored his own views and his Iron Fist approach. As well as confirming capitalist suspicions it received a furious response in Moscow and Stalin accused Churchill of being a ‘warmonger’, which both damaged US-Soviet relations and demonstrated the significance of personalities in the Cold War.
The influence of these personalities resulted in US Foreign Policy being more assertive: it aimed to actively prevent the spread of Communism, which they termed ‘containment’. This lead to relations deteriorating, as shown by the lack of co-operation during Potsdam Conference, which was held in July-August 1945 between Attlee, Truman and Stalin. While held in order to ease tension, it in fact did the opposite as Russia was only given 10% of all zones as part of the reparations agreements, despite making the heaviest sacrifices during the war. The decision to de-militarise, de-natzify, de-industrialise, de-centralise and democratise Germany further alienated Russia as these principles conflicted with Communist ideology. Furthermore, Truman mentioned the successful testing of the atomic bomb in the USA, a programme which the Soviets had been excluded from, but neglected to inform Stalin of his decision to drop the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, which devastated two thirds of the city and killed over 70,000 people, a mere four days after the final day of the conference.
The Potsdam Conference emphasised how relations had hardened since the February 1945 Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, where the Allied Control Commission had been set up giving all three countries (and France) an equal role and Russia’s border with Poland had been altered and accepted. As the ideologies remained constant and only the people involved had changed, this strongly suggests that the cold war owed a great deal to personalities. However, it is arguable that tension had increased in part due to agreements made at the Yalta Conference. Germany had been unfairly divided and disagreements regarding resources seemed inevitable, and the Declaration on Liberated Europe was based on ‘democratic means’ which demonstrated a clear bias towards Capitalist ideals which would anger the Russians. The terms of both were later broken: the US announced in May 1946 that the US would suspend reparation payments; and the Russians breached the Declaration on Liberated Europe through vote rigging, use of terror, delaying elections in Poland, Romania and Hungary and the 1948 coup d’état in Czechoslovakia. This again is evidence to suggest that the Cold War did not owe little to personalities, as Roosevelt’s legacy had provoked tension in the future.
Furthermore, while US-Soviet relations were at their worst during the presidency of Truman, the seeds of disagreement had been sown long ago by the actions of others, such as Roosevelt and Churchill’s reluctance to open a second front against Germany in France which would distract the Germans from the Russian Front and relieve pressure on the Soviets. This meant that the already paranoid Stalin understandably stopped trusting Britain and the US and believed that the West wanted to use Hitler to defeat Communism. Considering Truman’s comments during his Vice-Presidency that ‘If we see that Germany is winning the War we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning we should help Germany, and in that way, let them kill as many as possible’, Stalin’s suspicions were correct. Furthermore, the US believed that Stalin was a monolith and wrongly blamed him for the Communist takeover in China and the 1946 Greek Civil War. This suggests that although relations between the Russians and Americans did deteriorate due to impact of personalities, inherent tension between Capitalism and Communism existed due to a fundamental lack of understanding.
To conclude, conflict between Capitalism and Communism was inevitable as both sides regard their ideas as morally superior and the inherent instabilities of a Capitalist economy would provoke expansion. This was demonstrated by the American failure to recognise the Soviet’s sphere of influence in their desire to create markets in Europe and Asia when they feared a post-war recession. During the World War America and Russia were obliged to co-operate, but once this was no longer the case both superpowers were drawn into a power vacuum as the economic devastation of Europe presented the opportunity to impose their ideology on a European, or even global, scale. This view is supported by Orthodox historian Arthur Schlesinger who states that ‘The Cold War was at heart an ideological confrontation...Ideological tensions grew especially in the wake of World war Two and events in Europe’. Ideology was at the root of the Cold war, but the personalities of the leaders were a reflection of the countries they presided over and consequently did contribute towards an increase in tension, such as the US belief in the monolith which led them to unfairly blame Stalin for the Revolution in China. Furthermore, US-Soviet relations changed according to who was in power: Stalin and Roosevelt were able to compromise and co-operate (although many of his actions did provoke future conflict after his presidency) whereas Stalin and Truman were not. Therefore the origins of the Cold War owed most to the ideological differences of the two superpowers, but the role personalities was not insignificant.
