Mosley’s third major flaw was that his political strategy was inconsistent and not at all well thought out. This inconsistency was demonstrated by Mosley’s complete change of direction from the early 1930s to the later 1930s. In the early 1930s, Mosley’s strategy involved public meetings, paramilitary activity and propaganda with the intention of increasing the momentum of British fascism and creating a violent crisis from which the BUF could arise as Britain’s saviour. However, following the disastrous Olympia meeting of 1934 the BUF strategy changed, placing much less emphasis on paramilitary activity and instead concentrating on electoral strategy. This complete change of direction could have been confusing to potential supporters of the BUF.
More important than Mosley’s flaws, however, was the economic and political context. The impact of war had a great effect on the way in which fascism rose in Europe. In Germany and Italy there was an intensely nationalistic mood. In Italy this was the case because at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles she was sideline, when initially she had been promised huge territorial gains. Italy had lost a larger proportion of the population than Britain and had been engaged in a mountain war just as horrible as the Western front. This became known as the ‘mutilated peace.’ Germany had an intensely nationalistic mood due to the loss of the war and the huge losses made at Versailles. In Britain, there was no heightened sense of nationalistic feeling as Britain has won the war. There were psychological effects, but this did not take the form of nationalism because Britain was not defeated, her empire remained fully intact and in fact, her imperial position was actually strengthened, making territorial gains in the Middle East and South Africa. Externally, this made Britain look stronger than ever (although internally the empire was beginning to fall apart); Britain’s world influence was at a zenith.
The economic factor in the failure of the BUF, rather than its leader’s flaws or other external factors, was the most crucial factor. There are three main economic factors. The first was that the economic conditions in Britain were simply not severe enough to be conducive to a rise in fascist support. Undoubtedly, there was an economic crisis in Britain, however this crisis was nowhere near as severe as the European crises that occurred in which fascism was able to succeed. In Italy there was suffering during the transition from war to peace. During the ‘bennio rosso’ (the two red years) there were large scale military socialist acts and chaos in the industrial cities. Germany from 1929-1933 faced massive economic collapse like never before, the crisis was out of control making the country appear ungovernable. In both cases there was genuine fear among the middle classes that their respective country was about to fall to communism. This fear was simply not present in Britain. Clearly there was a UK economic crisis, but the most severe conditions were localised. Furthermore, from 1932, the British economy began to recover. Areas such as Romford and Ilford had a huge house building boom bringing with it a sense of prosperity. There was new industry too, for example, a new car plant at Dagenham.
Also, there is the fact that the BUF was founded too late. The BUF was founded in 1932, by which time the depression had already bottomed out and things were beginning to get better. In early 1932, unemployment peaked at just under three million according to official figures (although this may well be inaccurate). Therefore, the party could not take full advantage of any desperation that was present.
The economic factor in the failure of fascism was the most important factor, although this has been disputed. The historian Alan Sykes argues that the political factor is the most important. He states that ‘there was a point in the first half of the 1930s at which the British economy appeared to be in sufficient trouble to threaten social and political instability.’ Although in reality the situation was never as serious as Sykes suggests with safety features, such as the dole, preventing great unrest within the working class. Furthermore, he states that ‘it was during this time that fascism achieved its peak membership,’ but this is wrong. By this time, the BUF had barely been created; it was in fact formed after the depression had bottomed out. The economic factor was the more important for two main reasons. Firstly, because the political factors were to some degree dependant on the economic position. Had there been a complete economic meltdown it is highly possible that the Communist Party would have gained more support. Another reason was the political culture. There was a political culture in Britain. Belief in ‘British’ values of tolerance, non-violence and respect for the constitution was also dependant on the economic situation. Had the circumstances been as severe as in Germany, it is possible that the opposition to violence would have disappeared. In Germany there had also been a strong political culture, but the loathing of violence disappeared in the depths of the depression.
Despite this, the political factors were nonetheless important. There were two political reasons why the BUF was unable to succeed. Firstly, in Italy and Germany there was always a fear that the country was about to fall to communism, but again, this fear was not present in Britain. The Communist Party in Britain was a negligible and inconsequential force which at its peak had less than 18000 members. In Germany there was an acute economic crisis and Nazi propaganda led to ‘panic in the Mittelstand.’ Support for communism in Britain only grew during the Spanish Civil War; the economic crisis had no effect on Communist support. The Communist Party was useless at targeting the discontented whereas Labour Trade Unions were effective at doing so. Therefore, it was not plausible for Mosley to generate a ‘Red Menace’ alarm. There were several features of Britain which prevented the Communist Party of Great Britain from gaining support. Firstly, if people were badly hit by the depression, public welfare was available. In 1911 the National Insurance Act had been introduced, which involved the employer, the employee and the state each putting a certain amount of money into the National Insurance fund which would grant benefits for a fixed period of time in the event of unemployment. ‘The dole’ was not generous but it allowed people to retain a sense of self respect. It was sufficient for little more than basis subsistence but it prevented complete desperation. Public welfare in Germany and the USA was nowhere near as generous. As the unemployed did not face destitution, they were much less likely to turn to communism. Secondly, young people (often the most active supporters of extremism), moved to look for work, particularly to the South East of England to the areas in which prosperity was returning, moving from their home patches and avoiding becoming embroiled in extremist politics. Therefore, the middle classes were not worried that the country was about to fall. Also, in the worst affected areas, unemployment was no new problem. For several years, Britain had been facing structural unemployment. This is when one industrial process supersedes another due to technological changes or a permanent fall in the demand for a product causing long term unemployment. Structural unemployment had hit coal, iron and ship building industries particularly badly since the 1920s. The areas in which these industries had been most prominent were also the areas worst hit by the depression, the result being general apathy as they had been facing unemployment since the 1920s.
Secondly, Mosley could not play the ‘Red Peril’ card with the Labour Party claiming that labour where the main threat from the left. This would have been completely implausible as Labour was a moderate political party with no revolutionary feelings. It even banned Communists from the party and shunned any affiliation with militant socialists. Labour had not supported the General Strike of 1926 and during its periods in government in 1924 and 1931 it had not done anything radical at all. Also, Labour was too weak to be dangerous. The party had only advanced at the expense of the Liberals and even so, it had not advanced spectacularly. Even when there was a Labour government (1924, 1929-31) it was still a minority. In 1931 Labour became weaker because of a split. This was catastrophic for the party as it brought their advance to a halt and they fell from office.
Thirdly, there is the argument of the distinctiveness of the British national character. However, it is debatable as to how important this is as a factor. D.S Lewis suggests that ‘it is as well to dispense at the outset with the popular myth that fascism was eliminated by the moderation and toleration of the British character, or culture.’ This argument can be supported by the fact that there were acts of violence in twentieth-century Britain, for example, the Tonypandy incident where there was fighting between miners and police. Although this may well be true to a certain extent, states do have a political culture and indeed Britain has its distinctive features. It is true that Britain’s political arrangements were the product of several hundred years of evolutionary change and the assumption at the time was that Britain’s political system worked effectively thus making people willing to stick with the system with the expectation that it would pull through. Also, both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party had very deep roots in British society and therefore could claim to be national as opposed to sectional. The Conservative Party, although having started off for the Conservative sections of the landowning class, had under Peel and Disraeli opened its doors to new social groups and from 1885 the Party was the dominant force in British politics. Also, when Baldwin was the leader of the party, he reinforced the image of moderation. Likewise, Labour was also a moderate party who even after the 1931 split was able to retain the majority of working class support ensuring that Mosley was unable to attract it.
A less important point, but nonetheless a factor in the failure of fascism, was the response of the British government to the BUF. Following the Battle of Cable Street, the government passed the Public Order Act of 1936, giving police the power to ban marches and all marches had to take place with the permission of the police. It also outlawed the wearing of paramilitary uniform in public. This knocked back Mosley’s plan of marches. It showed the government was capable of robust and decisive action. This not a key cause as it came late in Fascism’s life.
In conclusion, although Mosley’s failings and errors were a key reason for the failure of fascism in Britain, there were more important factors. Namely, the resilience of the British political system, more importantly, the economic conditions in Britain and less importantly, but a factor nonetheless, the response of the British government.
