Since Britain had become a debtor nation following the end of the war it was clear that the only way to cope in the face of the economic reality was to cut military expenditure. Less than one tenth of the army remained by 1920, which was largely responsible by the eradication of conscription. Seventy five percent of the mere 300,000 remaining army was devoted to the empire. The army was reduced to a small force obligated to the maintaining of home security and to policing the newly formed empire. Military spending was reduced from £692 million to £115 million within 2 years and did not rise again until 1935. Retrenchment meant that military commitments were simply too costly to consider. Retrenchment was justified by the employment of the Ten-Year rule which stated ‘that the British Empire will not be engaged in and great war during the next ten years’. The policy was criticized not for its initial enstatement but for its annual renewal which meant that by the mid 1930’s when it was time to rearm Britain was technologically ‘ancient’ and productively inefficient. The ten year plan is a very significant indication of Britains unwillingness to form any continental commitments in the post war period.
At home, continental commitments were seen as very unpopular for the central reason that it was because of continental commitments in the first place that sparked off continental tensions that eventually lead to war and obvious disaster on a global scale. A system of alliances which may have reduced Britain’s imperial alliances was unrealistic because such arrangements were blamed for causing the war in 1914. It was then believed in the 1920’s that a more productive way of dealing with economic problems and increased imperial responsibilities was to rely on collective security. It was felt that this method would maintain the peace better that the old method which entailed alliances and meant that Britain would not have to commit to France because French security would be guaranteed by the League of Nations. The league is very popular with Britain as Britain no longer has to maintain its illusionary power status and protect other nations. Disarmament and collective security seemed a very productive idea but obviously did not function to the desired effect as no nation willingly wanted to sacrifice its entire armed forces. Britain saw the League of Nations as the perfect way to stay clear from having to make any Military or Financial commitments. Britain felt as though they had been dragged into the war because of alliances and it was not prepared to make any more. It would not ally with France when the French called for a military alliance to deter any future German uprising. Britain rejected this alliance as it felt it went against its National interest to do so. On the other hand however, despite Britain’s determination to avoid continental commitments was undermined by joining and becoming a potent member of the League of Nations, as by merely being a member it is continentally committed to all the other members of the League. The League was fundamentally flawed from its birth based on its exclusion of major world nations and lack of actual power in achieving its aims. However the pure fact that Britain was so eager to join the League of Nations is another clear indication of the unwillingness to form any continental alliances and in a way dilute the power between the nations that it was believed Britain had after the war. Britain faced a lot of problems due to its illusionary status and becoming a member signifies Britains willingness to step out of the continental limelight and share responsibility with other nations.
It can be seen there was a very strong opposition to any military commitments however there was not quite so much opposition when it came to Financial and Diplomatic commitment during the 1920’s.
The Dawes plan of August 1924 was a significant example of continental commitment. The Dawes plan was implemented to help Germany pay off the huge sum of reparations. Systems of loans were set up involving the USA, which helped Germany pay off the debt more easily. Britain was in favour of this as it helped Germany get back on its feet which was necessary to Britain’s trading possibilities and by 1924 both the British people and government realised that the Versailles treaty had been too harsh and that a economically viable Germany was needed not a bitter unwilling country, useless to Britain’s trading expectations.
The financial commitment of the Dawes Plan and diplomatic commitment in the League of Nations was very necessary for Britain and was definitely in the National interest. The financial commitment of the Dawes plan was also necessary because of the reduced funds put into the British military and the reduction in size. Britain could not risk war breaking out so it was important to appease Germany and the Dawes plan was the first step of appeasement by making it easier for them to pay off the reparations. These commitments were therefore necessary and in the national interest as they were making pacifism possible and enabling Britain to remain uncommitted to the continent in a military sense.
The Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 entailed 15 nations initially agreeing to renounce war as a legitimate weapon for a nation which then attracted the support of 40 more nations which then pledged there support by signing up. This pact was another instance of Britain’s involvement where Britain was diplomatically committed to the continent but it was again in the national interest and involved helping Britain in creating a strong front against military commitments. This was another form of defence that was needed during a period of which Britain relied on other continents being as weak militarily as Britain itself was, and it again enabled further concentration on domestic issues without worry of war breaking out.
The Locarno treaty of October 1925 is further evidence to continental commitment in the diplomatic sense but there is also financial commitment and even military commitments that must be noted. The Locarno Treaty was a security pact signed by Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Belgium. In the treaty Germany agreed to accept the western frontiers laid down at Versailles as well as the de-militarization of the Rhineland. It was a multi lateral agreement and all powers agreed that any aggressor would be attacked by the other nations, this was a firm military commitment however Britain refused to have any commitment over Germany’s eastern borders. Despite there being total continental commitment as far as the western borders were concerned it was done in the national interest. The British people were delighted with the treaty they had not got involved with anything to do with Eastern Europe, Franco- German cold war had been ended which meant there was less risk of an outbreak in war and therefore less need for a strong military which Britain didn’t have.
All in all it is fair to conclude that there was significant opposition to continental commitments coming from the public and the Government. These international alliances inflicted memories of the war that was begun as a cause of these commitments. The Government was simply more concerned with recovery and recuperation in the post war years, but however much Britain tried to isolate itself from the rest of Europe and nations, it seemed the more it was being pulled into international affairs that weren’t directly related to Britain’s problems. Some commitments were made due to sheer necessity and others because they were thought to be generally beneficial to Britain’s interests. The certainty is however, that regardless of all opposition, these commitments were unsurpassable and eventually lead to rearmament into the mid thirties, a goal one of the commitments was meant to eradicate.
