It was Trotsky that crushed the Kronstadt Rebellion with brute force. Many men died as a result of his tactics. Born Lev Bronstein, he was born in to a Jewish land owning family in the Ukraine in 1897. A gifted child, he was quick to learn foreign languages and showed great interest in Russian and European culture. As left opposition to Stalin, Trotsky had great intellectual strength, which he was keen to let others know about. He was therefore seen as very arrogant. This arrogance is displayed no better than when he considered himself as “A key player” concerning revolution. He is also very contentious of Stalin, stating, “He is a grey blur”. He believed himself to be Lenin’s equal and perhaps didn’t attend Lenin’s funeral because he did not see his passing as that significant: as a more orthodox Marxist and former Menshevik, Trotsky saw history as being shaped by economic forces, not individuals. However, to many he represented a very dangerous prospect. His control of the Red Army made him a hero to his men, but other members of the politburo, students of the French Revolution to a man, saw him as a Bonaparte figure ready to seize power my military coup. The crushing of the Kronstadt Rebellion reinforced this Bonaparte image. In Trotsky’s defence he testified that NEP was wrong as so many men had died and thus compromise was wrong yet still his arrogance was the overriding factor and led to his destruction. Stalin and Trotsky differed in all senses of the word, perhaps due to their different upbringings – Stalin, in his childhood days, experienced first hand Russtification and rural unfairness of Tsarist Russia whereas Trotsky was schooled well and educated. Stalin supported Communism and the new N.E.P, and greatly believed that that socialism in one country was the way forward. The split gave Stalin the basis from which he could rise to power yet Trotsky’s attitude was his own undoing and Stalin simply took advantage.
As well as Trotsky, Stalin had another major opponent in becoming leader of the Bolshevik party. Josef Bukharin’s conversion to the right and to the N.E.P in 1921 was dramatic. Having been a key supporter of War Communism, he now led the right of the party in its support for Lenin’s N.E.P. Lenin in fact described him as “The most valuable member of the party” in his testament, although he stated his views contained too much enthusiasm for peasant profits and capitalism also. This was seen as un-Marxist, and he was forced to withdraw an article, which declared that the peasants should “Enrich yourselves”. Bukharin had been very close friends with Stalin, and didn’t expect him to reverse his support for N.E.P in 1928. Bukharin therefore, I believe, was an easier opponent for Stalin when he decided to introduce his Five Year Plan and Collectivisation of Agriculture in 1928-33, and Stalin’s defeat of the right was made easier because of Bukharin’s lack of power base within the party as Stalin, since being General Secretary, had created a firm one for himself. Bukharin was never the opponent the Trotsky was as he failed to come up with a successful plan to counter the arguments of super-industrialises. As a result he never really proved his abilities to his colleagues.
Two politburo members who Stalin used as ‘rightist allies’ to block Trotsky were Kamenev and Zinoviev. They both initially supported N.E.P and attacked Trotsky’s views. A bitter feud raged between Kamenev and Trotsky in two books; Trotsky’s ‘Lessons of October’ where he criticised their voting against revolution in October 1917 and Kamenev’s ‘Lenin or Trotsky’ where Trotsky was criticised for his Menshevism. This certainly aided Stalin as he attempted to outmanoeuvre Trotsky in the politburo.
In 1925, due to worried over the slow recovery of the Russian economy, Kamenev and Zinoviev declared the socialism in Russia would be impossible without similar revolutions in the capitalist nations of the west. Zinoviev called for an end to N.E.P and greater restrictions on the peasants and enforced industrialisation. This became known as ‘New Opposition’ and the similarities between this and Trotskyism were obvious. Therefore it was no surprise when Trotsky joined Kamenev and Zinoviev in 1926 in a ‘Trotskyite-Kamenevite-Zinovievite’ opposition bloc. This was Stalin’s greatest test and he knew overcoming it would almost ensure power. In response, Stalin mobilised the right against the ‘New Opposition’ in order to defeat the bloc in a serious of key votes. Kamenev and Zinoviev were dismissed subsequently as Soviet Chairmen, and replaced with the Pro-Stalinists Molotov from Moscow and Kirov from Leningrad. Stalin had eradicated his arguably 3 biggest opponents and to solidify his power, Trotsky was expelled from both the politburo and the central committee. Even with attempts to rally support against Stalin in 1927, Trotsky was expelled from the party in 1927. His internal exile was followed in 1929 by a total exile from the U.S.S.R. This was crucial to Stalin as his major opponent was gone. Lynch states; “Stalin’s victory over Trotsky was not a question of ability or principle. Stalin won because Trotsky lacked a power base”.
The left were effectively destroyed after Trotsky’s exile and thus the right remained the block between Stalin and absolute power. The right now consisted of Rykov (Chairman of the Central Committee), Tomsky (Leader of the Trade Unions), and Bukharin (Editor of Pravda and leading economic theorist). Politically speaking, these former loyal supporters were by no means as threatening as the Trotskyite left had been. They were primarily removed because they stood in the way of Stalin’s industrial policy in 1928. Stalin “beat” Trotsky as it were due to support effectively but Stalin didn't have Trotsky’s politically astute mind. Thus Stalin began to use Trotsky’s ideas and no more so that collectivism. Stalin’s decision to move towards collectivisation has been seen by many historians as political opportunism rather than the result of any great economic theory or conviction. Others see his conversion as the result of serious grain shortages, which threatened the nation in 1928. Stalin however, had made sure that he appeared moderate on economic matters in the early 1920s in order to make his opponents appear more extreme. Here his tactics cannot be faulted. Having defeated the left, he saw no reason not to adopt their policies, the brainchild of Trotsky, and pursue collectivisation from 1928 onwards. The right and Bukharin in particular had become increasingly convinced that to accelerate the industrialisation of Russia by greater state control was wrong. They believed that it was better to allow industry to grow naturally and slowly, under the theory that the state should assist but not direct. The right agreed that the peasants were the ones who would provide the necessary capital for a socialist society to the sale of their grain abroad. Bukharin argued this case in the politburo and at the Party Congress in 1928. He proceeded to criticize Stalin for his aggressive policy of State grain procurement, via fixed quotes on the peasants, as counter productive. He completed his attacks by reminding the party that Stalin was pursuing the very same policy that Trotsky had been advocating. However this neither halted Stalin’s progress nor harm his support.
War was on the agenda in Russia and the economic policies of Bukharin’s right seemed impractical. The approach to the peasantry was viwed as a sign of weakness and weakness is the worse thing to be described as at a time of war. Due to this, Stalin was able to skilfully exploit the patriotic feelings of the Russian people. He knew that the party members were far more likely to support a return to the hard line policies of the Civil War during the period than to listen to the arguments of the right. These ideological weaknesses are matched by the right’s weakness in terms of their position within the Party structure. Stalin also held the power to the party and thus the right never were given a free hearing just as Stalin’s enemies were not when he was party secretary. Trade Unions were the only hope of Stalin’s oppositions yet Stalin still acted decisively against them. He sent the ruthless Politburo member Kaganovich, to undertake a purge against the suspect Trade Unionists. He also sent Molotov to carry out similar actions against the Moscow CPSU using loyal Party officials within its structure. As a result of this, by early 1929, Tomsky was no longer Trade Union Leader, Uglanov had been replaced in Moscow, Rykov had been superseded as premier by Molotov and Bukharin had been voted out as chairman of the Commintern and lost his place in the Politburo. They were in effect “dropping like flies” and Stalin wasn’t having to work too hard for power. The gulf was never that wide between the left and right but Stalin exploited what little gap there was well.
Overall I feel that none of Stalin’s opposition from the left or the right had the confidence or the conviction to actually seriously challenge Stalin for the right to become Bolshevik leader, and as MaCauley states: “Stalin was greatly assisted by the inept tactics of his opponents.”