'In the context of the period 1715-1815 to what extent were economic factors the cause of the French Revolution?'

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Jack Harrison

In the context of the period 1715-1815, to what extent were economic factors the cause of the French Revolution?

        The French Revolution came to a head in 1789, because of the ongoing socio-economic conflict between the French government, nobility and the ‘Third Estate’. However, it is debated amongst historians about what was the main cause of the French Revolution. One reason for this is that the ‘Third Estate’, held responsible for the Revolution, was made up of such a wide variety of social groups: peasants, industrial city workers and a rising bourgeoisie, throughout the period from 1715, all of whom had separate grievances and desired different outcomes from the Revolution. Some of these complaints were economic, but others social and political. The peasants were in desperate plight following famines and food shortages in the 1780s, industrial workers were fighting the problems of economic turbulence affecting their wages and the bourgeoisie were dependent on the economic climate and the ability to trade their outputs with foreign nations. This meant that there were a wealth of motives and the ‘Revolution’ took hold in such a variety of different ways that there are many different perspectives from which one can assess whether the economy, or another factor, was the principle cause of the Revolution.

The opinion of many historians, such as the renowned French economist and historian Florin Aftalion, is that the financial crisis, and consequently, the economic crash, that occurred during the 1780s, are crucial to explaining why there was a Revolution in 1789. However, the decline of financial stability in France had begun far earlier than this, suggesting that in fact the economy was even more deeply responsible for the Revolution. Indeed, the origins can be traced all the way back to the reign of Louis XIV. Louis had spent most of the crown’s wealth on fighting near-constant wars in the Netherlands and Low Countries, culminating in the War of Spanish Succession. This conflict, lasting until 1714, combined with Louis’ high spending on the Palace of Versailles, led to a legacy upon his death in 1715 of high debt and low production. High military outgoings, coupled with a great famine in 1709-10, left France, as Fénelon remarked, as ‘just one great desolate hospital lacking provisions’. Though France had become a major world power during the reign of Louis XIV, it was now engaged in a heavy competition to beat off rivalry from the growing influences of Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain. The naval rivalry with Great Britain in particular led to a financially draining arms race, as France sought to protect its overseas territories and trade routes. In the period 1750-1789, France fought another two major wars, the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and played a major role in the American War of Independence. Aside from the ideas of liberty and democracy that this brought into France, fighting such a war so far away from home cost France 1066 million livres, and though Britain were defeated, their military force and empire lived on. In reality, France had gained little in a conflict that had crippled the crown’s treasury.

        In order to cope with the mounting Crown debt (the interest alone had reached 318 million livres in 1788), Louis XVI needed to drastically cut government spending and reform the tax structure. However, a representative body was needed in order to do this, but the Assembly of Notables in 1787, then the Estates-General in 1789, both blocked the reforms of Louis’ finance ministers Fleury and Calonne. This both increased opposition to the Crown and its ‘unpopular’ reforms and forced Louis to declare the suspension of all payments from the Royal Treasury, effectively declaring the Crown bankrupt. This severely weakened the Crown’s political standing, increased opposition and cast doubt upon Louis’ suitability as a Head of State and Government.

        Unfortunately for Louis, this financial crisis led to a huge economic collapse in France. Confidence in the treasury was severely undermined, lending ground to a halt and as a result, many businesses and industries had to make huge cuts or cease operation. The agricultural sector, which had grown steadily since 1730, underwent a series of terrible harvests in 1778-79, 1781-82 and 1785-7. This was followed by a major famine in 1788, which caused a monumental increase in grain prices. By the end of 1788, the average peasant was spending 88% of his wages on bread. These occurences led to a decrease of 50% in industrial production, mass unemployment and widespread food shortages. These soon turned violent, contributing both to the politicalisation of the Third Estate and the growing displays of discontent, culminating with the Storming of the Bastille on 14th July 1789. As well as this violence being a catalyst of the Revolution in itself, the financial troubles of the 1780s negatively impacted the monarchy because it exposed the weaknesses of the Crown’s position, undermining the autocracy. Louis was incapable of controlling the Crown treasury and French economy, and was unable to get any of his financial reforms past opposition in the nobility and Third Estate. This showed a growing willingness of French politicians to stand against the King, and an increased success for those who did, essentially tying the King’s hands, and in the short term contributing very significantly to the spread and success of the Revolution.

These economic factors were later developed by some historians to fit the Marxist theory. Marxist historians have stressed the importance of the economy as a major factor in the outbreak of the French Revolution but look beyond merely economic factors, into the wider social background of eighteenth-century France. These historians see the revolution as part of the ongoing class struggle in French society and the eventual triumph of the working classes over the autocratic ruler; the dominant position amongst historians during the twentieth century. Georges Lefebvre most clearly expressed this view in his work ‘Les Paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution française’ (‘The Peasants of the North During the French Revolution’), where he described the Revolution as a ‘bourgeois revolution’. His argument was that, during the eighteenth century, whilst the aristocracy and absolutism was going through steady decline, the industrial classes of the French bourgeoisie were growing in number and the peasants in strength. However, the aristocracy’s determination to keep the lower classes out of the privileged positions created a class struggle, with the bourgeoisie fighting for the equal rights that the enlightenment theorists had set out several decades before. This interpretation concurs with the evidence that the aristocracy and even the monarchy was often suppressive, sometimes tyrannical, towards the lower classes. The King and his government were unpopular with the people for a number of reasons. Firstly, Louis’ XVI’s wife, Marie Antoinette, was resented by a large proportion of the French population for her Austrian heritage, extravagent behaviour, and unsympathetic attitude to the plight of the lower classes, indicated by such actions as the ‘March of the Women on Versailles’ demonstrating the mob’s hatred of her. The King chose to implement his authority over the country through his 36 intendents. Many of them were highly unpopular for their authoritarian natures and the unfairness of the system which they operated, taxing the Third Estate heavily and reaping all the profits. The King had an important opportunity to redeem his government’s falling reputation in 1789, when he made the decision to call the Estates-General to attempt to reform the finance system. Much of the Third Estate saw this as a positive move, with a powerful body in which they enjoyed double-representation having the opportunity to give them a voice and lessen their burden. Many others saw it as an opportunity to gain political power for themselves. However, it soon became clear that the clergy and nobility were still not interested in ceding any of their own influence, and all voting was organised such that each Estate had one vote. Thus, the numerical advantage the King had seemingly given the Third Estate did not exist in practice. Very quickly, the Estates-General lost the support of the Third Estate, and with it went any last hope, Marxists argue, of a peaceful end to Louis’ troubles. In addition, the system of government was woefully organised: some provinces were vast, others small, some parlements presided over large areas, and some held power in just one small province. There was also no national co-operative of the ruling bodies of the provinces. Good evidence to argue the impact of this can be found in France under Napoleon, who made it one of his very first priorities to completey overhaul the administration system in France, as he saw how it had hindered the ancien régime. The Napoleonic system of administration still exists in France today, showing just how much of an advantage a successful system of government could have been to Louis XVI.

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However, not all historians would agree with this view. Revisionists began altering the interpretations of Lefebvre in the 1960s, disagreeing with Lefebvre’s vision of a ‘social revolution’. Alfred Cobban was one of the first people to disagree with the widely accepted Marxist view, arguing that, actually, the revolution was not instigated or led by the ‘proletariat’ at all. There is fair evidence to back up this theory. Revisionists argue that the universally-regarded ‘leaders’ of the Revolution, Hébert and Robespierre particularly, were themselves above the lower classes and merely used the sans-culottes as a convenient base of support, rather than the ...

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